Uparivanje lekara i bolnica primenom Gejl-Šejplijevog algoritma
ABSTRACT: In this paper, we present the review of the application of the deferred acceptance algo- rithm on matching doctors and hospitals. The standard version of this algorithm must be modified to enable stable matching, bearing in mind the peculiarities of this market. There is an incentive for hospitals to manipulate with their capacities in the algorithm, in order to obtain the preferred set of doctors, but this incentive diminishes with the size of the market. The algorithm can not be adjusted to increase the number of doctors that would do the internship in small towns. Still, this objective can be achieved by introduc- ing regional quotas and by adjusting the algorithm to the presence of quotas.
APSTRAKT: U ovom radu prikazujemo mogućnost primene algoritma odloženog prihvatanja na upa- rivanje lekara-stažista i bolnica. Standardna verzija ovog algoritma mora da bude mo- difikovana da bi obezbedila da stabilno uparivanje postoji na ovim tržištima, imajući u vidu specifičnost uparivanja lekara i bolnica. U algoritmu postoji podsticaj za bolnice da umanjuju kapacitet, da bi bile uparene sa preferiranim skupom lekara, ali se ovaj pod- sticaj umanjuje sa povećanjem veličine tržišta. Algoritam nije moguće prilagoditi tako da poveća broj lekara koji bi stažirali u malim mestima, ali je taj cilj moguće ostvariti uz uvođenje regionalnih kvota i prilagođavanje algoritma uparivanja.
srpski
2020
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KLJUČNE REČI: GEJL-ŠEJPLIJEV ALGORITAM, STABILNO UPARIVANJE, MANIPULACIJE KAPACITETIMA, REGIO- NALNE KVOTE
KEYWORDS: GALE-SHAPELY ALGORITHM, STABLE MATCHING, CAPACITY MANIPULATION, REGIONAL QUOTAS