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СВЕСКА 2

НАУКА БЕЗ ГРАНИЦА III МЕЂУНАРОДНИ ТЕМАТСКИ ЗБОРНИК

СВЕСКА 2

Језик и језици

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НАУКА БЕЗ ГРАНИЦА III



КОСОВСКА МИТРОВИЦА
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НАУКА БЕЗ ГРАНИЦА III
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УНИВЕРЗИТЕТ У ПРИШТИНИ
ФИЛОЗОФСКИ ФАКУЛТЕТ

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2. ЈЕЗИК И ЈЕЗИЦИ**

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Међународни тематски зборник *Наука без граница III* резултат је научноистраживачких пројеката *Превод у систему компаративних изучавања националне и стране књижевности и културе* (ОИ 178019) и *Косово и Метохија између националне идентитетске и евроинтеграција* (III 47023), које финансира Министарство просвете, науке и технолошког развоја Републике Србије.

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УВОДНА РЕЧ

У другој свесци Међународног тематског зборника *Наука без граница 3* садржани су одабрани радови из лингвистике, а ауторе ових радова чине универзитетски наставници и сарадници из земље и иностранства, научници Института за српски језик Српске академије наука и уметности, те неколико докторанада који, судећи по приказаним резултатима свог рада, заузимају добар правац кретања на пољу научноистраживачког делања.

Именована као „Језик и језици“, свеска обухвата 17 текстова. Разуђеност тематике која се у њима обрађује, приступа у њеном расветљавању и примењених методолошких поступака још један је одраз и изразите комплексности природе испитиваног језичког феномена, и изразите ширине науке која се њиме бави. Већи број садржаних радова извештава о резултатима дијалектолошких истраживања српског језичког простора. Дијалекатски језички материјал, забележен на терену од стране самих аутора или ексцерпиран из речничких или књижевних извора, подвргава се аналитичким поступцима на различитим нивоима језичке структуре. У радовима се, између осталог, пописују, анализирају и упоређују поједине фонетске, морфолошке и лексичке особености (косовско-ресавских) говора села Синаја у северној Метохији и села Мала Косаница у околини Куршумлије; указује на најмаркантније структуралне црте у говору села Добраве у лепосавићкој околини као месту додира косовско-ресавског и зетско-сјеничког дијалекта; даје инвентар и распоред назива за типове куће и њене делове из шест говора са српског етнокултурног и језичког простора (Војводина, Лијевач поље и Жупа, Бањани, северна Метохија, Ваљевска Подгорина, Ровца); спроводе лексичко-семантичке анализе кулинарске лексике у говору јабланичког краја, назива за сточно звоно у призренско-тимочким говорима југоисточне Србије, те лексема карактеристичних за пљеваљски крај које се односе на женске одевне предмете; представља когнитивно-семантичка и лингвокултуролошка анализа лексичко-семантичког поља *болесѝ* у српском призренском говору; врши класификација и испитује функција дијалектизама у роману *Ткачи средра* косовскометохијске књижевнице Леле Марковић. Осим тога, попис и лексичко-семантичка анализа личних имена и презимена мештана села Корман, који су такође нашли своје место у овом зборнику, дају знатан допринос српској антропонимији имајући у виду да ономастика зоне Алексиначког Поморавља у којој је поменуто село смештено до сада није завређивала пажњу лингвиста.

У другој свесци налазе се и радови из других области језичких проучавања попут фразеологије, семантике, прагматике, контактне лингвистике, те

група радова која се бави процесом учења језика и неговања језичке културе. У њој се, прецизније речено, представља анализа значења српских фразеологизама који у свом саставу садрже лексему *ййица* или називе за различите врсте птица; испитивање семантичких и прагматичких корелација између главних парадигматских лексичких односа (синонимије, антонимије, хипонимије, инкомпатибилности) и (међу)реченичних односа (семантичке импликације, имплицатуре, еквиваленције, контрарности и контрадикције); поређење категорија појединих именица средњег рода у српском језику као наследном и немачком језику као доминантном; контрастивна анализа садржаја наставних програма за основну школу (предметно подручје *Језик*) у Републици Србији и Републици Црној Гори са циљем да се утврди однос поменутих друштвених заједница према планирању наставе матерњег језика у основној школи; указивање на могућности неформалног (неинституционалног) бављења језичком културом на интернету с циљем њене популаризације у научно-образовне сврхе и с циљем њеног изучавања за потребе лингвистичких истраживања; испитивање импликација мултимодалности и мултиписмености у процесу учења страног језика у раном животном добу; мерење ставова средњошколаца и студената према учењу енглеског језика као страног, уз примарно утврђивање компонената које чине саму структуру става и потом успостављање везе између ставова и понашања (у овом случају, постигнућа у енглеском); анализа ставова студената према енглеском језику струке, као и конкретних језичких потреба студената неопходних за успешно спровођење наставе језика и постизање дефинисаних исхода учења.

Приказани колаж и актуелност обрађених тема, постављени истраживачки циљеви, те постигнути резултати препоручују ову свеску како лингвистичкој тако и широј научној јавности.

Голуб Јашовић
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CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN LEXICAL AND INTERSENTENTIAL RELATIONS: SEMANTIC AND PRAGMATIC PERSPECTIVES

The subject of this paper are lexical and (inter)sentential relations in their mutual semantic and pragmatic relationships. The goal of the paper is to demonstrate systematic correspondences between major (paradigmatic) lexical and intersentential semantic relations and to show the usefulness of understanding these correspondences for understanding of the said relations. The considered lexical relations include synonymy, antonymy, hyponymy, and incompatibility, while the observed intersentential relations include entailment, implicature, equivalence, contrariety, and contradiction. The methodology applied in the paper is based on selective literature synthesis. Some shortcomings in semantics literature that the present paper addresses are somewhat obscure correlation between lexical and intersentential relations and fairly vague definitions and scope of lexical relations, resulting in dubious apprehension of their relationships. Seen from the perspective of sense inclusion/exclusion, the examined paradigmatic lexical semantic relations are shown to belong to two types, hyponymy and incompatibility. On the sentential level, (lexical) hyponymy largely corresponds to entailment (semantic implication); synonymy to equivalence (bilateral implication); incompatibility (including gradable antonymy) to contrariety; and complementarity to contradiction. Analogously to semantic plane, it is shown that correspondence could be established between (for the lack of possibly better term) pragmatic hyponymy and lexically induced implicature, or more specifically between pragmatic synonymy and bilateral implicature.

Keywords: lexical relations; intersentential relations; logical semantics; implicature; pragmatic hyponymy.

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INTRODUCTION

Lexical and (inter)sentential relations in their mutual semantic and pragmatic relationships are the subject of this paper. The goal of the paper is to demonstrate systematic correspondences between major (paradigmatic) lexical and intersentential semantic relations and to show the usefulness of understanding these correspondences for understanding of the said relations (especially the lexical ones). First, a brief overview of these relations is provided, starting from definitions and scope of the major paradigmatic lexical semantic relations, including synonymy, antonymy, hyponymy, and incompatibility. Therein, I shall speak of sense relations, rather than of relations that hold between the (whole) lexemes. In a similar way, I shall look through the main intersentential logico-semantic relations (specifically entailment, equivalence, contrariety and contradiction), also taking into account pragmatic relations, namely implicature. The lexical-sentential correspondences and their treatment in literature are then considered and discussed, shedding light back to the definitions and relationship of the examined lexical relations.

The hypothesis undertaken is that intersentential relations largely mimic lexical ones on both semantic and pragmatic planes, with the respect to the fundamental difference in complexity between lexical and sentential levels. Some shortcomings in semantics literature that this paper addresses are somewhat obscure correlation between lexical and intersentential relations and fairly vague definitions and scope of lexical relations, resulting in dubious apprehension of their relationships. In theoretical approach I particularly draw upon structural semantics (Cruse, 1986; Leech, 1981; Lyons, 1968; 1977; 1995), logical semantics (Cann, 1993; Löbner, 2002) and inferential pragmatics (Grice, 1989; Horn 1989; 2004; Huang, 2007; 2017; Levinson, 1983; 2000).

METHODOLOGY

The methodology applied in the paper is based on a selective literature synthesis. The subject key words and phrases are combined in academic database search (mostly the exact terms are used, put in quotes, e.g. “hyponymy”, “synonymy”, “equivalence”/“paraphrase”, “implicature”, and the like) in order to find studies that address the relationships among sense relations, as well as those between them and intersentential relations. While the treatment of these relations was the main criterion for taking studies into consideration, authoritative semantic and linguistic works are also consulted in examining the definitions and scope of the subject semantic relations, particularly the lexical ones, and in con-

structuring a synthetic view. The conducted synthesis is organized thematically, around the examined semantic relations and their correlations.

LEXICAL SENSE RELATIONS

An influential definition of word sense adheres to the structural semantic tradition, where “the sense of a word is the sum total of its sense relations with other words in the language” (Cruse, 2006, 163). In accordance with the aim of the paper, word sense is better understood in terms of *intension* – “the set of defining properties which determines the applicability of a term” (Crystal, 2008, p. 248; Lyons, 1977, pp. 158–159). It contrasts with *denotation* or *extension*, which links a word sense to the entity or class of entities to which the word is correctly applied (Crystal, 2008, p. 181; Lyons, 1977, p. 158). The relation between word form, sense (intension) and denotation (extension) can be simplistically represented by a triangle of the Ogden–Richards (1946) type, where a word relates to its extension indirectly (hence the broken line between), via its intension, which itself evokes the word form while referring to the extension (Figure 1; a more comprehensive model in scholastic grammarian tradition is given by Allan, 1986/2014).




FIGURE 1. SEMIOTIC (OR SEMANTIC) TRIANGLE. [СЕМИОТИЧКИ (ИЛИ СЕМАНТИЧКИ) ТРОУГАО.]

Synonymy and antonymy, and, somewhat more rarely, hyponymy and incompatibility are most usually mentioned as paradigmatic sense relations between lexemes. Synonymy is commonly seen as identity/similarity of meaning, while antonymy is traditionally associated with oppositeness. For example, Crystal (2008) writes that “lexical items which have the same meanings are synonyms” (p. 470), and Cruse (2006) notes that “a word is said to be a synonym of another word in the same language if one or more of its senses bears a sufficiently close similarity to one or more of the senses of the other word” (p. 176). The identity of meaning, i.e. interchangeability of lexemes in all contexts (with the identical connotations), is proven to be extremely rarely encountered, while similarity as a criterion raises the question of what “a sufficiently close similarity” is, and how

it is measured. Hence, synonymy is usually restricted to equivalence of denotative (descriptive, conceptual, cognitive, propositional) meaning, as opposed to connotative (affective, associative, expressive) meaning (see Leech, 1981; Lyons, 1977; Cruse, 1986).

Establishing the scope of antonymy is not any less controversial. The term is used in a narrow sense of ‘gradable opposites’ (“classical” antonymy, e.g. *fast/slow*; see Lyons, 1977), but also as an equivalent of *opposites* (*contraries*) in general, which are usually said to include (see Murphy, 2006, p. 314) – in addition to gradable opposites – complementaries (smoker/non-smoker) and directional opposites (conversives, e.g. *parent/child*, or reversives, e.g. *pack/unpack*). Therein, “it is a matter of controversy how many types of opposites one should usefully recognize in semantic analysis” (Crystal, 2008, p. 29). There are, for instance, so-called gradable complementaries, e.g. (more or less) *honest/dishonest*, which seem to “lie between complementarity and contrariety” (Murphy, 2006, p. 315).

According to John Lyons (1968), “hyponymy and incompatibility are the most fundamental paradigmatic relations of sense in terms of which the vocabulary is structured” (p. 453). Hyponymy is usually accounted for in terms of inclusion, and incompatibility is explained in terms of exclusion. From the extensional perspective, a more general lexical item, the hypernym, includes a more specific one, the hyponym, because the extension of the latter is a part of the extension of former (the set of animals includes the set of dogs). It is the opposite case from the intensional perspective: the sense of the hyponym includes that of the hypernym plus one or more differential features (the sense of the word *dog* includes that of the word *animal*) (see Cruse, 2006, p. 81). Hyponyms of the same hypernym, called *co-hyponyms*, can be compatible or incompatible. Compatible *co-hyponyms* denote sets that have common elements, like *queen* and *mother*, *co-hyponyms* of *woman*, because one can simultaneously be both a queen and a mother (Cruse, 2000, p. 166). Conversely, incompatible *co-hyponyms* denote sets (also called *contrast sets*) that do not have any common elements, i.e. are mutually exclusive, like *dog*, *cat* and *mouse*, *co-hyponyms* of *animal* (or, more directly, *mammal*), because one cannot at the same time be a *dog* and a *cat*, or a *mouse* (Cruse, 2000, p. 165).

Figure 2 shows a simplified perspective of the interrelation between hyponymy, synonymy and antonymy. Exemplified by the semantic field of size, hyponymy is represented as an overarching relation, with *size* being the hypernym. In a synonymy (or near-synonymy) relation, one synonym usually has a more general (wider) sense or more senses than the other(s) (e.g. *big* has more general use than *large*, which is more general than *huge*; it is analogous for *little*, *small* and *tiny*). In that respect, it could be regarded as a relation of inclusion, so that the more general synonyms could be seen as hypernyms, and, in return, the more specific synonyms as their hyponyms, sometimes forming a hyponymy hierar-

chy (e.g. *huge* can be seen as a hyponym of *large*, which itself can be regarded a hyponym of *big*). The scope of *size* is partially covered by antonymic pairs such as *big/large/huge* : *little/small/tiny* (partially, of course, because there is something in between, something neither *big* nor *little*). The triangular-like scale in Figure 2 reflects the extent to which the antonym pairs cover the (literal and figurative) scope of *size*, which corresponds to the aforesaid hyponymy hierarchy. *Huge/tiny*, for example, are implicit superlatives (Cruse, 1986, p. 216) and, thus, cover less extent than *large/small*, while *big/little* cover about the same literal extent as *large/small*, but extend further into the metaphorical meaning of *size* (e.g. *She is a big Hollywood star.*). In this light, synonyms can also be seen as compatible co-hyponyms, and antonyms as incompatible co-hyponyms.




FIGURE 2. LEXICAL SEMANTIC RELATIONS. [ЛЕКСИЧКИ СЕМАТИЧКИ ОДНОСИ.]

LOGICAL SEMANTIC RELATIONS BETWEEN SENTENCES




FIGURE 3. SENTENTIAL SEMIOTIC (OR SEMANTIC) TRIANGLE.

[РЕЧЕНИЧНИ СЕМИОТИЧКИ (ИЛИ СЕМАТИЧКИ) ТРОУГАО.]

The original semiotic/semantic triangle could be applied to sentences (Löbner, 2002, p. 26; Nirenburg & Raskin, 2004, pp. 100–101), as in Figure 3. Most often, sentence intension (sense) is equalled with *proposition*, which is usually taken to be declarative-sentence meaning (see e.g. Bussmann, 1996, pp. 959–960), while

sentence extension (denotation) is understood as its *truth value*, which varies from one possible world to another (see Frege, 1948; Carnap, 1947/1988).

As Cann (1993) notes, “the logical meaning relations of entailment, paraphrase and contradiction are discussed mainly in textbooks on logic” (p. 25), at least until close to the end of the previous century.

Entailment (logical/semantic implication²) is a relation between propositions such that the truth of one of them (Q) follows from the truth of the other (P) logically inescapably and context-independently ($P \rightarrow Q$). *Equivalence (paraphrase)* is the case of mutual (symmetrical, bilateral) entailment between the two propositions (each one entails the other), i.e. $(P \rightarrow Q) \& (Q \rightarrow P)$, or, in other words, the case of the same proposition (i.e. propositional/denotative meaning), i.e. $P \leftrightarrow Q$ or $P \equiv Q$. Equivalence is, thus, a special, extreme case of entailment, as entailment is typically an asymmetrical relation. *Contrariety* is also based on entailment – contrary propositions entail negation of each other, i.e. $(P \rightarrow \sim Q) \& (Q \rightarrow \sim P)$. In cases of *contradiction*, not only that one proposition entails the negation of the other, but, at the same time, the negation of one entails the other: $(P \rightarrow \sim Q) \& (\sim P \rightarrow Q)$. Of course, truth values of propositions can be independent of one another (e.g. Cruse, 2000, p. 31). Because equivalence, contrariety and contradiction are based on entailment, they hold without exceptions (see example [1]).

[1]

- Entailment: It is a mouse. – It is a rodent.
- Equivalence: She is not religious. – She is irreligious.
- Contrariety: It is fast. – It is slow.
- Contradiction: She is religious. – She is irreligious.
- Independence: This is a mouse. – That is a rabbit.

The term *contradiction* is also used for “propositions that are necessarily false by virtue of their logical form” (Lyons, 1995, p. 149), in opposition to *tautologies*, which are propositions always true by the same virtue (see also e.g. Leech, 1981, p. 5; Saeed, 2016, p. 85). Note that example [2a] is a compound tautological proposition because it is a *disjunction* of two simple propositions in a contradictory relation (the first being *it is raining*, and the second *it is not raining*; obviously something cannot simultaneously be and not be happening). Inherently, there are only two possibilities for truth-value relation between contradictory propositions, as shown in Table 1: one (P) can be true and the other false (Q), or the other way round (they cannot simultaneously be true and false). Either way, their dis-

2 For a concise overview of somewhat different uses of the term entailment/implication, see e.g. Bussmann, 1996, p. 543–544.

junction is true (which constitutes a tautology).³ In contrast, example [2b] is a compound contradictory proposition because it is a *conjunction* of the same two simple propositions in the contradictory relation. Both truth-value possibilities for these contradictories yield the truth value *false* for their conjunction (in other words, a contradiction in the sense discussed, as shown in Table 2).⁴

[2]

- a. Either it is raining or it is not raining.
- b. It is raining and it is not raining.

ТАБЕЛА 1: DISJUNCTION OF PROPOSITIONS [ДИСЈУНКЦИЈА ПРОПОЗИЦИЈА]

P	Q	$P \oplus Q$
T	F	T
F	T	T

ТАБЕЛА 2: CONJUNCTION OF PROPOSITIONS [КОНЈУНКЦИЈА ПРОПОЗИЦИЈА]

P	Q	$P \wedge Q$
T	F	F
F	T	F

So far, I have been discussing context-independent semantic relations. Involving context into his account of implicit meaning, Grice (1989) bases his concept of *conversational implicature* on his *cooperative principle*, which is grounded on the assumption that communicators normally cooperate in the process of communicating, in terms of quality (truthfulness), quantity (informativeness), manner (clarity/style) and relevance of the information presentation. Levinson (2000) elaborated the original Gricean principle (excluding its quality subprinciple) into the Q(uality)-, I(nformativeness)- and M(anner)-principles. These principles could be simplified as follows (Levinson, 2000, pp. 35–37, 136):

- 3 The disjunction in [2a] is of the exclusive type (which is symbolized here by \oplus , in contrast to the inclusive disjunction symbol \vee), so it is false if the disjuncts are both true or are both false, which is impossible in the case of the two contradictory propositions in [2a]. If the operator *either* were left out, the disjunction would be inclusive, and again tautological, since its theoretical false value would require both disjuncts to be false. It is worth noting that the exclusive disjunction is the negation of equivalence ($\sim(P \leftrightarrow Q)$).
- 4 Again, in general, a conjunction is true only if both conjuncts are true, which is also impossible in the case of the two contradictory propositions in [2b].

- Q-principle: What isn't said is not the case (see [3a]);
- I-principle: What is expressed simply is stereotypically exemplified (3b);
- M-principle: Marked messages indicate marked situations (3c).

[3]

- a. Three guys came in. Q+> Exactly three guys (not more) came in.
- b. She doesn't drink. I+> She doesn't drink alcoholic drinks.
- c. The corners of his lips turned slightly upward. M+> He didn't exactly smile.

[4]

A: Where's Peter?

B: The light in his office is on. (+> Peter is in his office.)

In example [3] the symbol +> means 'implicates', as used by Levinson (1983). Levinson (2000) develops the theory of Q-, I- and M-implicatures as instances of the so-called generalized conversational implicature (Grice, 1989). Generalized conversational implicature (GCI) arises through the use of certain expressions in normal, usual circumstances, in contrast to particularized conversational implicature (PCI; see Grice, 1989), which require particular contextual situations (as in example [4], from Huang, 2007, where the implicature critically depends on the context). Because of their association with certain forms of words, generalized conversational implicature, although in principle tied to certain (common or specific) contextual situations, are close to Grice's *conventional implicature* (sometimes called *semantic implicature*), which arises from (conventional) linguistic meanings of particular words and grammatical structures (e.g. *but* conventionally implicates contrast between the connected propositions). While Grice's concept of (conversational) implicature seems to be well accepted by scholars, his introduction of generalized and particularized implicature, as well as conventional implicature, has been subject to some controversy (see Bach, 1994; 1999; Sperber & Wilson, 1995). Grice's (1989) "total signification of an utterance" could for the most part be represented as in Figure 4.




FIGURE 4. GRICE'S TAXONOMY OF SIGNIFICATION. FROM *PRESUMPTIVE MEANINGS: THE THEORY OF GENERALIZED CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE* (p. 13), BY S. LEVINSON, 2000, CAMBRIDGE, MA: MIT PRESS.

PARALLELS BETWEEN LEXICAL AND INTERSENTENTIAL RELATIONS

Semantic plane

As the examples above suggest, there is a striking correspondence between lexical and sentential semantic relations. This correspondence is scarcely explicitly and thoroughly stated, the closest to which I have found in a semantics workbook (Gregory, 2000, p. 27, from which example [5] is taken), which notes the parallel, with the subset relation (\subseteq) corresponding to entailment/implication (\rightarrow). Therein, gradable oppositeness is called *antonymy i*, complementarity *antonymy ii*, and contrariety simply *incompatibility*.

[5]

Hyponymy	$A \subseteq B$	Implication $P \rightarrow Q$
Synonymy	$A \subseteq B$ and $B \subseteq A$	Paraphrase $(P \rightarrow Q) \wedge (Q \rightarrow P)$
Antonymy i	$A \subseteq \sim B$ and $B \subseteq \sim A$	Incompatibility $(P \rightarrow \sim Q) \wedge (Q \rightarrow \sim P)$
Antonymy ii	$A = \sim B$	Contradiction $P \equiv \sim Q$

Still, the correspondence between hyponymy as relation of inclusion and entailment as logical consequence does not always hold (see e.g. Cruse 2000, p. 151), and consequently the same goes for other correspondences presented in [5].

A similar overview is given by Löbner (2002, p. 77), though he speaks of *logical relations* between words (equivalence, subordination, incompatibility, complementarity), analogous to, but different from what he calls *meaning relations* (e.g.

synonymy or hyponymy). Also somewhat similarly, Allan (1986/2014) speaks of semantic relations between “language expressions” (p. 174), including synonymy, hyponymy and antonymy, and treats them (essentially) as relations between propositions. Thus, synonymy is defined as symmetric semantic implication (equivalence) between propositions, hyponymy is defined in terms of asymmetric semantic implication (entailment), and antonymy as relation holding between a proposition and its negation.

Elsewhere, sentential/propositional relations are correlated to lexical semantic relations in terms of diagnostic for the latter’s identification. E.g. Cruse (1986) notes regarding:

(a) hyponymy that “X will be said to be a hyponym of if A is $f(X)$ entails but is not entailed by A is $f(Y)$ ” (pp. 88–89);

(b) (cognitive) synonymy between X and Y that “any grammatical declarative sentence S containing X has equivalent truth-conditions to another sentence S_1 , which is identical to S except that X is replaced by Y” (p. 88);

(c) antonymy that “a statement containing one member of an antonym pair stands in a relation of contrariety with the parallel statement containing the other term” (p. 204).

Thus, if hyponymy is defined in terms of entailment, synonymy, as Lyons (1995) points out, “may be defined in terms of symmetrical hyponymy” (p. 127; see Lyons, 1968, p. 455), i.e. symmetrical entailment or equivalence (this is what he terms *descriptive synonymy*, i.e. identity of purely descriptive meaning).

Both antonymy and the lexical relation of incompatibility are defined in terms of contrariety (Cruse, 1986; Lyons 1968; see also Löbner, 2002), i.e. the intersentential relation of incompatibility, as referred to in [5], or “entailment and negation”, as Lyons (1995) puts it (p. 128). Lyons (1968; 1995) sees complementarity as a special case of incompatibility, which allows only for two-member lexical sets. On the other hand, Cruse (1986) points out that complementarity, similarly to gradable antonymy, is “to some extent a matter of degree”, and speaks of “a continuum between contradiction and contrariety”, with the “intermediate points along this continuum” being “occupied by cases for which intermediate values are to a greater or lesser degree unexpected, or difficult to conceive of” (pp. 200–201). Examples that he suggests include the “typical” complementaries *male* and *female*, given “the existence of hermaphrodites and animals of totally indeterminate sex”, as well as the complementaries *dead* and *alive*, with modalities represented by *ghosts* and *vampires* (p. 201). While Cruse’s challenging of binary exclusiveness of complementaries is sound (see also Brinton, 2000, for more examples), the examples given strike as dubious or oversimplified, because they assume two poles and variants that fall between them, which is “a matter of de-

gree". They imply that sex modalities can simply be defined in terms of degree of maleness/femaleness, and that the mythical undead creatures (such as vampires) can be defined with respect to degree of "aliveness/deadness" (when in fact they may well have characteristics that neither alive nor dead creatures have). These examples seem better treated as instances of incompatibility sets, suggesting that in some cases apparent complementarity is, in fact, reduced incompatibility, which is related to the mentioned Lyons' view of complementarity as a special case of incompatibility.

But it would also seem that (gradable) antonyms, too, are special cases of incompatibility. It is suggested that these cases represent binary incompatibles (e.g. Murphy, 2006). But being of scalar nature, they involve middle ground: e.g. between *good* and *bad* we have something like *average* or *indifferent* (neither *good* nor *bad*), which indicates that *good*, *indifferent* and *bad* form an incompatibility set (note that middle member or members are not lexicalized in some cases of gradable antonymy). Hence, incompatibility (example [6a]) and its scalar subtype called antonymy (6b), are both parallel with sentential contrariety (which can hold between more than two propositions, as in [6a–b]). Complementariness as a binary case of incompatibility is parallel to contradiction as a binary case of contrariety (6c).

[6]

- a. It is a *mouse*. – It is a *rabbit*. – It is a *cat*. – It is a *dog*. – ...
- b. This is a *good*. – This is *average*. – This is *bad*.
- c. She is a *member*. – She is a *non-member*.

As expected, word senses contribute to the tautological and contradictory character of single sentences. Some examples are given in [7a–b], which illustrate tautology, and [7c–e], which represent the contradiction. In [7a] tautology is produced by equating the synonymous expressions *bachelor* and *unmarried* (i.e. equating that which is inherently equivalent; note also that, similar to example [2a], the proposition in [7a] could analogously be analysed as subsuming the two conjoined equivalent propositions *this (person) is a bachelor*, implied by *this bachelor*, and *this person is unmarried*). Tautology can also be induced by hyponymous expressions if the hyponymic predicate precedes the hypernymic one, making the latter redundant (7b). In [7c] contradiction is induced by equating the contradictory expressions *bachelor* and *married* (with the implied *this person is a bachelor* and *this person is married* correspondingly constituting a contradictory relation). But conjoining (other) incompatibles also produces contradictoriness (7d–e).

[7]

- a. This bachelor is unmarried.
- b. This bachelor is a human. / This is a bachelor and a human.
- c. This bachelor is married.
- d. This bachelor is tall and short.
- e. This mouse is a rabbit.

Pragmatic plane

Let us now include pragmatic relations and consider a possibility of a lexical sense relation that would correspond to the implicature in a way similar to that of the correlation between hyponymy and entailment. Of particular interest are so-called Q- or Horn-scales from which Q-/scalar implicatures arise. A prototypical Q-/Horn-scale can be defined as in [8] (Huang, 2007, p. 38; see Horn, 2004), where S stands for ‘semantically strong expression’ and W stands for ‘semantically weak expression’.

[8]

Prototype Q- or Horn-scales

For $\langle S, W \rangle$ to form a Q- or Horn-scale,

- (i) $A(S)$ entails $A(W)$ for some arbitrary sentence frame A ;
- (ii) S and W are equally lexicalized, of the same word class, and from the same register; and
- (iii) S and W are ‘about’ the same semantic relation, or from the same semantic field.

Some examples of these scales include the quantifiers $\langle all, most, some \rangle$, articles $\langle the, a \rangle$, degree adjectives such as $\langle hot, warm \rangle$ or $\langle excellent, good \rangle$, modals $\langle necessarily, possibly \rangle$, adverbs like $\langle always, often, sometimes \rangle$, verbs such as $\langle adore, love, like \rangle$, etc. (Horn, 1989, p. 232; Levinson, 2000, p. 79). The use of an item from a scale entails items lower (rightwards) on the scale, and implicates negation of items higher (leftwards) on the scale. For instance, *all* and *most* entail *some*, while *some* and *most* implicate *not all*. The idea behind these Q-implicatures is that hearers are entitled to infer that the speaker, by using a semantically weaker expression, does not know the stronger statement, i.e. the one with the informationally richer expression (leftmost items on the scale are informationally richer than rightwards ones) to be true (see also Horn, 1972; Levinson, 2000, pp. 79–81). “But

when the stronger value is less economical than the weaker one, no Q-implicature is triggered" (Horn, 2004, p. 16).

If, for example, *all* entails *some*, then *all* could be seen as a hyponym of *some*. Analogously, if *some* implicates *not all*, it could be said that *some* is a "pragmatic hyponym" of *not all*. On the other hand, *not all* also implicates *some*, so the implicature relation is bilateral, symmetrical. The bilateral implicature could be called "pragmatic equivalence" (which could be symbolized by \leftrightarrow), and bilateral pragmatic hyponymy would, thus, be a "pragmatic synonymy". In some similar cases there is also pragmatic synonymy/equivalence (see [9]), while regularly the relation seems to be at least unilateral, i.e. hyponymic, so that for a Q-scale $\langle X_1, X_2, \dots, X_n \rangle \rightarrow \sim X_{n-1}$.

[9]

Some students came. \leftrightarrow Not all students came.

It will possibly happen. \leftrightarrow It will not necessarily happen.

He comes sometimes. \leftrightarrow He does not come often.

Huang (2007) also speaks of I-scales and represents them as $[x, y]$, where $y \rightarrow Ix$ (p. 47). To clarify, according to the I-principle, a semantically general expression I-implicates a more specific interpretation in line with the most stereotypical and explanatory expectation given our knowledge about the world, a case of which is the *inference to stereotype* (Huang, 2007, p. 47), exemplified in [10].

[10]

Have you met our new nurse? \rightarrow Have you met our new female nurse?

In [10] *nurse* triggers I-implicature *female nurse* (as a stereotypical example), whereas *female nurse* is a hyponym of *nurse*. This relation is one of bilateral implication (entailment in one direction, implicature in the other), which again can be considered a pragmatic equivalence. Huang (2017) gives more examples such as those in [9] and [10], treating them as instances of *lexical narrowing*.

CONCLUSION

Understanding correspondences between intersentential and lexical semantic relations provides for clearer understanding of both level relations. Seen from the perspective of sense inclusion/exclusion, major paradigmatic lexical semantic relations are shown to belong to two types, hyponymy and incompatibility. Synonymy is a special, symmetric case of hyponymy, gradable antonymy is scalar incompatibility, and complementary antonymy is binary incompatibility (in some cases apparent complementaries can be seen as part of wider incompatibility). On the sentential level, (lexical) hyponymy largely corresponds to entail-

ment (semantic implication); synonymy to equivalence (i.e. paraphrase, bilateral implication); incompatibility (including gradable antonymy) to contrariety; and complementarity to contradiction.

Yet, as Cruse (1986) remarks, “it must be remembered that language is designed neither by nor for logicians, and while definitions of sense relations in terms of logical properties such as entailment are convenient, they are also partially misleading as a picture of the way natural language functions” (p. 200). This could somewhat be amended by accounting for context-dependent relations. Analogously to the semantic plane, it is shown that correspondence could be established between (for the lack of possibly better term) pragmatic hyponymy and lexically induced implicature, or more specifically between pragmatic synonymy and bilateral implicature (i.e. “pragmatic equivalence”).

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МАРКО М. ЈАНИЋИЈЕВИЋ

ДРЖАВНИ УНИВЕРЗИТЕТ У НОВОМ ПАЗАРУ

ОДЕЉЕЊЕ ЗА ДРУШТВЕНЕ НАУКЕ

КОРЕСПОНДЕНЦИЈА ИЗМЕЂУ ЛЕКСИЧКИХ И МЕЂУРЕЧЕНИЧНИХ ОДНОСА:
СЕМАНТИЧКЕ И ПРАГМАТИЧКЕ ПЕРСПЕКТИВЕ

Сажетак

Предмет рада су семантичке и прагматичке корелације између (међу)реченичних и лексичких односа. Циљ је установити систематске кореспонденције између главних (парадигматских) лексичких и међуреченичних односа и показати корисност тих кореспонденција за разумевање наведених односа. Посматрани лексички односи обухватају синонимију, антонимију, хипонимију и инкомпатибилност, а међуреченични семантичку импликацију, импликатуру, еквиваленцију, контрарност и контрадикцију (уз осврт на контрадикцију и таутологију као својства појединачних реченица). Хипотеза рада је да међуреченични односи у великој мери

опонашају лексичке и на семантичком и на прагматичком плану, уз резерв с обзиром на темељну разлику у сложености између лексичког и реченичног нивоа. Примењена методологија заснована је на селективној синтези литературе, укључујући студије релевантне специфично за посматране корелације лексичких и међуреченичних односа, као и општије ауторитативне семантичке и лингвистичке изворе као исходишне. Неке од мањкавости у семантичкој литератури којима овај рад поклања пажњу тичу се нејасне корелације између лексичких и међуреченичних односа и релативно неодређених дефиниција и опсега лексичких односа, који за последицу имају дубиозно поимање њихових корелација.

Прво је дат кратак преглед односа, почев од дефиниција и опсега лексичких односа, који се посматрају као односи између смисла речи. Преглед међуреченичних односа, поред логичких (пропозиционих) семантичких односа, обухвата и типове имплицатуре као прагматичког односа аналогног семантичкој импликацији. Потом су размотрене паралеле између лексичких и међуреченичних односа и њихов третман у литератури, што је додатно осветлило поимање и корелације посматраних лексичких односа.

Показује се да, из перспективе укључености/искључености смисла, посматрани парадигматски лексички односи спадају у два типа, и то хипонимију и инкомпатибилност. На реченичном нивоу, (лексичка) хипонимија великим делом одговара семантичкој импликацији, синонимија еквиваленцији, инкомпатибилност (укључујући степенувану антонимију) контрарности, а комплементарна антонимија контрадикцији. Аналогно семантичком плану, показује се кореспонденција између (у недостатку бољег термина) прагматичке хипонимије и лексички условљене имплицатуре, односно између прагматичке синонимије и обосмерне имплицатуре („прагматичке еквиваленције“).

Кључне речи: лексички односи; међуреченични односи; логичка семантика; имплицатура; прагматичка хипонимија.