

## **THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE DIMENSIONS OF RELIGIOUSNESS AND MILITARIST POLITICAL CULTURE WITHIN THE CITIZENS OF SERBIA**

ANDRIJANA MAKSIMOVIĆ\*

ZORAN MILOSAVLJEVIĆ\*\*

### **ABSTRACT**

The authors use data obtained through empirical study of the relationship between different types of religiosity and militarist political culture. The three concepts of religiosity are: religious belief, attitude to religious confession, and personalised religiosity. Given the content of each dimension, religious belief and attitude to religious confession can be defined as forms of classical religiosity, while personalised religiosity could be defined as secular religiosity. The aim of the paper is to investigate the relationship between the religiosity of citizens in Serbia and the country's militarist political culture. Secondary data analysis of the European Value Study (EVS) was used. The highest degree of support for the militaristic form of political culture is contained within the secular form of religiosity – personalised religiosity (which can be varied, from belief in objects to para-religious and religious beliefs). This connection stems from the need to find security.

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\* Andrijana Maksimović, PhD, State University of Novi Pazar, Novi Pazar, Serbia; e-mail: andrijanam0809@yahoo.com

\*\* Zoran Milosavljević, PhD, Institute for Political Studies, Belgrade, Serbia

## KEYWORDS

religion, confession, Serbia, militarism, society

## INTRODUCTION

The subject of this paper is an empirical study of the relationship between the dimensions of religiosity and militarist political culture. One could ask: what is the relationship between the dimensions of religiosity in the citizens of Serbia with that of the militaristic political culture? We rely on the secondary data analysis of the European Values Study, i.e., European Values Survey, based on a survey method in all European countries. It is a comparative cross-national and longitudinal study that is conducted throughout Europe every nine years, utilising a unique methodology. The study was conducted in 2008 and 2009, but the data were provided in full only in 2011. The European Values Study is the most important comparative study in Europe in the field of social sciences. Serbia was included in the last wave of the study in 2008 and 2009, when Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the so-called Kosovo were included as well.<sup>1</sup>

The first chapter discusses the dimensions of religiosity. Namely, that there are three dimensions to religiosity: religious belief, attitude to religious confession and church, and personalised religiosity. Religious belief is operationalised through the following indicators: whether you believe in God, afterlife, hell, heaven, and sin. The attitude towards religious confession and church is considered via two issues: whether or not the church provides answers to moral questions, family problems, spiritual needs, and social problems and through the issue of trust in the religious confession and church. The third dimension of religiosity is personalised religiosity, which is not strictly related to religiosity in the classical sense.

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<sup>1</sup> European Values Study is the most important comparative research in Europe in the field of social sciences. The study is conducted every nine years and each European country is represented by one institution. The institution that became a partner of EVS in Serbia is the Faculty of Political Sciences in Belgrade. The first wave of this research was carried out in 1981. Serbia was included only in the last wave of the study in 2008 or 2009, when Montenegro, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and so-called Kosovo were also included. Slovenia and Croatia also participated in the previous wave of the study conducted in 1996. In this way, all the countries of the former Yugoslavia were included and this has created the possibility to perform valid comparative studies, based on the same tools and data for all other European countries. (M. Bešić, *Tranzicione traume i promene vrednosnih orijentacija – generacijski pristup: komparativna empirijska studija vrednosti u zemljama bivše Jugoslavije*, Beograd 2014).

This dimension includes believing in some kind of spirit or life force, interest in the sacred or supernatural but also finding comfort in faith, as well as determining whether respondents pray or meditate.

The second chapter briefly discusses political culture, its characteristics and types.

The third chapter discusses the militaristic type of political culture as an authoritarian political culture. In the third chapter authors investigate which of the three dimensions of religiosity stands is proportionate to militarism, as a form of political culture based on military power. Since authors question the relationships between variables, quantitative methods of bivariate and multivariate statistics are used.<sup>2</sup>

#### **DIMENSIONS OF RELIGIOSITY: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION**

Religiosity is usually defined as “a socio-psychological condition that is inherent in a believer and it can be said that it has three aspects: cognitive, affective, and active.”<sup>3</sup> Thus, it sublimates belief, feelings, and practice. For Pantić, religiosity is “an orientation which is based on attitudes of a cognitive nature, attitudes of an emotional nature and other feelings such as dependence, helplessness, admiration for a supernatural being, dynamic attitudes about the need to perform religious rites, attitudes towards institutions of a particular confession and certain moral attitudes”.<sup>4</sup> For Kuburić, religiosity is “a subjective system of attitudes, but also a system of internal permanent dispositions that includes beliefs, knowledge, feelings, and behaviour”.<sup>5</sup> Blagojević points out that the exceptional complexity and layering of religiosity stems from the fact that it is those phenomena in a person’s individual

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<sup>2</sup> M. Bešić, *Metodologija političkih nauka sa statistikom*, Beograd 2008, pp. 129–145.

Descriptive statistics uses numerical and graphical methods to describe and present data. The most basic type of descriptive statistics is the use of a so-called Frequency Table, which represents the distribution of values in numerical or percentage form. Statistically multivariate methods examine whether and to what extent each individual variable is a predictor of a dependent variable.

<sup>3</sup> D. Đorđević, ‘Religiousness of Serbs at the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century: What is about?’, *Revitalization of Religion – Theoretical and Comparative Approaches*, Niš 2009, pp. 57–64.

<sup>4</sup> D. Pantić, *Klasična i svetovna religioznost*, Beograd 1998, p. 67.

<sup>5</sup> Z. Kuburić, ‘Hrišćanstvo i psihičko zdravlje vernika’, in Z. Kuburić, M. Vukomanović (eds.), *Hrišćanstvo, društvo, politika*, Niš 1999, pp. 75–88.

life that capture the deepest layers of the mind and soul.<sup>6</sup> For Vukomanović, religiosity is one of the most original and authentic human experiences.<sup>7</sup>

It is important to emphasise that in the study of religiosity particular importance should be attributed to its social context. This is especially relevant in the light of today's discussions on the revitalisation of religion and religiosity. What is more, the types of religiosity are also debated due to their multidimensional nature. Also, religiosity is especially significant due to the contradictory attitude of modern society, in which the rigid boundaries between conflict and peace are dissolved, and a growing concern of citizens for their security can be observed.<sup>8</sup>

What can be concluded is that this is only one aspect of consideration and it is certainly insufficient for a complete presentation of the given phenomenon. The study of religiosity requires more data to confirm assumptions made by the scholars. In this paper, we are going to use three notions of religiosity: religious belief, attitude towards religious confession and church, and personalised religiosity.<sup>9</sup>

#### RELIGIOUS BELIEF

When we discuss religious belief, it should be clearly stated that it is the dimension of accepting or not accepting some fundamental religious truths, regardless of whether the belief is accompanied by basic knowledge of religious teachings and whether this fundamental belief is manifested in everyday behaviours. This is why it is important to emphasise that belief is the first and fundamental dimension of a religious relationship. One could assume that most religions are based on belief in a god or deity. Therefore, the intellectual dimension of religiosity is expressed through religious belief (in some of the traditional religions). In this paper, we operationalised this dimension of religiosity through the following indicators: whether one believes in God, afterlife, hell, heaven, and sin.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> M. Blagojević, *Religija i crkva u transformacijama društva: Sociološko-istorijska analiza religijske situacije u srpsko-crnogorskom i ruskom (post)komunističkom društvu*, Beograd 2005, pp. 137–138.

<sup>7</sup> M. Vukomanović, *Sveto i mnoštvo – izazovi religijskog pluralizma*, Beograd 2001, p. 102.

<sup>8</sup> M. Stojadinović, *Urušavanje demokratije i rađanje neoimperijalnog tipa građanina*, Institute of Political Studies, vol. 67, no. 1, 2020, pp. 61–77.

<sup>9</sup> M. Bešić, *Tranzicione traume i promene vrednosnih orijentacija – generacijski pristup: komparativna empirijska studija vrednosti u zemljama bivše Jugoslavije*, Beograd 2014, p. 59.

<sup>10</sup> Bešić, *Tranzicione traume i promene vrednosnih orijentacija*, p. 256.

Table 1 shows the values of measuring the religious concept of belief according to the following indicators – belief in God, afterlife, hell, heaven, and sin.

TABLE 1. PERCENTAGE OF THOSE WHO BELIEVE OR DO NOT BELIEVE (N-1512):

	Believe in God	Believe in afterlife	Believe in hell	Believe in heaven	Believe in sin
Yes	84.5	29.1	25.4	32.1	33.4
No	7.7	55.1	58.5	51.9	54.6
No answer	3.6	3.8	4.4	4.3	4.3
Doesn't know	4.2	12.0	11.8	11.8	7.8

Out of 1,512 respondents, 84.5% believe in God, 32.1% in heaven, 29.1% in afterlife, with the fewest number of respondents believing in hell – 25.4%. There is approximately the same number of those who did not answer the question whether they believe in God and afterlife (3.6%–3.8%) and those who did not answer the question whether they believe in heaven and hell (4.3%, 4.4%). The same percentage responded that they did not know whether they believe in heaven and hell (11.8%), in afterlife (12.0%) and the answer “doesn't know” was recorded in 4.2% of respondents when asked if they believe in God.

#### THE ATTITUDE TOWARDS RELIGIOUS CONFESSION AND CHURCH

Another dimension of religiosity is the attitude towards religious confession and church. There are two questions in the EVS, one of which has four separate items and measures attitudes towards the church by expressing opinions about whether or not the church provides answers to moral questions, family problems, spiritual needs and social problems. The distribution of responses to these four items is shown in Table 2. Table 3 compares the results of the measurement of trust in church and religious confession. The degree of trust is measured by a four-point assessment scale: “very great”, “great”, “not very great”, and “none”.

TABLE 2. THE CHURCH OR CONFESSION ANSWERS (IN PERCENTAGES):

The church or confession answers:	Moral problems	Family problems	Spiritual needs	Social problems
Yes	43.3	33.7	62.8	58.9
No	39.7	48.4	24.4	21.3
No answer	3.0	3.0	2.9	3.7
Doesn't know	14.0	14.8	9.9	16.1

The largest percentage of respondents believe that the church provides answers to spiritual needs (62.8%), followed by social problems (58.9%), moral problems (43.3%), while the smallest percentage of respondents espouse a belief that the church provides answers to family problems (33.7%).

TABLE 3. CONFIDENCE IN THE CHURCH AND RELIGIOUS CONFESSION (IN PERCENTAGES):

Very great	Great	Not very great	None
21.4	37.4	29.1	9.0

The largest number of respondents shows “great trust” in the church and confession (37.4%), followed by “not very great” (29.1%), “very great” (21.4%), while the least number of respondents has no trust (“none”) in the church and confession (9.0%).

#### PERSONAL RELIGIOUSITY – SECULAR RELIGIOUSITY

The third dimension of religiosity is personalised religiosity and it is defined as secular religiosity, without the mediation of a traditional religion. This dimension of religiosity is not strictly related to religiosity in the classical sense. “It consists of an inner and individualised attitude towards the world.”<sup>11</sup> Emotional aspects of religiosity reveal the connection that an individual establishes with God, that is, with something supernatural that an individual believes in. In fact, it is about building a religious world on a personalised spiritual level, independent of the first two dimensions of religiosity. As Cvitković points out, any kind of belief is a deep human need,

<sup>11</sup> Bešić, *Tranzicione traume i promene vrednosnih orijentacija*, p. 256.

as religion has “past, present, future; there may be dead gods, but religion remains eternal”. Given that religion was seen as the only possibility that offered practical solutions for the transitional social situation and that it regained its position on the public scene by being characterised by »retraditionalisation« and »recollectivisation«,<sup>12</sup> the emergence of this dimension of religiosity is understandable.

This dimension includes belief in some kind of spirit or life force, interest in the sacred or supernatural, various forms of para-religious belief as well as sectarian belief, but also finding comfort in faith and determining whether respondents pray or meditate. Measurements by items are represented by different scales. The distribution of responses by items is shown in tables from Table 4 to Table 7.

TABLE 4. BELIEF IN A PERSONAL GOD, SPIRIT OR LIFE FORCE (N-1433) (IN PERCENTAGES):

Belief in a personal god	Belief in spirit or life force
18.7	55.9

The tables show the distribution of answers by all indicators and, as it can be seen, 18.7% believe in a personal god, and 55.9% believe in a spiritual or life force.

TABLE 5. INNER SPIRITUALITY (N-1469) (IN PERCENTAGES):

Very interested	18.2
Somewhat interested	40.0
Not very interested	25.5
Not interested at all	13.5

The survey showed that 18.2% of respondents is very interested in inner spirituality, 40.0% is somewhat interested, 25.5% is not very interested, and 13.5% of the respondents is not interested in inner spirituality at all.

<sup>12</sup> S. Vrcan, ‘Novi izazovi za suvremenu sociologiju religije (politizacija religije i religizacija politike u postkomunizmu)’, *Revija za sociologiju*, vol. 30(1–2), 1999, pp. 45–64.

TABLE 6. HOW IMPORTANT GOD IS IN YOUR LIFE (N-1452) (IN PERCENTAGES):

1 (not important at all)	7.8
2	2.4
3	3.7
4	3.9
5	13.3
6	7.0
7	9.2
8	12.8
9	9.1
10 (very important)	26.8

We presented a scale from 1 to 10 as an answer to the question “how important God is in your life?”. The scale actually ranges from “not important at all” to “very important”. Table 6 shows that 7.8% of respondents answered “not important at all”, and that 26.8% of respondents answered “very important”.

TABLE 7. FINDS CONSOLATION IN A RELIGION (N-1397), PRAYS OR MEDITATES (N-1466) (IN PERCENTAGES):

Finds consolation in a religion	Prays or meditates
19.8	26.1

As we see from the table, 19.8% finds comfort in religion, and 26.1% of respondents prays or meditates.

#### **POLITICAL CULTURE: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND**

Political culture is one of the most important characteristics of a strong democracy. Given that political culture also exists in non-democratic societies, it should be emphasised that when it comes to democracy, political culture must be democratic or participatory, and hence not just any form of political culture should be included. Based on numerous

studies, both by foreign and domestic authors, it seems that the prevailing assertion today is that we cannot reduce democracy only to formal institutions and connections between them – the dimension of political culture is an indispensable aspect in the analysis of modern democracies.

Political culture includes a large number of categories, starting from participation and the competence to participate in democratic processes, all the way to the norms of trust and reciprocity. According to Podunavac, “political culture intersects elements of all relevant discursive strategies in contemporary political theory – liberalism, communitarianism, and republicanism. It expresses conflict and the need to unify the general and the individual in social value systems.”<sup>13</sup>

When we talk about political culture as a psychological phenomenon, “we should keep in mind that these are specific contents of social consciousness and patterns of behaviour which materialise as the consciousness and behaviour of a particular individual with regard to their life situation, position of the group(s) in the social structure, as well as with regard to the dominant contents of consciousness and patterns of behaviour at the level of global society.”<sup>14</sup>

To determine the content of political culture, you need to keep in mind economic development, political determinants of development, social norms, the predominant type of social mentality, religion – at the level of global society – but also the characteristics of each individual. Thus, Almond and Verba<sup>15</sup> emphasise that the analysis of political culture must be based on the following four elements:

1. the analysis of changes, revolutions, religious movements, and conflicts;
2. the analysis of institutional and ideological norms – expectations and requirements of the system;
3. the analysis of economic and social conditions related to democratic demands;
4. the analysis of personality structure, which represents the subjective side of political culture.

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<sup>13</sup> M. Podunavac, ‘Politička kultura i političke ustanove’, in M. Vasović (ed.), *Fragmenti političke kulture*, Beograd 1998, p. 212.

<sup>14</sup> I. Šiber, ‘Politička kultura i tranzicija’, *Politička misao*, vol. 29, no. 3, 1992, pp. 93–110.

<sup>15</sup> G. Almond, S. Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations*, Princeton 1963, p. 201.

A myriad of theories identify the relationship between political culture and political institutions of society. Montesquieu, for instance, emphasises the influence of political culture on the nature of the first principles of politics and the quality of the political order. He equates political customs (*mores*) with the technology of political rule (*instrumenta regni*). Rousseau presents political culture as an indirect symbolic world through which the political experience of peoples and groups is regulated and clarified. "It is in this symbolic component of politics that he finds a reliable support for the political order."<sup>16</sup>

For Tocqueville, political culture is a "universal truth to which study and experience continually bring us back".<sup>17</sup> His concept of political culture implies a hierarchical list concepts, namely: mores, law, and the influence of its physical environment.

Almond derives the theoretical status of political culture from the following elements:

- Political culture refers to a model of subjective political orientations within an entire nation or some of its parts;
- Cognitive, affective, and value elements are integral parts of political culture. It includes a knowledge and opinion about political reality, feelings related to politics, and political value stances;
- The content of political culture is the result of socialisation in childhood, upbringing, influence of the media and direct experiences in the lives of adults;
- Political culture influences the structure of government and politics, but also their results.<sup>18</sup>

Pye (1972) defines political culture as the set of attitudes, beliefs, and sentiments, which give order and meaning to a political process, but at the same time provide rules that govern behaviour in the political system. "The concept of political culture thus suggests that the traditions of a society, the spirit of its public institutions, the passions and the collective reasoning of its citizenry, and the style and operating codes of its leaders are not just random products of historical experience but fit together as a part of a meaningful whole and constitute an intelligible web of relations."

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<sup>16</sup> M. Podunavac, 'Politička kultura', in M. Vasović (ed.), *Fragmenti političke kulture*, Beograd 1998, p. 212.

<sup>17</sup> A. Tokvil, *O demokratiji u Americi*, Podgorica 1990, p. 65.

<sup>18</sup> L. Pye, 'Culture and Political Science: Problems in the evaluation of the concept of political culture', *Social Science Quarterly*, vol. 53, no. 2, 1972, pp. 285–296.

Starting from the above (Almond, Verba, Pye), Šiber sets the criteria for a developed political culture:

- Sense of identity within the community;
- Loyalty and trust as the basis of mutual relations in the community;
- Authority and hierarchy, i.e., susceptibility to authority, its acceptance, interaction and communication with authority;
- Open ego, i.e., willingness to cooperate and respect others;
- Willingness to share values with others, to belong and to act together;
- Multiple value orientation which implies the absence of value exclusivity;
- Trust in the social environment, social relations and support of others;
- Absence of anxiety, confidence in oneself and one's abilities;
- Conflict management, the necessity of controlling and, in a socially acceptable way, expressing aggression.<sup>19</sup>

Additionally, Robert Dahl defines political culture as a network of political orientations, consisting of:

- Orientations to the political system;
- Orientations to other people;
- Orientations to collective action;
- Orientations of problem solving.<sup>20</sup>

The orientation to the political system deserves special attention, as through this dimension one can infiltrate various environments of the society and control citizens' attitudes towards the political system – whether these relations are based on trust or distrust, attachment or alienation. Within this orientation, as Dahl points out, three subtypes of political culture can be crystallised:

- a) subject,
- b) apathetic,
- c) alienating.

If members of society uncritically create emotions and attitudes towards the existing political system, it is a subject subtype of political culture; the apathetic subtype is based on a neutral attitude towards the political system; the third subtype, alienating political culture, is the product of conditions that encourage negative attitudes and emotions toward the political system.

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<sup>19</sup> Šiber, 'Politička kultura i tranzicija', pp. 93–110.

<sup>20</sup> R.A. Dahl, 'Democratic Dilemma: System Effectiveness versus Citizen Participation', *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 109, no. 1, 1994, pp. 23–34.

Dahl mentions other orientations, such as cooperative and non-cooperative, in terms of the relationship to collective goals. There are also those that can differ in the attitude of the subject towards solving social problems (pragmatic and deductive-rational orientation). Based on all classifications of types of orientation, Dahl crystallises his dual typology of political cultures. Therefore, the first group of political cultures includes those with positive, cooperative and pragmatic orientations, which are mainly focused on political practice and effective social influence. The second group includes apathetic, natural, non-cooperative, and deductive orientations, which are restrictive and aimed at creating distance between society, groups, and individuals.

The analysis of democratic elitism theories and the postmodern paradigm makes the consideration of political culture theories more interesting. The theory of democratic elitism places the problems of order stability at the core of politics. As emphasised in the previous chapter, what connects the mentioned ideas is that the concept of democracy refers to the rules of a political game. In fact, democracy is about the procedures and rules of the political game, which enable people to choose one of the many political elites who are fighting for power. Here, we recognise Schumpeter's idea of procedural democracy, which nowadays is referred to as the model of minimal democracy. This theory is of particular importance for the study of political culture and it has been strongly supported and developed within the dominant theory of political culture.

Previous typologies of political culture have mainly emerged on the basis of the value orientations criteria, types of social relations and types of socialisation of personality. Almond and Verba suggest a classification that encompasses three main types of political culture, thus distinguishing between parochial, subject, and participant political culture.<sup>21</sup>

The sole criterion of this classification is the manner and degree of political participation in the political life of society. As the scholars discuss, parochial political culture characterises those societies in which the political system does not function separately from other social subsystems and in which its members know very little about political reality. Subject political culture is based on the inability of individuals to rise above existing power and established authorities. As a matter of fact, the individuals did not develop the means that would enable active involvement in political events.

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<sup>21</sup> Almond, Verba, *The Civic Culture*, p. 201.

Participant political culture is the type of political culture that is based on the possibilities of society to influence both political events and holders of political power. Participant political culture is a characteristic of democratic governments, while authoritarian governments are dominated by parochial and subject political cultures. The research has shown that the members of parochial and subject political cultures are disinterested in political life and, through this, easily kept in a state of obedience. They treat political life and government in two ways – either they adore it and are blindly loyal to it or they are disinterested and indifferent.

The basic characteristics of civic political culture are reflected in its tendencies to mitigate internal differences. For its full appearance, there must be a high level of political information and a high level of participation on the part of the participants in political processes.

Lijphart distinguishes three types of political culture, taking as their integral features: centripetal, centrifugal, and consociational political culture. Centripetal political culture is oriented towards the centre, as opposed to centrifugal which moves away from the centre. In consociational political culture, the means of seeking a consensus on major political issues is constantly open.<sup>22</sup>

There is also a division into traditional, modern, and postmodern political culture, then into conventional and protest. Based on value orientation, the division into democratic and autocratic political culture is frequent. Previous research on political culture has resulted in the view that political institutions are simply empty shells unless imbued with a certain type of political culture. This is especially true for democratic institutions that draw their stability from the norms of political culture. “Unless a political culture is able to support a democratic system, the chances for the success of that system are slim.”<sup>23</sup>

A significant typology of political culture arises if we take value orientation (modernity or tradition) as a criterion in combination with the type of relationship (democratic or egalitarian, authoritarian or hierarchical). If political culture is democratic, it is not only a framework, but also a precondition for the stable functioning of a modern democracy. If, on the other hand, the existing political culture contains elements of traditionalism, authoritarianism, nationalism, and populism any attempt to build

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<sup>22</sup> M. Matic, M. Podunavac, *Politički system*, Beograd 1994, p. 353.

<sup>23</sup> Almond, Verba, *The Civic Culture*, p. 201.

a democratic system is likely doomed to failure. As Rawls emphasises, a political conception of a well-ordered democratic society “is not formulated in terms of any comprehensive doctrine but in terms of certain fundamental ideas viewed as latent in the public political culture of a democratic society.”<sup>24</sup>

A democratic political culture would, in fact, be a consequence of the political participation of citizens and the creation of democratic values.

#### RELIGIOSITY AND MILITARIST POLITICAL CULTURE: RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Although the concept of political culture does not directly mention the notion of authoritarianism, it seems that it is necessary to understand the orders established in countries without a tradition of civil society. Authoritarian rule is dominated by subject political culture.<sup>25</sup> Authoritarian political culture relies on authoritarianism. The basic characteristics of an authoritarian political culture are: closedness, exclusivity, ideological rigidity and dogmatism, a closed way of communication, intolerance towards others, vengefulness, threats, and the use of violence. Authoritarian politics exclude the possibility of choosing values; they abuse universal values and uses them for partial and individual purposes, guided by set goals as well.<sup>26</sup>

We distinguish the following types of authoritarian political culture: leader-subject, expert-elitist, and the militarist type. We pay special attention to the militarist type of political culture. Militarist political culture is a form of political culture based on military power. An idiosyncrasy of militarism is reflected in its close connection with capitalism and, in this regard, it is very difficult to remove it from society if it is based on capitalist relations. Militarism was a necessary and irreplaceable valve of capitalist society.<sup>27</sup>

In Table 8, we enclose the degree of support for a militaristic type of political culture. We used a four-point scale through which respondents expressed their support for political culture based on military authority.

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<sup>24</sup> J. Rawls, *Political liberalism*, New York 1993, p. 175.

<sup>25</sup> G. Almond, S. Verba, *Civilna kultura: Politički stavovi i demokratija u pet zemalja*, Zagreb 2000, p. 24.

<sup>26</sup> Č. Čupić, *Sociologija: struktura, kultura, vladavina*, Beograd 2002, p. 155.

<sup>27</sup> S. Marković, ‘Ruska ideja-između nacionalnog egoizma, empatije i antimilitarizma i odjeci kod Srba do 1914. Godine’, *Srpska politička misao*, vol. 65, no. 3, pp. 347–365.

TABLE 8. DEGREE OF SUPPORT FOR THE MILITARIST (N-1333) FORM OF POLITICAL CULTURE (IN PERCENTAGES):

Degree of support for militarist political culture	
Very good	8.6
Good	17.0
Bad	33.7
Very bad	28.8

As it can be observed in the table, the greatest number of respondents (33.7%) think that the militarist form of political culture is “bad” or “very bad” (28.8%), while the smallest number of respondents think that this form of political culture is either “very good” (8.6%) or “good” (17%).

TABLE 9. MEAN VALUES OF THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE DIMENSIONS OF RELIGIOUSNESS AND MILITARIST POLITICAL CULTURE:<sup>28</sup>

		N	AM	SD	F-test <sup>29</sup>
Very good	Religious belief	109	.130	1,007	F(3,1070)=1.972, p>0.1
Good		198	.049	.994	
Bad		402	-.094	.981	
Very bad		365	-.044	.987	
Very good	Attitude towards the church or confession	102	.317	1,021	F(3,1015)=4.748, p<0.1
Good		205	.042	1,025	
Bad		388	-.088	.967	
Very bad		324	-.032	.992	
Very good	Personalised religiosity	116	.321	.735	F(3,1139)=6.004, p<0.1
Good		229	.043	.950	
Bad		436	-.084	1,043	
Very bad		362	-.085	1,034	

Table 9 shows that the highest values are observed in personalised religiosity in terms of support for the militarist type of political culture, and the numbers vary substantially (F(3,1139)=6,004, p<0.1). The differences are

<sup>28</sup> N – total number of respondents; AM – arithmetic mean (represents the sum of the values of a continuous sequence divided by the total number of values); SD – standard deviation (one of the key measures of variability that indicates the extent to which the values are distant from the arithmetic mean).

statistically significant in attitudes toward confession ( $F(3.1015)=4.748$ ,  $p<0.1$ ), while in religious belief there are no significant differences when it comes to supporting the militarist type of political culture ( $F(3.1070)=1.972$ ,  $p>0.1$ ). We notice the highest values of religious belief in those respondents who think that the militarist form of political culture is very good, and the lowest in those who think that it is bad. We observe the highest values in attitudes toward the church or confession among those respondents who believe that the militarist form of political culture is very good, and the lowest among those who think that it is bad. We notice the highest values of personalised religiosity in those respondents who think that the militarist form of political culture is very good, and the lowest in those who think that it is very bad.

#### SUMMARY

When it comes to the militarist form of political culture, the results show that the differences are statistically significant in attitudes toward the church and confession and in personalised religiosity.

Therefore, the greatest degree of support for this form of authoritarian political culture is found in personalised religiosity. This finding is specific because, according to the way we determined this dimension of religiosity, we expected that the factors of authoritarian forms of political culture have an adverse effect on the inner spiritual world of individuals who are exposed to these factors. This finding leads us to the conclusion that there is a connection between one form of spirituality and military authority. This connection stems from a state of alienation, isolation, and thus, insecurity, and the need to seek safety. It is precisely out of the need for security that believers show support for military power.

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