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# **ELECTED OFFICIALS IN CRISIS SITUATION**

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## **ABSTRACT**

Leadership role in crisis management is often considered as crucial. This applies especially to high-ranking politicians who have gained their position in the elections. Since elected officials are accountable to voters this means that citizens have a major impact on Leaders work. Citizens are not the only whose expectations should be met, there are the media, public administration, political opponents and different stakeholders. Therefore the elected leader, as an individual, cannot play a crucial role in the crisis situations because they are under the influence of the above mentioned factors and together constitute a whole new potential. This paper deals with ways and types of influence to the elected officials in crisis situations and reflections of these manifestations on the outcome of the crisis.



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## 1. FOREWORD

*“We live in the midst of alarms,  
Anxiety beclouds the future;  
We expect some new disaster  
With each newspaper we read”*  
Abraham Lincoln

In these years Crisis becomes very frequently used term. Someone said that Crisis is everywhere; it is unexpected, unpleasant and requires urgent response. In one of the most complete definitions, crisis is described as “serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values and norms of a system, which under time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances necessitates making vital decisions”<sup>1</sup>. The end of the Cold War resulted in a quite new perspective on security and September 11<sup>th</sup> raised the terrorism to the highest place at the list of modern threats. On the other hand, rapidly advancing technology that is becoming increasingly complex, it is now an integral part of everyday life. Probably the most frequently cited author in this field Charles Perrow concludes that large technical systems will sooner or later produce a disaster as the result of sheer potential, technical complexity, and tight coupling. Long-standing concern for human environment from day to day becomes more justified. One of the conclusions of the symposium held at the Wingspread Conference Centre January 1998 follows: “We believe there is compelling evidence that damage to humans and the worldwide environment is of such magnitude and seriousness that new principles for conducting human activities are necessary.” Unpredictability of nature and its response to the often reckless human activities are the cause of many disasters. Only a decade ago the tsunami for many people represented the unknown, rarely used exotic word. Unfortunately, all the above, but also many other miscellaneous categories causes of the events that are threats around the world. Psychological or societal impacts of threats are a function of cultural expectations about levels of order and security which vary widely within and between different communities and polities, partly depending upon existing

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<sup>1</sup> Rosenthal Uriel, Charles Michael, and ‘T Hart Paul (1989) “*The World of Crises and Crisis Management*”

levels of preparedness and prior experience<sup>2</sup>. When a crisis occurs unambiguously and shows their own nature the only certain thing is filing of uncertainty regardless on someone's age, experience or education. It is expected that citizens, faced with extreme events, are turning around and look for their Leaders, especially those that are officially elected. Indeed, Leaders are there, but with all their faults and virtues that specifically come to the fore in period of Crisis.

Before proceeding further it would be useful to define the key term "Elected officials" in this work. This term usually means all persons who become officials by virtue of an election. Somewhat "poetic" connotation of the term allows its use under slightly different circumstances. In a purpose of this paper, the term "elected officials" will be used to describe those whose work can be a crucial influence on the crisis situation and this position is directly or indirectly caused by the election results. Therefore, during the study of officials that dealing with crisis, the emphasis is on the impact of the will citizens and their expectations, on the one hand, and the character and nature of the crisis, on the other hand. From this point of view, the term means state presidents, prime-ministers, ministers, heads of parliamentary committees, etc.

It seems very clear that elected officials are not power by itself but together with public administration are unique mechanism that works with various degrees of compatibility. It is possible that someone could disagree with this statement. The long-standing separation between 'politics' and 'administration' has contributed to the prominence of an ideology of administration in which civil servants and government departments or bureaus are competent and politically neutral officials administering the implementation of policy<sup>3</sup>. Such pure and simple ideology is set as an aspiration rather than as a definition of reality. In practice, under critical circumstances, the lines between political and administrative roles and activities tend to be blurred<sup>4</sup>. Mixture of responsibility, the possible consequences and impact of numerous stakeholders and many decisions during the crisis does not allow autonomous consideration of one of these categories.

Clash of two complex phenomenon, such as Public Administration and Crisis situation, results in different specificities of Crisis Management. Therefore, entry into

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<sup>2</sup> Perry Ron and Quarantelli E.L. (2005). "What Is a Disaster?" New Answers to Old Questions

<sup>3</sup> Rosenthal Uriel, 'T Hart Paul and Kouzmin Aleksander (1991) "The bureau-politics of crisis management"

<sup>4</sup> Rosenthal Uriel, 'T Hart Paul and Kouzmin Aleksander (1991) "The bureau-politics of crisis management"



this work would be through the understanding crisis management in public administrations. Typical Public Administrations answer to the crisis situation is focused on planned and programmed activities with strong pursuit for hierarchy and centralized decision making process. Also, by its nature public affairs are exposed to powerful external influences. Somewhere in between those issues are hidden basic problems of Public Administration's Crisis Management. Moreover, there we could find and define role of Elected officials in crisis situation.

No matter what is our perception of people that we choose to lead us, they have capacities which might decide about victims in crisis. Off course, we are not discussing here about personal capacities, which are also significant - that should be considered for the later election. Capacities of Public leaders are conditioned by ravel of social, political, economical, natural and plenty of other issues. Modern crisis is the result of many converging factors: specific risks that are increasingly difficult to evaluate, large system consisting of entangled networks with a hitherto unknown complexity, the immediate mediatisation of incidents, abrupt changes in collective perceptions and social demands suddenly condemning what was hitherto tolerated<sup>5</sup>. In addition to rational factors that make complex environment, it seems that subjective expectations of society may be hardest matters for Leaders Crisis dealing capacities. Limitations of Liberal democracy values, large number of stakeholders and low tolerance for discomfort of people in high developed western civilization is something in what we believe but also it is something what ask for extraordinary capability of leaders as crisis managers. Analysis of leader's behaviour and decisions in face of public expectations during the crisis period should be important part of this work.

The closing section will face the previously established theoretical achievements and practical examples of crisis management in which public leaders had a prominent role. Analysis of several cases should indicate the justification of theoretical research but also the differences in the certain circumstances. Most important value of case studies could be discovering of niche that theory is not pointed enough attention.

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<sup>5</sup> Boin Arjen and Lagadec Patrick 2000. *"Preaparing for the future: Critical Challenges in Crisis Management"*

## 2. UNDERSTANDING CRISIS MANAGEMENT IN PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Public administration can be symbolically defined as a "translation of politics into the reality that citizens see every day"<sup>6</sup>. That diversified and complex network of public servants and institutions is primary professional surrounding of elected officials. Political leaders derive their ability for response to any kind of challenges from organizational capacity of public administration. Such a dynamic relationship between Leaders and Public bureaucracy cause necessity to understand Public administrations crisis management capacities before analysis of elected official's position in crisis situation.

Every society has a large number of public services that are primarily or secondarily involved in certain types of problems connected with possible crisis. However, Crisis management does not only deal with different subset problems, but also considers the myriad of actors involved in each step and the vast number of arenas where crises may occur<sup>7</sup>. Miscellaneous services of public sector are designed to deal with predefined emergencies and incidents. Therefore, Crisis management in Public administration can be viewed as a particular process which takes place between point where available organizational capacity become scarce and circumstances in which the system of public services again may provide a regular way of functioning.

Each crisis has its own peculiarities that characterize it and often have a crucial role. On the other hand, capacities of public administration are not nearly as diverse. After all, there are several common fields which should be discussed in here having in regard their strong affection to the ability of public administration to deal with crisis.

### 2.1. Legitimacy of Crisis management in Public Administration

It is not necessary to outline that the government and public administration at all levels in most of the countries have a predominant role in solving crisis. However, in the past few decades there have been serious doubts about the legitimacy of the government's role in crisis situations. These doubts are consequence of numerous failures in dealing with crises that have affected different countries or parts of the world.

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<sup>6</sup> Donald Kettl and Fessler James (2009). *"The Politics of the Administrative Process"*

<sup>7</sup> Stern Eric (2003) *"Crisis Studies and Foreign Policy Analysis: Insights, Synergies, and Challenges"*

After all, it seems that the real reason for the criticism should be found in the broader sense of vulnerability and general disadvantages in public administration. Rosenthal and Kouzmin highlight four reasons why the government's role in crisis situations should be reviewed<sup>8</sup>:

- Governmental authorities suffer because in a crisis situation their legitimacy is not uncontested. The occurrence of a crisis raises questions about the ineffectiveness of governmental agencies and authorities in preventing the occurrence
- The frequency of government (in-)action during crises certainly does not imply that government action is always functional or beneficial
- Not only that crisis are "occasions for decisions," but they are also occasions for a restructuring of power
- The activities of so-called emergency organizations such as the civil defence, police, fire squads, and the military often show a peculiar combination of functional and dysfunctional qualities

All this reasons are easily visible in the public sector activities, not only in terms of resolving the crisis but also in other fields. This empirical approach to criticism of the legitimacy of state authority in dealing with crisis overcomes doubts and points to specific problems. After all, it doesn't seem to encounter any radical changes in this field, on the contrary, most of the countries show an increasing interest in strengthening the capacity of emergency services which are specifically related to the United States. After September 11, despite a clear knowledge of the failures that have occurred on this occasion within the state agencies, government has resorted to enlargement its capacity. Most prominent step of this occasion was establishment of United States Department of Homeland security in aftermath of September 11.

We should be aware that the legitimacy of the government to deal with crisis situations is based on genuine democratic principles. Cabinet members have been appointed as a consequence of the election results, making them the confidence to lead the country through the performance of the duties of public interest. In this way the government gets the undisputed legitimacy. Therefore, government carries out activities in the public interest by making the decisions and policies implemented by the public

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<sup>8</sup> **Rosenthal Uriel and Kouzmin Alessander** (1997) *"Crises and Crisis Management: Toward Comprehensive Government Decision Making"*

administration. As the crisis threatens the fundamental values of society, it is certain that concern about these phenomena is part of the public interest which, undoubtedly, means that legitimacy was articulated in this segment as well. It is for sure that this legitimacy could be undermined, diminished or even lost. This applies to the specific convocation of Government and not to the government as a category of executive authority. Critical decline in the legitimacy of government will result in new elections. After the election, following the appointment of the new convocation of the Government, which, if considered necessary, to declare the Public Administration Reform. By this process legitimacy of the government in performing the duties of public service would be restored. It is hard to see why such a set view of legitimacy of government and public administration would not refer to engage in crisis situations. If the legitimacy of government is judged by number of failures in dealing with the crisis then this principle can be applied to other duties performed by the public sector, since there is no field without frequent failures. It is entirely another question what should be done to avoid failures.

On the other hand, some theories about the crisis might indicate rather different view of the previous paragraph. Crisis relates to a particular situation when government capacity is inadequate to handle it using its own resources<sup>9</sup>. Therefore, if government has been able to solve the problem in the usual manner with available resources, crisis would not pose. This theory could be corner stone in the inevitable questioning of the legitimacy of state authorities in dealing with crisis. Every summer in Greece, due to great heat, hundreds of fires occur. Since the summer fires are expected, Greek government, local communities and their services are organized to deal with that kind of emergencies but 2007 was different. That year, the fire spread over 2.700 square kilometres of forest, olive groves and farmland<sup>10</sup>. The fire destroyed 1.000 houses, 1.100 other buildings, and damaging hundreds more<sup>11</sup>. It certainly was not the regular response of fire-fighters in Greece, but one of the worst crises in Modern Greek history. Circumstances have exceeded the capacities of fire-fighters, civil defence, military and other organizations and services in Greece. The situation called for a series

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<sup>9</sup> **Alpaslan Ozerdem and Jacoby Tim** (2006) "*Disaster Management and Civil Society: Earthquake Relief in Japan, Turkey and India*"

<sup>10</sup> **www: panda.org** "Greek forests severely damaged by summer fires" (2007)

<sup>11</sup> **Polyzoidis Panos** (2007). "*Greek lives scarred by inferno*". *BBC News*

of decisions, reactions and solutions which are not in the domain of normal operation of public sector. Follows from the previous a crisis occurs when the institutional structure of a social system experiences a relatively strong decline in legitimacy as its central service functions are impaired or suffer from overload<sup>12</sup>.

## **2.2. Managerial perspectives of crisis management in public administrations**

There is a growing tendency to criticize the management abilities of public administration. Motivated by the threat, urgency and uncertainty of the crisis these criticisms become even more understandable. This is not to confirm or deny perceived weaknesses in the crisis management of public sector. Here the intention is to discover some of the characteristics and habits that set a strong influence on the outcome of the crisis. In the managerial view, the key challenge in crisis termination is to make an accurate and balanced assessment of the need to keep the crisis response infrastructure in place<sup>13</sup>. On reaching this crucial theoretical assumption in practice affects several features that are characteristic of public sector management.

### *2.2.1. Bureau-political behaviour*

Almost without exception, the bureaucracy is perceived as slow, highly centralized mechanism, burdened with too many regulations, which in the long run became their own purpose. It is hard to imagine today, but a hundred years ago bureaucracy meant something positive<sup>14</sup>. Bureaucracy at its beginning was the result of the need for efficiency, accountability and good order. Even Max Weber, who described the ideal model of bureaucracy in a positive manner, pointed out: “Real bureaucracy will be less optimal and effective than his ideal type model”. The lack of competition was highlighted as a cause of uninventiveness, inflexibility and lack of efficiency of public bureaucracy. Western democracies in the second half of the twentieth century offered a solution to this problem by the development of multi-agency systems. The late twentieth century is characterized by the establishment of government agencies with

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<sup>12</sup> **Boin Arjen** (2004) *“Lessons from Crisis Research”*

<sup>13</sup> **Rosenthal Uriel, Boin Arjen and Comfort Louise** (2001). *“Managing Crises: Threats, Dilemmas, Opportunities”*

<sup>14</sup> **Osborne David and Gaebler Ted** (1993). *“Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector”*

different field of activity whose responsibilities are often overlap. These agencies also create their own needs and interests which lead to an environment that Uriel Rosenthal called the bureau-politics.

Rosenthal's theory about "Bureau-politics" points to the circumstances that strongly influence the work of government and public administration in general. In a generic sense, bureaucratic politics is characterized by the following components<sup>15</sup> :

1. many actors in the policy-making arena
2. actors have diverging and conflicting interests
3. no one actor has overriding influence
4. decisions are inherently compromises
5. The decision outcomes tend not to anticipate the requirements for effective implementation.

Bureau-political model could be applied to the public administration in dealing with crisis situations. Furthermore, many, seemingly irrational, actions analyzed in this way suddenly become much clearer.

Crisis management in the public sector suffers from a remarkably large number of actors. This is primarily due to the need for a multidisciplinary approach but it is not just about leaders, departments and agencies that are primarily involved in solving crises. In the immediate vicinity of each primary involved actor there are miscellaneous interested parties not directly related to the crisis but its impact can affect the outcome. All stakeholders bring with them their own interests that want to protect. It is amazing how much these interests could be deferent and incompatible. In fact, what some see as a threat others see as an opportunity<sup>16</sup>. In the multi-agency environment where the crisis takes place, every actor can also have a different perception of the size, nature and content of the threat and the time constraints the crisis imposes<sup>17</sup>. It is inevitably that substantially different apprehension will be reflected in the manner and degree of agencies involvement in crisis solving. Where policy making is divided between numerous players with differing perceptions and interests, nobody seems to be

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<sup>15</sup> Rosenthal Uriel, 'T Hart Paul and Kouzmin Alessander (1991) *"The bureau-politics of crisis management"*

<sup>16</sup> Rosenthal Uriel, 'T Hart Paul and Kouzmin Alessander (1991) *"The bureau-politics of crisis management"*

<sup>17</sup> Van Santen Willem, Jonker Catholijn and Wijngaards Niek (2009) *"Crisis Decision Making Through a Shared Integrative Negotiation Mental Model"*

ultimately responsible for the compromises that finally emerge<sup>18</sup>. It is not just the policy making and responsibility but also access to the tasks for the agencies taking on the result of a compromise. As a matter of fact it seems that a compromise has multiple important roles in crisis resolving within the bureau-political environment. First, it is known that frequently compromise can result in powerful frustration of some of the parties involved. After reaching a compromise for some of actors the question remains whether it could be done more during the exchange of arguments. Second, the party that is under pressure, deviated from the original opinion. That party will leave discussion, unconvinced in the agreement and enter with suspicion in the execution. The most recent case of Police response during the riots due to the pride parade in October 2010 in Belgrade is sophisticate example of bureau-political behaviour, especially the presence of different interests.

LGBT population is not very popular in conservative Serbia. On the other hand there is a strong Serbian public perception of the need to accept the value of European Union. Such an ambivalent attitude is often used by extreme right groups and especially hooligans in dealing with his opponents. The first attempt at pride parade in 2003 ended in a brutal attack by hooligans on participants under the circumstances, almost non-existent police response. In October 2010 the authorities were determined to ensure the maintenance of the parade. The task of the security forces was to protect the parade participants. It was engaged more than 5,500 police officers, gendarmerie and antiterrorist squad which seems sufficient to cope with some 6,000 rioters. On the extremely violent rioters attempts to reach out to parade participants security forces reacted by refusing troublemakers and keeping them at a safe distance from the parade place. Actions of the security forces were carried out by the book. Tactically speaking everything was done in a disciplined and highly trained manner. Concern is problematic strategy that was used on that occasion. The lack of attempts to break the violent groups and push them away as far as possible from the security zone is the cause of an unusually large number of injured police officers and enormous material damage made to the city centre. Apparently hesitant strategy in fact has a very strong foothold in the circumstances that preceded the event and the very situation on the ground.

The primary task of the police was to protect the parade participants for what was needed to make a security ring volume of nearly ten kilometres. Any expansion of

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<sup>18</sup> **Bovens, Mark** (1990) "The social steering of complex organisations"

fields of action would require a involvement of additional forces (that were not available) or the weakening of the security ring. To break up violent groups would require far more aggressive police action. This approach request for motivation of the security forces, which is very questionable in case of Serbian police. Criticism of Milosevic's brutality dealing with demonstrators during the nineties often went to the police account which is the reason why they still have bad reputation in the public. Also, the question is how, poorly paid and not so well equipped Serbian police, is in the mood for risky actions.

Second, security services have estimated that the maintenance of the Pride Parade carries too great risk and the event should be cancelled, but the political pressure in favour of the parade pushed in to the opposite. Signals from Brussels that indicate the necessity of respecting the rights of vulnerable groups and the freedom of assembly Serbian government has seen as an obligation of a successful parade. In this set of circumstances the burden of extremely high-risk events dropped to tactical units.

Third, it is striking that almost nothing has been done in the preparation period in order to avoid the excess. It is important to note that in Serbia there is a visible problem of extreme fan groups. There were numerous outbursts of vandalism and violence that these groups have caused in the last decade and some of these events have had a fatal outcome. Hundreds of the perpetrators are arrested in the past few years and prosecutors brought dozens of lawsuits. After all, most of the hooligans were released to bail and the court has made only a few final judgements. On the other hand, investigators claimed that they had information on preparation of violence during the pride parade which was reason enough for arrestment, but this did not happen. Knowing that the LGBT population do not enjoy high reputation in Serbian public opinion, politicians are only declaratory and reserved supported parade, and so the problem is not that prevented either from this side. Finally, by Financing parade and use of the huge funds for security in the midst of economic crisis and financial instability, the government has provoked the wrath of citizens and thereby reduce public resistance to the protests that heralded. Therefore, again the whole problem was attributed to tactical units.

To complete the picture on the bureau-political behaviour related to the present case it is necessary to describe what followed. The Ministry of Interior asserted professional response of the security forces and the sacrifice that the police pressed on



this occasion. Ministry of Justice has asserted a compelling need to accelerate, otherwise seriously disputed, the judicial reform. Police, once again, highlighted the difficult conditions under which they perform the tasks and the need for new equipment and the police union threatened a strike if they do not increase wages and benefits for members of security forces. Political leaders were competing in praise of the police. LGBT associations, as the main instigators of the external pressure on the government, are declared the cops as heroes.

Expectedly large number of stakeholders in this case acted exactly in accordance with bureau-political theory. Almost each of the involved parties in public administration had created their own understanding of the current crisis. All involved departments and agencies have used the opportunity to exploit the event in order to protect their own interests. In the prevention phase, in spite of a clearly defined problem, no one has claimed responsibility for its solving. The applied solution was highly compromised. The parade had to be held in order to protect the reputation of Serbia. Preventive action has failed because it lacked the support of the public, the judicial failure and determination of politicians and the investigators. Tactical units have accepted the ungrateful role in the response phase, but they conditioned their future engagement by requesting greater benefits.

Result of dealing with the mentioned crisis gives a note of sophistication of this case. The impression was formed that the crisis is successfully resolved because the parade was held without consequences for the safety of participants. If we recall that crisis occur when core values or life-sustaining system of the community come under threat<sup>19</sup> we will come to the conclusion that the crisis is far from solved. The problem is, of course, that crisis situations often affect more than one value (.....). Indeed, determination to protect the sensitive values such as rights of vulnerable groups or the right of public assembly is to demonstrate. After all, it appears that core value present in affected is sense of security of citizens. That day police did not cut off riots but the rioters themselves withdrew after the parade. Without the poll can be assumed that 174 police officers injured during the five hours of the conflict and more than a million euro of damage to urban infrastructure resulting in a high degree of people's uncertainty.

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<sup>19</sup> Boin Arjen, 'T Hart Paul, Stern Eric and Sundelius Bengt (2005). *"The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under Pressure"*

Moreover it seems that the response of state authorities did not aim the preservation of security, but cover-up and solving various problems within the public sector.

The perception of the term bureau-politics gives the impression of negative effects. Bearing in mind the strong criticisms of public administration to which this model applies, one could conclude the definition of the model brought to the surface all crucial anomalies in public affairs. Organizational disorder, irresponsibility, selfishness and even abuses that may accompany the phenomenon of bureau-political environment, particularly concern in dealing with critical events. The concern is apparently justified, but the sensation of exclusively negative implication of the bureau-political behaviour during the crisis could be serious mistake. The public is familiar with examples of crisis management failures as a consequence of miscommunication, poor cooperation and lack of trust among different departments, agencies and authority levels. All analysis shows that these phenomena are some of the causes of so many victims during fatal events. Competition between intelligence agencies responsible for internal and external intelligence gathering, respectively, stymied the US government's ability to "connect the dots" of evidence pointing to an impending attack. Evaluations of the federal government's response to Hurricane Katrina, too, suggest that poor communication and information sharing between governance levels was partly due to organizational conflicts<sup>20</sup>. The rivalry between Brussels police and the Belgian gendarmerie all together with lack of coordination among emergency services allowed the tragedy of the stadium Heizel 1985. After all, still it would be irresponsible not to examine the benefits of bureau-political environment where crisis management often takes place.

Multi-agency system plays a critical role in avoiding the "tunnel vision" or group-thinking. Contemporary crisis, as often unexpected critical event, is characterized by non-linear dynamics and complexity<sup>21</sup>. Maintaining such occurrence implies strong support by information, analysis and possible solutions. Bureau-political environment acts as a quite acceptable source of various solutions whose presence can facilitate, accelerate and substantially affect the final cognizance.

Competitive nature of bureaucratic politics could be emphatic motivator for all stakeholders. It is truth that research on crisis decision making has dispelled normative

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<sup>20</sup> Cooper, C. and Block, R. (2006). *Disaster: Hurricane Katrina and the Failure of Homeland Security*

<sup>21</sup> Boin Arjen, 'T Hart Paul, Stern Eric and Sundelius Bengt (2005). *"The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under Pressure"*

assumptions that during crisis episodes, which take place under conditions of severe threat, acute urgency, and uncertainty, public officials put aside parochial differences to find solutions in a spirit of solidarity<sup>22</sup>. Considered from a different point of view, due to the desire for special emphasis within the public administration, precisely these relationships can lead to better results.

It is natural that the presence of many stakeholders leads to blame avoidance between the units in aftermath of crisis. On the other hand, in the diffuse system is easier to identify problems that preceded which is a prerequisite for eliminating interference. More closed environment generally tends to group responsibilities making evaluation more difficult.

Last but not least important positive role of bureaucratic politics is the preservation of democratic values. Presence of many actors, as a rule that prevents single-mindedness in crisis circumstances can lead to a constitutional dictatorship. This concern is a powerful motivation for consideration of centralization as a managerial model during crisis.

#### 2.2.2. *Centralization*

There is not so much consensus of scholars, practitioners and the public when it comes to centralization. One of the few is the conclusion that a failed emergency response usually prompts calls for a more centralised response<sup>23</sup>. Never-ending discussions in terms of centralization and decentralization are almost inevitably lost in an ideological trap. As the dogmatic approach is the last which shall be imposed on crisis management, centralization should be seen as an instrument of dealing with critical events.

While the professional community is discussing about the acceptability of one or another model or approach it seems that the general public have much less doubt about the justifiability of centralized management in crisis situations. Background for this uncritical standpoint is perceived connection between crisis components and management that are rooted in time and rarely questioned. Overview of these widely accepted conventional patterns can be valuable for understanding the centralized management during critical situations. By analysis of applied solutions in crisis

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<sup>22</sup> Rosenthal Uriel, 'T Hart Paul and Kouzmin Aleksander (1991) "*The bureau-politics of crisis management*"

<sup>23</sup> Rosenthal Uriel, 'T Hart Paul and Kouzmin Aleksander (1991) "*The bureau-politics of crisis management*"

management it was allocated several key features that indicate the nature of the strong foothold of centralization.

*Acceptability of management's adaptation during crisis* – High level of vulnerability, a strong sense of uncertainty and particularly concern about possible damage and casualties, reduces the sensitivity of society to set standards in the region shaken by critical threats. What's more, it is expected that the response to the crisis, which is often seen as an unexpected, unpleasant and unusual event, should be different from those applied in dealing with commonly issues. A notable example of such adaptation would be the centralization of decision making<sup>24</sup>.

*The necessity of prompt response* – Urgency is one of the most perceived components of crisis. It is considered that urgent response on severe threat could minimize negative consequences. As the requirements of urgent decision making and immediate response are at odds with formal, time-consuming policy procedures<sup>25</sup>, it appears that exclusion of unnecessary participants from the management activities is quite reasonable.

*Demand for hierarchy* – As already pointed out, the crisis is a complex phenomenon, which almost never refers to only one social value. Therefore, in technical terms, crisis is characterized by a distinct multidisciplinary, as such should be treated with a variety of subjects which involves miscellaneous stakeholders in management process. In these, inevitably, network management structure, critical decision could be crucial for the outcome. Hence, not surprising that everyone wants to know who has the dominant role – Who is in charge?

*Suspicious about the public institutions* – High developed western democracies are trying for decades to carve the institutions of the system to ensure regular operation which also, in accordance with the multidisciplinary of crisis, could play an important role during critical events. Many of these organizations are prepared for such circumstances but strongly burdened image of bureaucratic procedures and possible incompetence often increases the uncertainty caused by the crisis. Based on the behaviour of people in conditions of prominent uncertainty, we may conclude that they rather look for encouragement in leaders, then in seemingly impersonal organizations. On the other hand, leaders also do not show a high degree of trust in institutions and

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<sup>24</sup> Rosenthal Uriel, 'T Hart Paul and Kouzmin Alexander (1991) *"The bureau-politics of crisis management"*

<sup>25</sup> Bronner Rolf (1982). *"Decision making under time pressure"*

would rather opt for the dealing with dramatic situation in an environment of closest and most trusted associates.

Step further in defining the role of centralized management during crisis situations would be a rationalization of these attitudes that are generally accepted by inert conducting towards the variable nature and ubiquity of crisis. What's more, with a strong belief we can say that the times of simple answers to complex question are over<sup>26</sup>.

It was previously emphasized that the crisis events cannot be solved in the usual manner. If we accept crisis as periods of upheaval and collective stress, disturbing everyday patterns and threatening core values and structures of a social system in unexpected, often unconceivable, ways<sup>27</sup> then there is no reason for denying the necessity for adaptation, of conventional management system, in particular decision-making, to the new circumstances. Actually, unpredictability of the crisis, somewhat paradoxically, suggested the need for pre-arrangement of possible systems adaptation, in terms of preference, potentially vulnerable, core values. Entirely another issue is about way, type, and extent of adaptation, which is influenced by many circumstances that caused by different, types of crises or, more often, the individual critical situations. As a matter of fact, centralization of decision-making can be a solution, especially at high urgency, when precious time would be wasted by scheduling regular responsibilities. However, cannot be argued that all crises are resolving under the extreme time pressure. More often than not, urgency should be appreciated as a sense of urgency: it is the perception of decision makers rather than some set of predefined circumstances<sup>28</sup>. There is no doubt in the desire that each crisis should be resolved as quick as possible. Although, if the harm caused by excluding different approaches and solutions are greater than that which would be caused by a long decision-making, in this case, the consequences of centralized approaches were extremely unjustified. It should be borne in mind that the most common need for centralized decision-making due to the critical situation is, in fact, consequence of the lack of preparedness for possible incidents. If, as a preventive measure, lines of communication between the key players

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<sup>26</sup> Rosenthal Uriel, Boin Arjen and Comfort Louise (2001). *"Managing Crises: Threats, Dilemmas, Opportunities"*

<sup>27</sup> Rosenthal Uriel, Charles Michael, and 'T Hart Paul (1989) *"The World of Crises and Crisis Management"*

<sup>28</sup> Rosenthal Uriel, Boin Arjen and Comfort Louise (2001). *"Managing Crises: Threats, Dilemmas,*

have not been established, if there are not clearly defined responsibilities and possible sources of information are not pre-planned, centralization seems like the only possible solution, regardless of adverse consequences. In contrast to the previous, centralized decision-making can occur as a result of planning in the preparation phase response to critical events. By establishing a hierarchy, under the preparation plan for the unwanted circumstances, some disadvantages of adaptation can be compensated. It is expected that a hierarchical system will determine the levels of decision making, perform the distribution of responsibilities and establish channels of communication. After all, there is reasonable suspicion that the hierarchical system of command and control may show significant shortcoming in practice. First, the hierarchy is directly dependent on communication between different levels of decision making and operating. As a rule, the crisis is accompanied by a combination of adverse circumstances that may disrupt the communication channels within the hierarchical lines. In this way the system command and control would be compromised, which is inevitably reflecting to the outcome. Second, multidisciplinary nature of the crisis, causes the involvement of different actors who usually do not cooperate with each other under normal circumstances. According to, earlier described, bureau-politics behaviour, it's hard to believe that among people with different interests, even a different perception of the circumstances, it can be established an efficient hierarchical relationship. Third, hierarchy implies the existence of key individuals, depending on their own abilities, they can play a crucial role in recognizing and dealing with crisis. Doubts arise just at the ability of individuals, because the outcome reflects both positive and negative features that occur exactly in stressful situations. As much as it may sound profane, but we should not neglect the importance of physical and mental condition of an individual for whom we rely in crucial moments. Also, consequences of a possible single-mindedness are well known. Of course it's not just about the negative consequences to the democratic heritage, but also the effects of rejection of alternative approaches. The negative impact of the core role of individuals can also be felt in the pre-crisis period. Indeed, key individuals may leave the organization, bringing with them valuable expertise, which can weaken the preparedness of communities or organizations to respond to possible adverse and complex circumstances. It appears that the most acceptable way, to avoid dependence on key individuals, is strengthening institutions and their role in events that threaten society. However, an increasing number of

organizations in the public sector, the burden of the procedures and numerous failures have caused the lack of much needed support for institutions. Indeed, reviewing the recent past it can be concluded that most of the failures in dealing with crisis situations are, in fact, the result of institutional capacity. There are lot of reasons for criticism of public organizations, but criticism is not enough to improve conditions. There is a long way from the newly established organization to the institution with integrity and legitimacy, particularly if the development process takes place in conditions of severe dramatic events that threaten the entire society.

For further discussion about the dilemmas that are indicated in the previous paragraph it could be used case of fatal event, during the football match between Liverpool and Juventus on Heisel stadium in Brussels in 1985. Tension that has characterized this sports event escalated fifty minutes before the game, when a large group of Liverpool's supporters destroyed the fence that separated them from rival fans. Juventus fans have started to run back to avoid the danger that threatened them and then they found themselves pressed by Liverpool supporters on one side and a concrete wall on the other side. Eventually, the wall collapsed under the pressure of the crowd and hurt most of the thirty-nine dead and 400 injured. Other victims were the result of a stampede and a clash between two groups of supporters on the court. After all, it was decided to precede with the game in order to avoid further conflict. Later, this controversial decision was the subject of strong criticism of international public. Tragic event, apparently caused only by uncontrolled behaviour of hooligans, got a slightly different connotation when in analyzing details of the preparation matches, during and after the incident.

Selection of the neutral playground, which should be neutral, has been extremely problematic from the wary begging, taking in consideration numerous Italian community in Brussels. Heisel stadium was built in the 1920<sup>th</sup> and fatal match was announced as the last to be played in that dilapidated construction. It's really hard to understand the choice of Heisel for, probably the most attractive football match in Europe in a season. Additional problems were the counterfeit tickets that caused excessive number visitors at the stadium. All above mentioned indicates that organization of the mach suffered from "group thinking" and single-mindedness. In the case of applying a comprehensive approach that would involve more actors and different perspectives, it is certain that Heisel would not be the final choice. Also, lack

of coordination between football clubs, organizers and the Belgian authorities in the tickets distribution resulted in one of the most influential conditions for such a tragic epilogue.

Particular concern is the way of cooperation between emergency services during the preparation of events. Subsequent investigations showed that representatives of emergency services were excluded from most of the planning sessions. Emergency services were simply not informed of formal and informal meetings and, thus, were required to make their own preparations. Actually, disaster planning and emergency relief did not enjoy a high status in the administrative setting of Brussels at the time. As well, the emergency services' disaster assistance plan for Brussels, launched in January 1985, was seen by the police services as an attempt to by-pass them in this area. In the plan, police services were required to coordinate with the emergency services, with a leading role for the fire brigade. This case is often used as a notorious example of bureau-political behaviour<sup>29</sup> but also the relationships clearly show the instability of formally provided hierarchy between the different services. Status of fire department, points to the fact that some organizations may experience a failure in performing tasks because of someone else's fault, regardless of their own integrity and legitimacy.

During the match lasted a permanent conflict between the gendarmerie, police and other emergency services, which reflected the aspirations of the dominant role. For example, there was a debate between the gendarmerie and fire brigades about the priorities of entry into the stadium during the incident. One might argue that the problem could be resolved by centralization of decision making but it was already demonstrated that a hierarchical relationship, in these circumstances is difficult to achieve. This is especially because the gendarmerie is organized at the national level and the organization was delegated to the city authorities. However, it is hardly possible to avoid the conclusion that the circumstances would be improved by the existence of a higher competent authority that would coordinate the work of all services.

Most of the public misunderstandings were about the decision to continue the game after the incident, despite the information about the many victims. Seemingly inappropriate step, in fact, is one of the few thoughtful decisions related to this tragic event. Continuation of the match was allowed to assist the injured and removal of victims from the field. The most significant is that, in this way, almost certain, street

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<sup>29</sup> 'T Hart Paul and B. Pijenburg. 1989. *"The Heizel stadium tragedy"*



clashes between opposing sides, are avoided. Considering the comprehensive approach which is recognized in the decision to continue the match, it is not clarified whether the move is a result of rapid changes in the organization and operation of the service or the consequence of fear of responsibility for what happened. Anyway, seems that the lesson is learned but, unfortunately, at unacceptably high prices.

Almost all previous discussion points to the conclusion that it is impossible to strictly determine the way of crisis management between centralized and decentralized. Incident Command Systems ICS was developed as a kind of mixture of centralized and decentralized management with the obvious intention to incorporate the positive effects of both approaches and the maximum offset weakness stemming from the individual models. The starting point in the development of ICS was the need, to coordinate from one centre the activities of various, unavoidable, agencies. By this way was created a hierarchical network of crisis management. Analyzing the ICS model in various cases of crises, from forest fires to Hurricane Katrina, Donald Moynihan defined The Nature of Hierarchical Networks in crises<sup>30</sup>:

1. The ICS model incorporates elements of both hierarchy and network.
2. Rapidly changing crises limit the efficacy of a centralized command.
3. Networks grow as crises grow, incorporating new members and becoming more difficult to coordinate.
4. Conflict about who is in charge is likely for large or complex crises, undermining network coordination.
5. The potential consequences and time constraints of crisis situations make it critical that ICS hub organizations have high capacity.
6. Even with command and control systems, ICSs depend on network values such as trust and norms of reciprocity to succeed.

Discussion on the particular model deserves much more space than on this occasion can be given. However, it can be concluded by Moynihan's definition that the mixed approach, maintain a very significant weakness of both, centralization and decentralization. This is not confirmation or denial of the effectiveness of the ICS model, but it should indicate the possible over-defining of the models that serves as instruments of dealing with situations that are difficult or impossible to predict.

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<sup>30</sup> **Moynihan Donald (2007)** *"From Forest Fires to Hurricane Katrina: Case Studies of Incident Command Systems"*

### 2.2.3. *Preference for Routine*

Essential part of everyday activities of modern public organizations is based on pre-defined procedures. Most public organizations were originally designed to conduct routine business in accordance with values such as efficiency, fairness, and lawfulness.<sup>31</sup> Furthermore, the procedures in the functioning of the public sector, often act as corrective factors and control mechanisms in order to preserve democratic values. Consequently, the same management approach has been applied to overcome the crisis circumstances. Public organizations tend to the prescribed procedures in order to more effectively meet the challenges of critical situations. The public sector is not alone in these pursuits, on the contrary. Over time, both academics and practitioners have tried hard to capture 'best practices' of crisis management in standard operating procedures, checklists, organisational structures and even job descriptions<sup>32</sup>. Although the unconstrained application of generally accepted mode of public administration is overriding reason for the development of procedures as the basic instrument of crisis management, there are other typical elements that led to this approach:

*Promptness of response* – The need for rapid reaction is a very common phenomenon that characterizes crisis. Timely response in the first place, involves a combination of decisions that influence the further action. As less time is spent on decision making, the implementation will start earlier, which sometimes can be crucial. The problem is that prompt decision making is uncommon to public institutions. Democratic systems in particular have not been designed for this purpose<sup>33</sup>. Possible answer to the question of public administration's quick reaction is found in the routinization of standing procedures for dealing with crisis. This manner can have life-saving results in less demanding emergency events or incidents that are part of complex crisis such as some hostage situation or evacuation due to set explosive devices as well as in certain natural disasters. In the case of Katrina or the tsunami in Southeast Asia, by the existence of developed routine procedures of early warning and effective evacuation plan, many lives would be saved. Performance of routine procedures is directly conditioned by the degree of events predictability as well as training and mutual

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<sup>31</sup> **Wilson, James** (1989), *"Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It"*,

<sup>32</sup> **Boin Arjen and Lagadec Patrick** 2000. *"Preparing for the future: Critical Challenges in Crisis Management"*

<sup>33</sup> **Rosenthal Utiel** (1990) *"Politics in Administration: Max Weber and the Quest for Democratic Order."*

cooperation of those who carried out this procedure. Exactly the absence of these preconditions is the primary reason for the unspeakably tragic outcome in New Orleans 2005<sup>th</sup>.

*Common features of crisis* - Crisis can be divided into groups according to different criteria. Probably the most frequently mentioned division of crises is caused by natural and man-made disasters such as earthquake and air pollution. Then, crisis could be distinguished by object of basic threats<sup>34</sup> as in the case of hydro power surge threatened by swollen river or embassy occupied by terrorists. Also, the crisis can be divided according to the values that are threatened, so we can hear about security crisis, economic crisis, etc. Therefore, there are many different typologies of the crises that are distinguished according to common characteristics inside specific classifying criteria. These common features may be valuable for the development of policies that would be implemented in critical circumstances. Hence, common features could be used as a pillar of routine procedures during crisis events. After the experience due to, terrorist attacks in Tehran 1979<sup>th</sup>, the bombing of embassy in Beirut 1983<sup>th</sup>, then the attack in Dar es Salaam, and generally growing threat from terrorism symbolized by the event of September 11<sup>th</sup>, the U.S. government has implemented several policies aimed at preserving the security of diplomatic missions. Among other issues, there was a fairly detailed framework for the construction of embassy buildings. This act prescribes measures such as minimum area of ground for construction, the contents of the embassy's complex, conditions to select the position and many other regulations defined based on best practices and experiences from all around the world. It should be noted that the utility of common characteristics in crisis management is growing in proportion to their numbers and similarity. More or less, this can be viewed as a statistical approach to crisis management with a strong reliance on the probability of the event.

*Complexity of crisis* – This paper repeatedly underline the complexity of the crisis as one of the basic guidelines in crisis management. Simultaneous threats to multiple values, cause-effect relations of individual events during the crisis and the high tech environment, require a multidisciplinary approach to managing crisis situations. It would be desirable to analyze the threat from several angles and in the same way to be prepare, with the objective of comprehensive and effective response to critical events.

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<sup>34</sup> Rosenthal Uriel and Kouzmin Aleksander (1997) “*Crises and Crisis Management: Toward Comprehensive Government Decision Making*”

This structured approach towards crisis management has proved effective in the face of the impending Millennium disaster<sup>35</sup>. The case of millennium bug is an atypical event in many ways. The ubiquity of information technology in all spheres of humanity caused the extraordinary importance of possible consequences. It was impossible find a solution based on best practices because there are no similar experience. Solving this problem required the involvement of large number of scientists for a long time. Unusual features of this case such as the certainty of the event and enough time for preparedness were also key factor of its solution. The truth is that the crisis is extremely rare characterized by these features.

It is obvious that routine procedures have practical value in crisis management. In some circumstances, it is difficult to imagine an appropriate response to the indication of a threat, without applying routine activities. However, there are indications that the routine can cause negative effects, even completely opposite to those we aspire to. The management of crisis often requires flexibility, improvisation, redundancy, and the occasional breaking of rules which is not compatible with routine activities. It seems that the very nature of the crisis prevents reliance on routine procedures. This discrepancy creates a tension that will always exist between institutional tendency to routinize crisis management practices and procedures and necessity to operate in a flexible and adaptive way in the event of crisis<sup>36</sup>. If we attempt to define the gap between preference for routine and crisis management, we come to some knowledge whose application could improve the ability of public administration to respond to critical threats.

First, it is well known that surprise is a fundamental characteristic of crises. By reducing the degree of predictability of the threat is less possibility to develop procedures that would be responded. Such a surprise it happened during the San Francisco Earthquake, in October 1989<sup>37</sup>. Many fire alarms and smoke detectors used by major San Francisco institutions were monitored from Chicago. Under normal conditions, this seemed to be a satisfactory and rational solution. In a generalized emergency, the remote monitoring centre could not reach the fire station in the affected

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<sup>35</sup> **Boin Arjen and Lagadec Patrick** (2000.) *“Preparing for the future: Critical Challenges in Crisis Management”*

<sup>36</sup> **Rosenthal Uriel, Boin Arjen and Comfort Louise** (2001). *“Managing Crises: Threats, Dilemmas, Opportunities”*

<sup>37</sup> **Lagadec Patrick** (1993) *“Preventing Chaos in a Crisis: Strategies for prevention, control and damage limitation”*

area. The whole basis for the system collapsed because the telephone network was overloaded, and no one could call in from outside. San Francisco is known as a seismically unstable region and previous experience have caused a good preparedness of local emergency services. However, the surprise factor made it impossible for their timely response.

Second, crisis situation is like a kaleidoscope. If we touch the smallest element in it, the entire structure is altered. Consequently, the crisis resists attempts to simplify it<sup>38</sup>. On June 1976 Palestinian terrorists hijacked a Air France plane with 248 passengers and crew members who flew on the flight to Israel and forced it to land in Uganda. This, in many ways exceptional situation was ended by magnificent action of the Israeli Defence Forces at Entebbe airport, in which hostages were rescued with only one victim of the Israeli army<sup>39</sup>. The so-called, Operation Thunderbolt quickly became a subject of interest for a number of armed forces in the world, both because of success, as because of way it is made, and the circumstances in which it occurred. The U.S. Army has gone a step further and based on experiences from the foray on Entebbe Airport, has developed a highly trained unit, later known as Delta Force. One of the first actions of this unit was an attempt to rescue hostages from the embassy in Tehran in April 1980. While the operation, named Eagle Claw<sup>40</sup>, resemble on the Entebbe airport situation, it was resulted by complete failure at the outset. On that occasion, eight American soldiers were killed, even before direct release of hostages began. This case emphasize the deleterious effects of relying on best practices without taking into account the fact that there are certainly some details that can completely change the outcome. Countless cross-linked elements, making the crisis too complex, to based it's resolving on previous experiences.

Third, too thoroughly trained and provided routine procedures could completely prevent the removal of threats. Well-trained executives often focus on the proper and credible implementation of prescribed activity than on solving problems that are causing the crisis. In this context, it is interesting to note the sequence of case Three Mile Islands<sup>41</sup>. In an attempt to solve a problem that could have dramatic consequences, the

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<sup>38</sup> **Lagadec Patrick** (1993) *"Preventing Chaos in a Crisis: Strategies for prevention, control and damage limitation"*

<sup>39</sup> **www.dover.idf.il** *"Entebbe diary"*; Israel Defence Forces

<sup>40</sup> **Special Operation review group** (1980) *"The Holloway Report"*

<sup>41</sup> **Perrow Charles** (1984) *"Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies"*

operator of the equipment is carried out all measures envisaged by the handbook, but the threat still remained. Only after the inclusion of Engineers, which were not part of the standard team at the plant, the problem is resolved in a manner not contemplated by standard procedures.

Fourth, the unpredictability of the crisis certainly limits the possibility of preparing for emergencies. Therefore, when circumstances are rapidly deviate from the supposed course, improvisation is imposed as a kind of unlocking process. This is not to claim that improvisation is the basis of crisis management, but that is a reasonable approach in some circumstances, for sure. The key question is: when to improvise. Routine enforcement procedures are confronted with a timely response to this question, and exactly this decision at the right time can save lives. The crucial role of improvisation is clearly reflected in the resolution of the dramatic circumstances during the Apollo 13 mission, especially in the way that enables removing of carbon dioxide from the module<sup>42</sup>.

#### *2.2.4. Institutionalization of Crisis management*

Quite a long time the crisis is perceived as an undesirable phenomenon that comes and goes. The period between arrival and departure of the crisis belonged to the experts, whose task was to make this period as short as possible and minimize the consequences. Top management is also implicated but their engagement last as long as the crisis lasted, with a marked tendency to return to daily activities. However, the theory and practice of crisis management have gradually adopted a wider and more comprehensive perspective. Crises are no longer seen as events with a clear-cut beginning and a distinct cut-of point<sup>43</sup>. This broader understanding of the crisis has opened a space for the institutionalization of the treatment of crisis events. Hence, the immediate cause of institutionalization is the desire for a certain outcome but the process is burdened with a multitude of other influences. Policy feedback is based on inner sources on information rather than on freely expressed response to outcome<sup>44</sup>. One of the most worrying problems in both the public and private sector is how to diagnose

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<sup>42</sup> [www.nasa.gov](http://www.nasa.gov) "Apollo 13 - A Successful Failure"

<sup>43</sup> Rosenthal Uriel and Kouzmin Alessander (1996) "Crisis Management and Institutional Resilience"

<sup>44</sup> Rosenthal Uriel and Kouzmin Alessander (1996) "Crisis Management and Institutional Resilience"

and determine the adequate level of institutionalization<sup>45</sup>. Depending on the political development and economic growth, countries often suffer from over-institutionalization and the under-institutionalization. Both phenomena may impair the ability of public administration and thus its capacity for crisis management.

From the time of severe economic depression in thirties of the twentieth century, the generally accepted response of governments to existing and persistent phenomenon is the establishment of public organizations that would permanently deal with these problems. The same model was applied when it comes to treatment of various types of crises that are present and which increase in the future we can certainly expect. In contrast to the frequent tendency in critical situations to entrust managerial processes to capable individuals, in aftermath of crisis, the public sector tends to establish new organizations with the aim of efficient crisis management in the future. For example, the collapse of operation Eagle Claw was the direct motive for the establishment of United States Special Operations Command. It has already been mentioned that one of the measures that followed the September 11 was establishment of a United States Department of Homeland Security and set up of European Network and Information Security Agency was EU's response to the growing cyber crime. It is clear that public institutions are already very important element of crisis management and it is expected that this will magnify the importance in the foreseeable future since there is no indication of an alternative approach that could be applied by public sector. On the other hand, many failures in resolving the crisis managed by public institutions and more restrained public trust suggest the obvious problems in this area.

*The difference between the institutions and organizations* - In addition to frequent identification, there are very significant differences between institutions and organizations. Boin and Kofman<sup>46</sup> define very useful characteristics of highly institutionalized organizations. First, it is an organization with a distinct identity, a particular way of working, and a certain way of going about the organization's daily business. Second, it is an organization that has established a high degree of legitimacy. From this it can be concluded that process of institutionalization thus consists of

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<sup>45</sup> Selznik Philip (1992) *"The Moral Commonwealth: Social Theory and the Promise of Community"*

<sup>46</sup> Boin Arjen and Kofman-Bos Celesta (2003) *"The Emergence of Public Institutions: Towards a dynamic theory of institutional birth and development"*

building a distinct identity that is appreciated, accepted and trusted by stakeholders<sup>47</sup>. Concern in this case is not related to the issue of institutionalization, but the ability of organization to cope with crisis in such conditions. Considering this is a newly established organization that has not gone through a process of institutionalization, its integrity is certainly not recognized by stakeholders. The question is, how much can we expect in critical situations, from the organizations that did not have the opportunity to acquire reputation and trust in society. Probably the results will not be at the desired level. It is not difficult to assume that such organizations can be shoved, lost, or their existence can be politicized. On the other hand, the highly institutionalized organizations such as police, fire brigade or medical emergency service, may be criticized for failure but it will not in any way jeopardize their existence. Furthermore, their legitimacy can be reduced but it is very possible that it will not affect their status in the state mechanism, even in a society. This reminds us of cases of the Belgian gendarmerie after the Heisel tragedy or the U.S. intelligence services in aftermath of September 11th.

It seems that this disproportion in the treatment of organization could seriously jeopardize the ability of public administration to manage crisis. The variable nature of the crisis requires a flexible, reasonable and meaningful approach in all areas, including institutional development. Rigid conception of institutional development in terms of crisis management in many cases could put the society in a defenceless position, especially if it is perception of public organization based on subjective awareness.

*Purpose of Institution* - As at the beginning of this subchapter ascertained, many if not most public organizations are the recognizable product of the immediate past<sup>48</sup>. Many organizations were created to meet the challenges that have been identified and that society was not prepared. When the development of institutions is the consequence of a critical event, the result is a newly established organization that specializes to cope with a particular kind of crisis. These organizations are showing different results, but they are coping with crisis situations with more or less success. The future development of "Crisis organizations" is conditioned by many factors but, certainly clearly aimed at

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<sup>47</sup> **Boin Arjen and Kofman-Bos Celesta** (2003) *"The Emergence of Public Institutions: Towards a dynamic theory of institutional birth and development"*

<sup>48</sup> **Boin Arjen and Kofman-Bos Celesta** (2003) *"The Emergence of Public Institutions: Towards a dynamic theory of institutional birth and development"*



addressing critical events. The real question is what happens to organizations that are aimed at a segment of social development. Many transitional countries have recognized the small and medium enterprises as a development opportunity and try to recover this economic sector. The same case was also with Serbia. In order to strengthen small and medium enterprises, the Serbian government established the Agency for SME's development. As usual, the activities of this agency are: to support the creation of an enabling environment for SME growth and development, participation in the development of regulations and the creation of institutional infrastructure for the establishment and development of SMEs, non-financial direct support for SME sector, preparation and implementation of education programs for instructors and training of entrepreneurs and managers of SMEs, coordination of regional network, international cooperation, promotion of entrepreneurship and to assist SMEs in new technologies and support their innovative activities<sup>49</sup>. SME's development in Serbia, with more or less deviation, went upward until beginning of the global economic crisis in 2008<sup>th</sup>. SMEs are strongly affected by the crisis and the sector is crying out for help. Since it is recognized as one of the pillars of the economy, it would be dangerous to leave the sector to self-struggle with adversity. Who is responsible to help them? It is unrealistic to expect from the agency, whose tasks are strictly developmental, to deal with the problems of SMEs in the global economic crisis. After all, such an expectation is a sort of paradox. The task of crisis management is to survive and return to the pre-crisis atmosphere, which is in contradiction with the development. Of course it is often possible to convert crisis into an opportunity, but government agencies are simply not designed to find alternatives in unusual circumstances. This point to the possibility of endangerment of many socially significant elements, due to the development of specialized institutions only on the basis of previous experience.

*Existing Alternatives* - Dissatisfaction with the performance of the institutions in dealing with critical situations as well as unsuccessful attempts to make traditional institutions more efficient caused the desire to find alternative solutions. It may be noted that there is no so many revolutionary ideas in this field. Moreover it seems that both practitioners and theorists prefer to maintain a safe ground of reconstruction and repair of the existing system rather than show strides in the uncertainty of establishing a completely new approach. However, when it comes to crisis management, it could be

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<sup>49</sup> [www.sme.gov.rs](http://www.sme.gov.rs)

divided into three alternatives that cause the most debate: High Reliability organizations, Synthetic organizations and private organizations.

The structural complexity of public institutions is often stressed as the primary problem in solving urgent, unforeseen and comprehensive critical situations. One of the most common ways to minimize the environmental impact of intended effects of bureaucracy, resulting from the specific institutional design is the formation of ad hoc organizations with clearly defined goals and lifetime. What distinguished such a system from lower levels of structural complexity is the fact that elaborated shared systems of meaning exists<sup>50</sup>. James Thompson called this mechanism “*Synthetic organizations*”. According to Thompson characteristic of “Synthetic organizations” is headquarter established based not on authority in any formal sense but upon scarce capacity to coordinate<sup>51</sup>. These ad hoc synthetic organizations can be highly effective in achieving complex or highly contingent tasks, but they are rarely efficient in resource terms. The overriding reason for this tension between effectiveness and efficiency is that the synthetic organization must simultaneously establish temporary structure and carry out non routine operations<sup>52</sup>. Although these organizations are empowered with adequate decisions, they continue to operate in a bureaucratic environment. After all, the available resources are still in executive control of public institutions<sup>53</sup>.

There is no doubt that errors are inevitable. In any system, no matter how well designed, failures occur, particularly those caused by man. However, there are activities in which the slightest mistake, as a rule, resulting in unacceptable consequences. Particularly visible examples include nuclear power plant operation, radioactive and toxic-waste management, widely dispersed electrical generation and distribution systems, large-scale telecommunication and computer networks, express air freight, and maintenance of the purity of blood supplies used for transfusions. It is notable that this class of organizations is deeply embedded in the public sector, many are operated by public servants, and few of them do not draw the searching scrutiny of regulatory bodies

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<sup>50</sup> **Burton Richard and Eriksen Bo** (2006) “*Organization design: the evolving state-of-the-art*”

<sup>51</sup> **Thompson James** (1967). “Organizations in action”

<sup>52</sup> **Rosenthal Uriel and Kouzmin Alexander** (1997) “*Crises and Crisis Management: Toward Comprehensive Government Decision Making*”

<sup>53</sup> The limited empirical data available does not allow me to make any precise statements about Synthetic organization

and an increasingly nervous public<sup>54</sup>. Therefore, the purpose of so-called *High-Reliability Organizations* is continuously performing the duties of vital importance under the failure-free terms. Theorists are not inclined to this type of organization. Moreover, the HRO are often characterized as unsustainable because of defects, such as the inability to conduct "trial and error" decision-making, a strong dependence on the procedures and the like. In contrast, it seems that the practice substantially denied the allegations. If we advert to the commonly activities of HRO, will be faced with revelation that there are very few omissions in their work. Indeed, the very rare cases, an accident caused by air traffic control work. Also, incidents on naval aircraft carriers are not common. Fortunately, nor nuclear power plant disaster are not often. Therefore, the ideal of failure-free performance is not met fully but errors are extremely rare. The HROs are characterized by very clear, well-agreed-upon operational goals<sup>55</sup>. Unlike traditional organizations in HROs focus is on failure rather than success and reliability rather than efficiency<sup>56</sup>. Hence, the imposed question is: can the HRO approach be used as a pattern for functioning of all organizations in public sector that are supposed to cope with crisis situations; probably not. Circumstances that do not tolerate mistakes prevented the cognitive processes that are typical for bureaucratic organizations. Technological characteristics of the HROs tasks cause limited field of action in which a greater degree of predictability allows learning through simulations and, by this, developed procedures makes more effective. Also it should not be forgotten that HROs have almost unlimited budgets, which is, for other organizations, elusive condition.

Often stressed the claim, that the private sector may be faster, better and cheaper to do everything that the public sector does, is basically correct. Therefore, no wonder increasingly claims that in the case of crisis management should rely on private organizations, primarily because of their market orientation. Yet, viewed in a broader sense, the insistence on this position led to a collective amnesia about the manifest failures of capitalism in the late 1920s and the possibility of more corporate crises and

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<sup>54</sup> **LaPorte Todd and Consolini Paula** (1991) *"Working in Practice but Not in Theory: Theoretical Challenges of High-Reliability Organizations"*

<sup>55</sup> **LaPorte Todd and Consolini Paula** (1991) *"Working in Practice but Not in Theory: Theoretical Challenges of High-Reliability Organizations"*

<sup>56</sup> **Weick Karl, Sutcliffe Kathleen and Obstfeld David** (1999) *"Organizing for High Reliability: Processes of Collective Mindfulness"*

market failures<sup>57</sup>. Is it necessary to mention that public institutions did not have much stake in the economic crisis that has shaken the entire world, at the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century? What's more, in this case, public institutions would rather be borne by some of the blame for the inaction and abandonment of a whole system that can cause global consequences, in the hands of private institutions. Through this work is repeatedly stressed, the importance of clear and undivided awareness within the system that copes with crisis. In the bureaucratic institutions this affection, more often than not, is not reached. If we look at the case of private security companies involved in Iraq by the U.S. Government, we can conclude that the orientation towards the common goal was not achieved even in private companies involved in crisis situations. This is not the intention to dismiss the possibility of engaging the private sector in solving the critical situation of public importance. On the contrary, public-private partnership in the event of crisis can solve many problems such as engagement of additional capacity for which there is no compelling need under normal circumstances. Here is indicated that the criteria, such as ownership and market orientation, are not legitimate in the case of institutional approach to crisis management.

### **2.3. Impact of Critical trends**

A lot of time and energy is spent trying to find a practical and theoretical ways to extract the crisis from the environment and treat it as an isolated event. These efforts are not surprising. No matter how complex it could be, an isolated event can be seen at a much more objective way. The truth is, however, that modern society is too content that anything could be protected from the subjective influences. The future crises will become endemic features of modern society as they reproduce themselves in mutating forms<sup>58</sup>. More than a few general trends in modern society reflexively influence, even on the assumption of the crisis, and turn it into an event with a brand new features and challenges.

#### *2.3.1. Mediatization*

Ubiquity of mass media and their impact to the entire society is an inexhaustible source of controversies. The fact is that the media shape the everyday life and thereby

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<sup>57</sup> Kouzmin Aleksander (2008) "Crisis management in crisis"

<sup>58</sup> Boin Arjen and Lagadec Patrick 2000. "Preparing for the future: Critical Challenges in Crisis Management"

influence the future of society. In critical circumstances, the role of media becomes more apparent, simply because the consequences of these circumstances are more explicit. Primordial role of media in critical situations is providing citizens with information and raising awareness of the circumstances and consequences. Crisis management becomes rumour management and media management<sup>59</sup>. Due to the growing dissatisfaction with public institutions in general and especially their reactions to crisis events, in addition to the role of guardian of democracy, the media accepted the role of control and corrective factors of authority's actions. However, technological advances and the ongoing development of the media rise to changes that are difficult to follow. Popularization of the Internet has irrevocably changed the media landscape and with other technologies such as satellite and mobile communications media are permanently globalized. The structure and culture of media markets and organizations have become more competitive, more sensationalistic and more aggressive in their surveillance of political administrative elites<sup>60</sup>.

Remembering Breed's observation that "newsman are close to big decision without having to make them"<sup>61</sup> attention will be focused here on certain features of the media that in critical situations, depending on the circumstances, can have completely opposite effects on the outcome.

The role of media in presenting the crisis continues to inspire analysts. Polemics about the growing influence of media on the perception of crisis are increasing. The understanding of this phenomenon helps Thomas Theorem<sup>62</sup>: "If men define their situations as real, they are real in their consequences". Hence, if CNN define a situation as a crisis, it will be a crisis in its consequence<sup>63</sup>. This statement has contributed that the term "CNN'- crisis." comes to life. Indeed, for many crises the public never found out or have passed with a minimum of attention, some are overwhelm all other events in the current period and recorded as historic. Chernobyl disaster has left an indelible mark in

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<sup>59</sup> **Boin Arjen, Ekengren Magnus, Rhinard Mark** (2006) "*Functional Security and Crisis Management: Capacity in European Union*"

<sup>60</sup> **Boin Arjen, 'T Hart Paul, Stern Eric and Sundelius Bengt** (2005). "*The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under Pressure*"

<sup>61</sup> **Breed Warren** (1955) "*Social control in the newsroom: A functional analysis*"

<sup>62</sup> **Thomas William and Thomas Dorothy** "*The child in America: Behaviour problems and programs*"

<sup>63</sup> **Rosenthal Uriel, Boin Arjen and Comfort Louise** (2001). "*Managing Crises: Threats, Dilemmas, Opportunities*"

many areas of humanity. Because of presence in the media, even today we learn some lessons from the disaster that has provoked so much tragedy. Unfortunately there are cases which are not, for various reasons, not recorded in the media. Majak nuclear complex plants have repeatedly befallen the accident, and the most serious of them occurred in 1957, when he scheduled the cooling system in one of the reservoirs with nuclear waste. Fuel tank exploded and the amount of radiation that is then released several times outnumbered Chernobyl. At least 20.000 square kilometres around the plant Majak are the hardest zone of radioactive contamination on the planet. To date, no one knows how many people were killed in an explosion in 1957, much less how many of them got sick or died as a result of the radiation. Majak is seen by many as “permanent Chernobyl” because the local complex remained in operation until today, with more than 100 disasters only until 1970<sup>64</sup>. It is possible that victims of these tragedies can be forgotten, and mankind will be deprived of valuable lessons from these accidents. The ubiquity of Chernobyl case in the media resulted in numerous debates about the real causes of the disaster. There are two reports on the causes of the Chernobyl tragedy and the supporters of one or the other are still conflicting arguments. More often than not, proactive media coverage or the sheer momentum of events results in active outside participation<sup>65</sup>. As already noted, different views can contribute to solving complex problems, if not in the ongoing case, then in some future event.

In 1994 Irish Sunday Independent journalist, Veronica Guerin, began, in her articles, to cover the topic of drug trafficking in Ireland. Very soon it turned out that, until then, not an interesting topic has caused much public attention but also attention of the actors themselves from the world of Irish crime. The problem of drug trafficking has become the news number one. During the investigating of drug dealers, she did not hesitate to lists in her article, the names of the most powerful men of the underworld. It is obvious that her findings were correct. After multiple threats, injuries, and attempted assassination, she was killed on 26 June 1996 on behalf of Irish drug lords. Veronica's murder sparked public outrage, directed to criminals but also to the authorities who were unable to protect her or to do anything significant against drug trafficking. But when we consider steps that followed, this case is given an entirely different

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<sup>64</sup> **Sasa Bojic** (20.11.2010) “*Majak - permanent Chernobyl*”

<sup>65</sup> **Rosenthal Uriel and Kouzmin Alessander** (1997) “*Crises and Crisis Management: Toward Comprehensive Government Decision Making*”

connotation. In the next few years were arrested and convicted almost all of which were mentioned in Veronica's articles. Ireland's constitution was changed in order to enable confiscation of proceeds of crime and passed a law regulating this issue. This led to the formation of the Criminal Assets Bureau. For the first time in Irish history was created witness protection program. All these measures have come too late to protect the life of Veronica Guerin but her professionalism, persistence and courage led to major changes in the state relates to the growing crime. It's hard to imagine any other power, in addition to media, which could initiate the efficient operation of government as it was in this case. Moreover, this case shows the ability of the media to heal, at least for a while, some of the negative qualities of public administration, which are in this paper labelled as crucial. However, it seems, in this example, that media, as an institution, did not have a crucial role, but the individual contribution of a journalist and newspaper editor who recognized the importance of her work. In another case, the perception of journalists and editors who covered the event could have unpredictable consequences.

In the autumn of 2010 Serbian authorities have planned a comprehensive, high-risk action of transportation of nuclear waste from the Scientific Institute Vinca to Russia, in where would be permanently stored. For that occasion were provided, until then, not applied security measures and preparations, kept in strict confidence. Three days before the scheduled transport sensational news was published in a Belgrade daily newspaper which announced the action, details described route and planned security measures. It turns out that the news did not cause significant public attention. Perennial problem of nuclear waste from Vinca is well known and it was clear that must be addressed. Given that transport is planned through the Hungary, there is only one path that can pass without entering in a populated area so there was no need for a public debate about the choice of routes. The only epilogue of this news is disclosure of confidential information that could jeopardize the whole action and citizen's safety. It should not be forgotten, that sensationalism is on very high position on the list of journalist's values that often, during critical events, exacerbates the situation. According to later statements of journalists who published classified information, their motive was concerns for the health of people that living near the route of transport. Expressed doubt is completely unjustified because the terrain in which the convoy was moving is very sparsely populated and the risk of storing waste at the Institute for years threatens to turn into a disaster. If a priori accept the sincere concern of journalists we come to the

conclusion that the media suffer from the shortcomings of experts in its ranks, and that their reporting depends on the expertise of the sources they use.

Entrenching the Internet as a primary medium has brought about a revolution, especially when it comes to access to information. The scandal about the announcement of diplomatic correspondence, on Wikileaks, is still going on. Although it still cannot be imagined what would be the consequences of this incident, the event can be characterized as a historical because of the fact that in a few days a huge number of letters marked as a secret, were available worldwide.

### 2.3.2. *Politicisation*

Crises are political events par excellence<sup>66</sup>. Mainly, as a precondition for this statement highlights the double feature of the crisis. While for some the crisis is a threat that must be removed as soon as possible, for others, at the same time, the crisis is an opportunity not to be missed. Also, depending on how is presented, the crisis can be strongly exposed to the public and may remain completely undetected. Some situations can be effectively treated, or they can pass on their own. Crisis events can be resolved in the short term while others can last indefinitely and go to pathology. All this represents a set of challenges for many actors in the political arena.

The unpredictability of the crisis, its course and outcome, leaves room for political debate that is almost impossible to avoid. Search for solutions among the possible negative consequences, risk assessment, the high cost of prevention and the possibility that a crisis does occur, is certainly an excellent ground for the collection and losing political points. Thailand was a particularly popular tourist destination for Swedes, with an estimated 10,000-15,000 in the region at the time<sup>67</sup>. The task for Swedish authorities was to help repatriate its citizens, as well as assist with relief efforts. Slow response to the problem that appears has led to start the blame game between the politicians, public administration and travel agencies. The result is reflected in a number of Swedish citizens who are helplessly waited for state reaction, the loss of confidence in the current government, and eventually the adoption of regulations and procedures that would be applied in similar circumstances. On this occasion, a similar scenario took place in

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<sup>66</sup> Rosenthal Uriel and Kouzmin Aleksander (1997) *“Crises and Crisis Management: Toward Comprehensive Government Decision Making”*

<sup>67</sup> Boin Arjen, 'T Hart Paul and McConnell Allan (2009) *“Crisis exploitation: political and policy impacts of framing contests”*



many western countries. Such kind of situation development is not surprising. Simply, state authorities were not prepared for such a possibility. It has already been stressed in section 2.2.4. that the authorities usually respond by institutional solutions to the crisis that has already happened. Very rarely, the government's pre-prepared response to the events that had not occurred but in the future might happen. However, we must ask ourselves what would happen if the government tried to prepare expensive and complex system of evacuation of several thousand people from all over the world which might be affected by the disaster. If this proposal comes to life before the tsunami in southern Asia, with a high degree of certainty we can assume that applying it would be subjected to criticism of political opponents, because of unjustified resources spending. Before the tsunami and Hurricane Katrina, expensive early warning systems had similar treatment, but today are criticized those governments that don't have funds for the introduction of such systems.

The crisis itself is an extraordinary event. It follows that in such circumstances, take emergency measures, which often serve as an excuse for political action whose consequences go beyond crisis. This applies especially to the restructuring of power by vertical and horizontal lines of authority. Every public organization must satisfy the stakeholders on whom it depends for such crucial resources as political support and adequate funding. In the absence of a believable and acceptable way of working, stakeholders will try to exert control over the critical processes in that organization<sup>68</sup>. It is also possible the opposite. Due to the complexity of the crisis, whose resolution requires specific knowledge and skills, politicians often lose power in favor of specialized agencies. This may not be due to objective circumstances, but rather the result of politicians' fear of liability for the consequences of the crisis they are unable to resolve without the vital participation of agencies. It is even possible that these relations develop into a total socio - political anomaly. Already mentioned the case of the Belgian gendarmerie after Heisel tragedy could constitute an example of such relations. Instead of changes that must occur after the apparent failure, the Belgian government has increased budget for gendarmerie on the grounds that the lack of resources is cause poor results. In critical situations, particularly interesting are the relations between local and central government. In addition, significant resources available to the central

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<sup>68</sup> **Boin Arjen and Kofman-Bos Celesta** (2003) *"The Emergence of Public Institutions: Towards a dynamic theory of institutional birth and development"*

government impose liability for the level of preparedness, especially when it comes to natural disasters. In these circumstances the local authority will rarely miss out an opportunity to shift blame for the negative outcome, to the central level. In both scenarios, ongoing relationships are maintained even after the critical events and be spread to other areas of cooperation. Something similar happened in the relations between the White House and authorities in New Jersey during Hurricane Katrina.

The presence of numerous and various stakeholders in many ways affects the political relations in a critical situation. Influences, to which politicians and public administration are exposed for the sake of individual or group interests of stakeholders, can make political arena a completely incomprehensible to a passive observer. Already enough problematic situations can be paradoxical, due to various influences, which get their legitimacy through the phenomenon of lobbying, ideology and political campaigns. In an attempt to stop a series of awkward moves of White House, during the case of Deepwater Horizon, at June 16<sup>th</sup> 2010. Obama's administration is reached agreement with British Petroleum on creation of the 20 billion dollars spill response fund, which would be used to repair the consequences of this disaster. In the public, this Agreement is seen as a consolation and the attempt of White House to soften criticism regarding the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Still, some Republicans, on that occasion, have stood to defend, for many indefensible, position of BP. Taking advantage of the vulnerability of the Obama's administration, the Republican senator from Texas, Joe Barton described this move of White House as "\$20 billion shakedown". Republicans increasingly accuse Obama of being anti-business<sup>69</sup>. This began a series of mutual recriminations between U.S. Republicans and Democrats so that the immeasurably health, environmental and economic consequences of Deepwater Horizon disaster remaining in the background.

### 2.3.3. *Scientificiation*

Science is at the core of the mankind's progress. Behind the many accomplishments that meet our everyday life are years and decades of scientific work. Naturally, the desire for further advances results in greater investment in science and the efforts of scientists to master the increasingly complex solutions. Longing for longevity

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<sup>69</sup> **Wolf Richard and Hall Mimi** (17.06.2010) "*Republican congressman accuses Obama of '\$20 billion shakedown'*"

motivated scientists in the field of medicine and genetics. The desire to crossing to the longer distances in a short period has caused, once unthinkable, the achievements of the twentieth century. Dependence on energy and more present its lack of resources has led to development of nuclear power plants. Technology has become so increasingly complex to a degree that users often don't understand how the technology works<sup>70</sup>. This kind of a direction of development has its consequences which are not exclusively positive. Our technological systems have become so sophisticated and compressed that a minor malfunctioning is capable of causing a system breakdown<sup>71</sup>. This is not about rare and isolated cases. Dependence on science and high technology is present to all segments of civilization. Wrong weather forecast can affect flood protection, and inadequate assessment of the risk of influenza may jeopardize health of the whole society. The consequences can be much more tragic, as in the case of Chernobyl, which will affect several future generations. Yehezkel Dror stressed that such developments can develop partly because of the growing discrepancy between mega-science and the knowledge or understanding on the part of administration and political decision makers<sup>72</sup>. The question is: what is the level of comprehension of public officials to understand science which by itself is complex and often uncertain. Moreover, it seems that the uncertainty of science is one of the major causes of uncertainty of crisis. Association of British scientists "The Royal Society" celebrating 350 years of existence, has published a report titled "Science sees further" in which stating the twelve key topics that will be the greatest challenge for scientists in the 21 century<sup>73</sup>. "Uncertainty in Science" is among them. One of the authors of the above mentioned report, Professor Tim Palmer points out that important political and business decisions are nevertheless made in the light of uncertain scientific input. Predictions which have properly quantified estimates of uncertainty make for better decision making than over-confident predictions with no estimate of uncertainty. But decisions can only be made if one can value the different probabilistic alternatives<sup>74</sup>. However, from the perspective of decision makers, it is not just about uncertainty of science itself. Remain doubts about

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<sup>70</sup> **Rosenthal Uriel, Boin Arjen and Comfort Louise** (2001). *"Managing Crises: Threats, Dilemmas, Opportunities"*

<sup>71</sup> **Perrow Charles** (1984) *"Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies"*

<sup>72</sup> **Dror Yehezkel** (1986) *"Policymaking under Adversity"*

<sup>73</sup> **Novaković A.** (05. 12. 2010) *"The twelve tasks for scientists"*

<sup>74</sup> **Palmer Tim** (2010) *"Uncertainty in science"*

the source of scientific information and resources to verify these findings. Still stands, partially confirmed the claim that the WHO report on H1N1 pandemic exaggerated. European politicians raise many questions that await answers. Hospitals have changed the priorities in preparation for the swine flu and the government bought millions of doses of vaccines that are unused<sup>75</sup>. It is not difficult to imagine the criticism that the leaders of European countries have suffered in the public, due to unjustified spending.

#### 2.3.4. *Transnationalization*

The crisis has always been blind for the inter-state border. Great Depression and the Second World War in the first half as well as the globalization in the second half of the twentieth century certainly removed doubts about transnationality of crisis, if such doubt ever existed. Natural phenomena such as tsunamis rarely affect only one country. One animal was diagnosed with foot and mouth disease in a remote English farm and, within days, the disease had affected all of Europe<sup>76</sup>. The West-German government at the time of Chernobyl could not prevent or directly mitigate the spread of contamination over the country, as territorial boundaries limited its freedom of action—what was left was the challenge to cope with the facts of life imposed by events outside West German control<sup>77</sup>. These events create legitimate concerns and open up many sensitive issues in international relations. No matter how a State is organized and prepared to deal with the challenges of crisis, its ability is limited by capacities of countries in the region. These limitations are important taking in consideration that the most effective suppress of the crisis is in its "Epicentre" and that everything else is a defence against the inevitable consequences. However, crisis impact on interstate relations goes beyond regional significance. In the combat with major fires in Greece in 2007 along with the local forces participated 37 helicopters, 24 aircraft, 33 special vehicles and over 500 fire-fighters from 23 states. It's true that these countries shown remarkable solidarity, but their willingness to help Greece is connected with power game in international relations. The Macedonian government directed to Greece three fire engines and the 86 fire-fighters but they were returned by Greek border guards due to long lasting dispute

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<sup>75</sup> **Folks Imogen** (19.01.2010) "*Charges: WHO invented a pandemic because of money*"

<sup>76</sup> **McConnell Allan and Stark Alastair** (2002) "*Foot and Mouth 2001: The Politics of Crisis Management*"

<sup>77</sup> **Czada Rolard** (1990) "*Politics and Administration during a 'Nuclear-Political' Crisis: The Chernobyl Disaster and Radioactive Fallout in Germany.*"

between Greece and Macedonia over the name of this country. Crucial role in fire fighting were Russian planes Be-200 Altair. Because of the unique capacities and the superiority for fire fighting these aircraft were engaged on the other hot spots so Greek government waited for them almost a month. Only after engagement of two Be-200 begun a significant suppression of fires. This indicates the weakness of the EU's capacity to respond on the major disasters. It is of particular concern that this fire cost Greece, a member of the European Union, more than five billion euro. When we add the fact that Greece was on the verge of bankruptcy only two years after this fire, it is clear that the EU has strong motive to strengthen their capacity for crisis situations. European response ability in case of major disasters is still on the level of coordination of individual states capacities, which was proved to be insufficient more than once. On the other hand, taking into account similar experience in Italy and Portugal, Russia has found an opportunity to strengthen its geopolitical influence in the region providing help. Even Serbia tried to strengthen the geo-strategic position by concluding an agreement with Russia for development of regional centre for disaster in Nis.

### 3. CRISIS LEADERSHIP - CHALLENGES AND DILEMMAS OF ELECTED OFFICIALS

In this paper, the starting point in analyzing the effects of elected officials in crisis situations is the fact that the leadership position is acquired by being elected. Hence, it is a very unique responsibility for the society and for the values that this society has adopted as common. It is rare that citizens give their trust to the leaders because of their professional qualities. Rather, as Weber argues<sup>78</sup>, it would be because of their charisma and “great political instincts”. This gap, between charisma and the need for performing various everyday tasks in order to manage the state, is filled with the public bureaucracy. Ideally, charismatic leaders and high-ranking bureaucrats complement each other because they are located in different segments of political elites, and this is what a parliamentary democracy requires for success<sup>79</sup>. Of course, the contemporary political scene is far from ideal. It is much more profound vulnerability of one side in relation of the other ones ambition. These basic characteristics of elected officials and the environment, in which they act, become even more profound during critical situations. Extreme events, as expected, are causing a lot more attention and have significant consequences. On the other hand, in such complex circumstances there is less “room for manoeuvre” and the errors often can be corrected. Successful performance in times of collective stress turns leaders into statesmen. But when the crisis fails to dissipate and “normality” does not return leaders are obvious scapegoats<sup>80</sup>. In crisis situations, leaders are not only faced with the crisis, its causes and consequences. Democracy is too complex structure that things could be observed in such simple way. Democratic society insists on the fundamental rights and values in all circumstances, including crisis, not relying on the morale of the leaders but with the developed mechanisms that protect the entire community. In the liberal democracy, public leaders must manage a crisis in the context of delicate political, legal and moral order that forces them to trade off considerations of effectiveness and efficiency against

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<sup>78</sup> Weber Max, (1978), “*Economy and Society*”

<sup>79</sup> Pakulski Jan and Higley John (2008) “Towards Leader Democracy?”

<sup>80</sup> Boin Arjen and 'T Hart Paul (2003) “*Public Leadership in Times of Crisis: Mission Impossible*”

other embedded values – something leaders of non-democratized do not have to worry about as much<sup>81</sup>.

Facing to the above circumstances and concerns that the crisis brought by itself, produce a series of challenges and dilemmas among elected leaders, with which they should cope, often without any alternative that would like to choose.

### 3.1. Facing the Capacities

Unique functions performed by political leaders, are basically very responsible and often dynamic, with a profound pressure of the public exposure. However, the fulfilment of long-term strategic goals, axioms of daily politics, functional public administration and long-term stability, can turn activities of public leaders into routine solving citizens daily problems and mechanical implementation of pre-planned internal activities and adaptation to international trends. In this way, circumstances where the basic social values are endangered and their preservation depends on the readiness of government to make fateful decisions certainly cannot be described. In the face of such pressure, political leaders can be presented with threats to their policy programmes and indeed their own legitimacy<sup>82</sup>. The nature of crisis situations, unpredictability, complexity, and on the first place, possible consequences imply engagement of all available capacities. For leaders this often means facing the truth about their own abilities, resources, and the results of previous work. It is difficult to separate the capacity to be put into operation during crisis situation. Certain types of facilities do not have much significance as an isolated resource, only considered through aggregate form can indicate a degree of readiness for critical events. Still, in the purpose of a clear insight into this issue, the capacity of leaders will be distinguished on the personal and impersonal

#### 3.1.1. Personal capacities

It is clear that extreme situations can cause extraordinary stress particularly in those who deal with the restraint of critical events. That is why special emphasis is placed on the ability of leaders to act rationally and impartially under stress. It is not just about making decisions under the pressure of responsibility and possible consequences

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<sup>81</sup> Boin Arjen, 'T Hart Paul, Stern Eric and Sundelius Bengt (2005). *"The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under Pressure"*

<sup>82</sup> Boin Arjen, McConnell Allan and 'T Hart Paul (2006) *"Inertia or Change? Crisis-induced Challenges for Political Leaders"*

but also delegating tasks, coordinating services and dynamic communication with different actors. Psychological stability of the leaders in crisis management is challenged by continuing pressure, unknown phenomena and consequences of decisions that are often the choice between bad and worse options. Also in the decisive moments it is expected from leaders to retain its distinctive style and personality that motivates associates and maintain a positive spirit. Most of elected leaders, before facing the extreme circumstances believe that they are capable to cope with these challenges. The reality is that most of them are not aware of their capabilities until they are under unexpected pressure since daily duties does not place them in front of such test.

Another important factor of personal capacity that leader should dispose in a crisis, is credibility. Some of decisions that should be adopted are reflected on the large number of citizens. Often, decisions in crises occasions are not popular at all, such as wage cuts during the economic recession, and their implementation is mainly determined by the recognized legitimacy of decision-makers and trust of the citizens. Resolving of critical situations and recovery usually require the solidarity of citizens and frequently certain sacrifice. On the other hand, the citizens of highly developed Western democracies show a low degree of tolerance on the reduction in comfort. Only a leader with strong legitimacy and high level of public trust can reconcile these two circumstances, otherwise it will face a persistent and often irreparable loss of credibility.

### *3.1.2. Impersonal capacities*

When it comes to impersonal capacities, elected leaders are usually facing with the results of their work and the work of their predecessors. Personal capacities, no matter how powerful they are cannot significantly influence the course of extreme occasion, if there are no adequate policies, developed institutions of the system and available resources. The question of impersonal capacities is on the first place a political issue, although it does not seem so at first glance. Here is particularly evident necessity of continuity in the development of instruments to react in critical situations. Mechanisms to cope with the crisis are developing over the years and decades, which implies the most wide political consensus. If there is no general agreement the current leader can be found in almost hopeless position. Of course there is, always politicized, the issue of available resources. Crisis situations are rare, but observed across species, that in terms of management are treated entirely differently (e.g. floods and terrorist attacks) can be considered quite rare. Hence, it is necessary to invest heavily in



prevention of events that rarely occur and, when crisis occurs, it requires major redistribution of resources. These two questions are an endless source of debate for political opponents.

### 3.2. Recognition of the Crisis

Most crises do not appear loud as unexpected force which should be vigorously resisted. On the contrary, the crises mainly escalate after a series of, often very subtle, signals that may indicate a problem. The theory has made significant progress in attempts to define the characteristics of events that can be considered as a crisis. Complete harmony about the definition of crisis is not reached among the scholars but there is no significant disagreement. More than a few studies have been carried out in regard to distinguishing of the crisis according to various criteria. However, there are three components<sup>83</sup> whose detection leads to recognition of the crisis: threat, uncertainty and urgency. These three components are still the subject of major discussion but by careful reading of many crisis cases can be concluded that there is a high degree of consensus among theorists and practitioners about the importance of these components in the recognition of the crisis. Still, seems that theoretical achievements are not so much useful when elected leaders should recognize the upcoming crisis. Bearing in mind some of the exceptions, we should be aware that a leadership position in the public sector is, on the first place, conditioned by the personal charisma, much more than by competence in dealing with crisis. Recognition of crisis events tends to be less homogenous and is influenced by individual experience and imagination as well as available information<sup>84</sup>. Exactly these influences lead to different signal acceptance that require attention, and therefore to a different perception of events.

#### 3.2.1. *Components that should be recognized*

At the beginning of this paper was accepted description of the crisis as “a serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values and norms of a system, which under time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances necessitates making vital

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<sup>83</sup> Boin Arjen, McConnell Allan and ‘T Hart Paul (2010) “*Coping with Unscheduled Events: The Challenges of Crisis Leadership*”

<sup>84</sup> Kouzmin Aleksander (2008) “Crisis management in crisis”

decisions”<sup>85</sup>. This definition relies on three basic characteristics, which determines the perception of the events that need attention.

*Threat* - This issue most frequently referred to the vulnerability of citizen’s physical integrity, and the devastation of material value. Events, in which these kinds of threats are most pronounced, clearly transmit signals about the seriousness of the situation. Armed conflicts and natural disasters do not leave room for a dilemma when it comes to a sense of crisis. On the other hand, some events whose effects may also cause death and mass destruction, such as failure of power plants or chemical incidents, are easily recognizable for the managers of these facilities but not for public leaders. Barack Obama and his administration certainly did not know much about the risks of extracting oil from the seabed at a depth of 2400 meters and the possible consequences of the explosion on the Deepwater Horizon. U.S. Presidents’ perception of this event is entirely dependent on the opinions of experts.

*Time pressure* - Urgency that is often linked to crisis situations in some cases prevents recognition of the crisis. Some strongly manifested events can happen at such short notice that their recognition is irrelevant as is the case of earthquakes. In other cases, the signals that precede the major event are so gentle and emitted in a relatively short period of time that requires a high degree of sensitivity to detect threats. Unfortunately, that sensibility was missing in the U.S. intelligence services in the event of the September 11. so that morning President Bush was listening to a group of children reading in Sarasota elementary school when he learned about second plane crash into the WTC<sup>86</sup>. Of course, there are circumstances in which the signals are clearly stated and the time is limited but enough to recognize threats. In such circumstances, public leaders can play an important role as coordinators of activities. All that preceded the event at the stadium Heisel pointed to a possible incident, but there was no coordination that would prevent the consequences. However, not every crisis is related to the urgency. It can take years or even decades, after the onset of clear signals to the main event of crisis. Sufficient time at their disposal, allows public leaders to recognize the crisis and take the necessary steps. Nevertheless, it appears that leaders do not meet expectations in these circumstances. The problem of climate change and the

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<sup>85</sup> Rosenthal Uriel, Charles Michael, and ‘T Hart Paul (1989) “*The World of Crises and Crisis Management*”

<sup>86</sup> Boin Arjen, ‘T Hart Paul, Stern Eric and Sundelius Bengt (2005). “*The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under Pressure*”

impact of global warming are subject of discussion of experts since the late seventies of last century. Since then, not much has been done in this area, primarily due to the inertia of the leaders. Coping with climate change involves the implementation of unpopular measures so that the identification of critical process is replaced by ignorance.

*Uncertainty* – Very rarely signals clearly indicate a crisis. Precisely from this setting is derived uncertainty as the key characteristic of crisis situation. Sometimes it is almost impossible to estimate the course of phenomena which indicate that something is wrong. Analyses of the meaning of signals, which require attention, are usually entrusted to experts. However, as noted, these signals are often vague, thus experts may well disagree about further course of events. These differential perceptions set the crucial role of public leaders. In these circumstances, the leaders are expected to take responsibility and, based on various assessments, determine how the observed signals are to be treated.

### 3.2.2. *Conditionality of Crisis Recognition*

As mentioned earlier in this subchapter, the recognition of the crisis in the practice is not at all structured as is the case in the theoretical approach. Actually recognizing the crisis tends to be a highly subjective process. Subjectivity of the leaders who took over responsibility is expected and understandable to some extent but this is not just about leader's first impression. The final perception is caused by different influences from the surroundings, which consciously or unconsciously transfer their impressions and therefore affect the outcome.

*Experience* - The changing nature of the crisis limits the ability of pre-defining the meaning of signals. Depending on the social, political, natural and other circumstances, occurrences that require attention could have entirely different meanings. This seems like a good opportunity for public leaders with great experience. Comparing the situational assessment and the prior experiences, leaders can draw conclusions about current conditions, and possible future course of events. This perspective is most often found in operational crisis commanders, which is known as natural decision-making<sup>87</sup>. However this kind of circumstances assessment depends on a high degree of congruence of previous experience and actual settings, even then, various details can create a completely different picture.

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<sup>87</sup> **Flin Rhona** (1996). "Sitting in the hot seat: Leaders and teams for critical incident management"

Personal experience is not the only one that affects recognition of the crisis. The experience of other people from leader's environment may also affect the final judgment. Basically, this is to extend the personal experience but with reduced significance due to the different legitimacy of persons who convey the experience and discrepancies in interpretation. It is important to note that the perception of the whole society can have an impact on the interpretation of critical signals. Cultural ambient which is a community created on the basis of previous experience will strongly affect the perception of future events. A flood killing 50 people may be a routine occurrence in Bangladesh, but would be considered a national crisis in Sweden or Canada<sup>88</sup>. The public perception of the social trauma is particularly important for elected leaders. Citizens can not have timely and valid information about the complex events, but on the basis of previous experience can make conclusions about ongoing events. Basically, these conclusions do not match the facts. It takes some time to, information that would enable a comprehensive view, reach a wider audience. Even then, education, social micro-environment, and many other factors limit the quality of conclusions. Although, it is understandable that the public will still react to the first signal of threat and expect from public leaders to take appropriate steps. Such is the case with the fall of the local currency value of in Serbia. In autumn 1993, the rate of inflation in Serbia hit  $5 \times 10^{15}$  percent cumulative inflation over the time period 1 October 1993 and 24 January 1994. It was the worst example of hyperinflation in history. The average daily rate of inflation was nearly 100 percent. Serbian citizens remember this period as a traumatic process of devastation of the economy and the destruction of living standards. At the present time, any fluctuation of the dinar raises public anxiety and public pressure on leaders who are expected to intervene to forestall the onset of the crisis. Although the current circumstances and those of 1993. do not have many similarities, traumatic experiences causing concern. Elected officials, those who pretend to retain long-term political perspective, can not completely ignore this concern, no matter how unfounded it is.

*Information* – The available information is a "trigger" that initiates the reaction of leaders. Received information still does not mean that the response required, it initiates the checking and processing the obtained information. It is clear that public leaders are not able to carry out independently even one of these tasks. Thus, the

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<sup>88</sup> **Boin Arjen, McConnell Allan and 'T Hart Paul** (2010) "*Coping with Unscheduled Events: The Challenges of Crisis Leadership*"

leaders' dependence of public bureaucracies for the first time came to the fore in incubation phase of the crisis.

The information usually comes to the leaders from the state agencies and other public institutions. Therefore, the awareness of leaders is determined by Agencies ability to gather information and recognizing the need to transmit that information. It seems that at this stage, the power shifting from the elected officials in the hands of senior managers of public bureaucracy. In a highly centralized system with strictly divided the scope of institutions, the leaders could find themselves with tied hands. In these circumstances, the benefits of competitive relationships between agencies, so typical for modern democracy, become visible. Here the role of leaders and their ability to coordinate and balance the work of public bureaucracy are becoming crucial. This is certainly not achieved the ability of Agencies to acquire information. Collection of information is reflected primarily in developing of Early Warning System, when it comes to natural disasters, routine monitoring of major infrastructures in case of man-made disasters, or in the work of intelligence services in case of security threats, international relations and political conflicts. As highlighted in the previous chapter, the contemporary crisis rarely is the geographically limited in its focal point. Increasingly, timely detection of threats depends on mutual cooperation of local authorities and central government, as well as cross-border and regional cooperation. Important role in this process take international organizations, especially when it comes to large catastrophes and inter-ethnic conflicts. Inversely, checking and processing data almost exclusively belongs to the competent agencies. This again means that the inputs that are placed in front of leaders are in close correlation with the work of bureaucratic institutions, and therefore elected officials have once again to express their political qualities rather than management skills. Here, leaders are faced with the preferences of the public administration to routine operations, such as analyzed in section 2.2.3. Bureaucratic Machinery is designed to convert information into familiar and routine categories and is unable to respond at the very moment it is confronted with inputs that cannot be treated in that way<sup>89</sup>. This feature of public bureaucracy considerably limits the ability of leaders to timely and reliably recognizes the crisis.

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<sup>89</sup> Rosenthal Uriel and Kouzmin Aleksander (1997) *“Crises and Crisis Management: Toward Comprehensive Government Decision Making”*

### 3.3. Framing of the Crisis

When a crisis occurs and become visible there is a need to shape the event, insight into the causes, predict the course and consequences. Thus, in order to take further steps, it is necessary to frame the crisis. For leaders this is the process of defining the problem that needs attention. Beginning of this process is based on the leaders' perception of particular event. However, public leaders do not have a monopoly on framing the crisis<sup>90</sup>. Given that the leaders are elected in order to represent the general social benefit, public interest, about ongoing occurrences, is quite legitimate. Of course, the vulnerability, which is increased by the occurrence of crises, makes social environment even more complex. In such extreme circumstances, citizens, the media, lobby groups and others look to political leaders to make sense of what is going on and to take appropriate action to restore order and a sense of order<sup>91</sup>. The problem arises when come to the fore the different interests of social subjects. Furthermore, different responsibilities, of social factors lead to disproportion in the framing of the crisis. Indeed, the only elected officials are directly accountable to citizens for their actions undertaken in order to preserve social benefit. Responsibility of the others was, in essence, entirely different set up.

#### 3.3.1. *Framing of the Crisis by Public Bureaucratess*

Many things are in the hands of bureaucracy when it comes to defining of crisis. It can be argued that public institutions have a crucial influence on the elected leaders in the prediction of flow and the possible consequences of critical events. After all it is the purpose of public bureaucracy because they constitute a professional capacity of authorities in particular fields. This position of public bureaucracy, affirms often emphasized feature of the crisis - what is the threat to someone for other can be an opportunity. Critical events are ideal opportunities for public agencies to emphasize its importance strengthening their position within the public administration and present themselves to elected officials as a vital factor of stability. One would think that such behaviour leads to pseudo-crisis. Indeed, there is a threat that ambitions of public institutions leading people receive such a degenerative form, but this happens rarely.

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<sup>90</sup> Boin Arjen, McConnell Allan and 'T Hart Paul (2010) "*Coping with Unscheduled Events: The Challenges of Crisis Leadership*"

<sup>91</sup> Boin Arjen, McConnell Allan and 'T Hart Paul (2006) "*Inertia or Change? Crisis-induced Challenges for Political Leaders*"

Namely here, once again, a decentralized public administration within a competitive spirit shows its advantages. The role of the elected leaders, in functioning of this mechanism, is reflected in the search for second opinions and coordinates a network of institutions. Also, public institutions can be loaded with special events of the past, which limits their ability to rationally define the new circumstances. The problem of a predominant reliance on self experiences occurs in all phases of crisis management, therefore, it should be, once again, emphasize that crisis is too complex to cope with it based on the experiences of the group or a one generation of government officials.

### 3.3.2. *Framing of the Crisis by Media*

The role of the media has already been analyzed in this paper. Yet here is the emphasis on the influence of media coverage in the early stages of a crisis. It appears that the most effective media activities are during the defining of crisis. In later stages, their impact is also important, but after the decisions are made and during its implementation, there is little on what can be substantially affected. The U.S. government and its coalition partners are very carefully conducted public relations in terms of intervention in Iraq which resulted in homogenous media coverage. After a short time some of the media, particularly Al Jazeera and the World Wide Web<sup>92</sup>, provided a different picture of certain events, thereby was started an avalanche of criticism. Epilogue of unmasking shaped image of the intervention in Iraq, by the media, is quite different perceptions of this crisis. Although, there were no significant effects because homogeneous media landscape has changed after the crisis has given its intended form. This indicates that a proactive, professional media performance enhances an actor's credibility; reactive and disorganized crisis communication can do the reverse. Immediately after the catastrophic earthquake on Haiti, the media are alternately carried completely different information about number deaths and wounded, referring on statements of local leaders. This mess of information is certainly hindered attempts to review the conditions and determine a course of action. The biggest problem, in such scattered communication, is loss of leader's credibility at a time when people desire for their leadership.

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<sup>92</sup> Boin Arjen, McConnell Allan and 'T Hart Paul (2010) "*Coping with Unscheduled Events: The Challenges of Crisis Leadership*"

### 3.3.3. *Framing of the Crisis by Political opponents*

Relations between political opponents can often provoke doubt in their sincere intentions to the community they represent. However, such attitude of political opponents protects society from the single-mindedness. Sincerely, it is understandable that political pluralism is not the primary concern of government leaders in times of crisis but this does not mean that in critical circumstances can be excluded from that process. Pre-existing opposition and distrust in government do not simply disappear, just because a crisis has arrived on the scene<sup>93</sup>. Leaders can expect that opponents also have their own view of current conditions. It is certain that political opponents will not hesitate to oppose their vision of the crisis to the official policy. Confronting the official policy can represent an opportunity that should not be missed. In an ideal world leaders should strive for the establishment of a general consensus, given that these are events that threaten the entire society, but this rarely happens. The most that can be achieved in practice is the position of opponents as a silent observer. This depends on skills of leaders, the arguments at its disposal and, of course, credibility. Contrasting views of political opponents could be used to expand summing up the problem. Will the leader be able to handle opponent's opinion in such a way but without political prejudice to his position, again depends on leader's arts.

### 3.4. **Crisis Decision Making**

Decision-making in critical situations is probably the most frequent field in the study of crisis management. A particular focus is usually on the decision-making in the acute stage<sup>94</sup>. Much less attention is paid to the broader context of crisis decision-making, the whole process and environment of decision makers. A common perception of decision-making refers to a defined problem solving based on knowledge, experience and available information. If really exists such a simple decision-making is certainly not the case with decision-making in crisis situations.

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<sup>93</sup> **Boin Arjen, McConnell Allan and 'T Hart Paul** (2010) *"Coping with Unscheduled Events: The Challenges of Crisis Leadership"*

<sup>94</sup> **Boin Arjen, 'T Hart Paul, Stern Eric and Sundelius Bengt** (2005). *"The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under Pressure"*



### 3.4.1. Nature of crisis decision

The fact that it is about decision-making during the crisis, points to their complexity and diversity compared to similar processes in different circumstances. Nature of the crisis, multidisciplinary and, on the first place, possible dramatic consequences, aside crises decisions from the rest and their performance deserves special attention.

First, it is clear that any decision bring their own consequences, after all, that is why the decision is made, but the consequences of crisis decisions have such broad impact to all areas of society and the lives of citizens. Regardless of the type of crisis and social fields in which escalated, the decisions that were made in this regard go beyond a specified problem. In the case of awakening volcano the primary problem that public leaders need to cope is safeguard life and property of citizens. If they decide on preventive measures, it will certainly affect the economy because it makes no sense to invest in an area where there is risk of eruption. Destabilized economies typically cause political turbulence and social problems. It is anticipated that the effects are build upon each other.

Second, this brief case simulation of awakened volcano may be extended further, but the consequences of decisions cannot be predicted with certainty because it is impossible to predict crisis flow. Awakened volcano does not necessarily mean imminent eruption. If leaders, as a preventive measure, decide to warn people, it will be immediately negative impact on future decisions of investors and the eruption may follow many years later. On the other hand, if they react only after the eruption is certain, it could happen that preventive measures are applied too late. So the uncertainty of crisis decision is very important and striking feature.

Third, decision makers, most often are faces with choice between "two evils". It is not just about two conflicting decisions whose outcome is uncertain. Public leaders are often in a position to, make decisions, selected between the options which in any case have unintended consequences and, on their own is to judge which of the alternatives would cause less damage. Such conditions are common in hostage situations, when should evaluated the justification of using force to overcome the hijackers. A dramatic example of such a case is the intervention of Russian security forces in Beslan.

Fourth, crisis, decisions are typically made in the conditions of high stress and under strong pressure surroundings and the public. Often, but not always, decisions in a crisis must be made in a very short time without the opportunities to recall and editing.

### 3.4.2. *Decision making process*

Conventional wisdom dictates that government leaders make strategic decision and coordinate government action when crisis occur<sup>95</sup>. Such a description is more suitable to one of the High-Reliability Organizations about which is discussed in section 2.2.4 and we know that government does not and cannot be HRO. Decision-making process by elected leaders tends to be much more substantial and takes place in a wider range of people than it is the leader and his crisis team. However, this process is significantly different from the romantic views of the leaders as national hero, even though they often want to present themselves on that way.

*Crisis Team, Experts and Advisors* – It is not difficult to assume that leaders do not make decisions autonomously. It would be mistake even to expect something like that. Comprehensiveness of public affairs and multidisciplinary of crisis, require for approach with much wider access to knowledge, experience and skills than can be contained in one person. Normally, leaders in critical circumstances are surrounded by experts, advisors and representatives of public agencies that together make crisis team. In this way, it creates a kind of network which consists of all entities within the public administration involved in resolving the crisis. Basically crisis team causes cognitive and intellectual improvement of crisis decisions. There was more discussion in Section 2.2. about crisis teams, syndrome of group thinking and bureau-political relations. Here the focus is on the relationship between leaders and members of the crises team and the impact of these relationships on decision-making. Based on theoretical knowledge and analysis of case studies, about work of crisis teams, it could be isolate two extreme patterns of relationships that are formed between the leader and his associates gathered in the crisis team. The first model involves a conflict environment caused by insisting on self-interest and the importance of individual team members. In this model of behaviour is prominent weak authority of the leaders that usually hides the lack of credibility. Representatives of public agencies in these circumstances strongly advocate

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<sup>95</sup> Boin Arjen, 'T Hart Paul, Stern Eric and Sundelius Bengt (2005). *"The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under Pressure"*

the interests of the organization from which they originate, and advisors, and experts insist on their intellectual and cognitive superiority. Characteristic of this pattern of behaviour is that everyone is trying to take over the role of informal leader. In this case it is very difficult to reach a decisions when, miraculously, the decision is made, it is the product of a wide compromise and is usually not coherent enough to give full results. The second pattern includes a dominant leader and his loyal associates. In these circumstances, the team put all its capacities at the service of strengthening the legitimacy of the leader's decisions and does not demonstrate the need to separate their different opinions. Moreover, neither leader has no interest in attitudes that are opposed to his. It can be argued that the rule of this model is: Criticism, dissent and mutual recrimination must literally wait until the crisis is over. In this way established crisis team reduces its role in coping with the crisis because it affirms mindedness of leaders and team members have only an executive role. There is also a third, at the same time desirable model. In optimal circumstances, team members are focused on achieving a common goal. The mutual differences are overcome or at least currently ignored in order to achieve the highest possible efficiency. Leader's role consists in the affirmation of expression dissent but with a clear view about who takes the final decision. Although, first two models are described as extreme and the latter is also an extreme according to its frequency. All three models are set up for convenience in theory and in practice are interfering with each other or even alternate. The most of the results depends on the leaders, what kind relationships will be established within the team but it is also important that team members know each other.

*Control, Coordination and Responsibility* – By carefully following the news about various critical events it can easily be concluded that the public is prone to delusion that elected leaders are those who always (or at least most frequent) control the situation and make decisions. Of course, neither is true nor is it feasible. A large number of decisions made in crisis situations are actually outside the competence of elected officials so it should be left to professionals. Also in a vertical line of the organizational structure authorities, decisions can move in different direction depending on circumstances. Hence any crises decisions are made in order to control the situation while others are directed to coordinate the work of other actors involved.

Elected leaders take control mainly when it is necessary to take responsibility for critical decisions that directly affect the community which has elected them. In practice,

these conditions are not so common. This primarily occurs in extreme circumstances such as possible need for use of force, the declaration of a state of emergency, mass evacuation or when there is a crisis in relations between states. Leaders tend to completely take matters into their own hands, also, when assessing the outcome of the crisis could bring political points. These are circumstances in which the central government is very glad to take jurisdiction of local authorities or interfere with the operation of public agencies. One must not forget that, as Uriel Rosenthal said:” Crises are political events par excellence”.

Public leaders do, of course, make highly consequential decision during a crisis, but so do the other official and pivotal people outside of government<sup>96</sup>. Crisis management tends to be identified with making crucial decisions. The reason is specific characteristics of these decisions, described in the previous section. However, when open-minded look at coping with critical events, we can easily conclude that the prevailing importance of implementing those decisions. Implementation process, certainly does not take place in the narrowest leader's team. Environment in which decisions will be implemented rather can be considered as a network of organizations and individuals coordinated by leaders and supported by his credibility.

Very important issue is circumstances in which the leaders do not make decision in their scope, also known as Strategic Evasion<sup>97</sup>. This is not a case where public leaders do not take measures in order to solve a problem. When crisis management feels it is in the best interests not to take anything on an issue, it is also a decision. Here points to the circumstances in which leaders avoid making decisions. The motive for this act usually is to avoid responsibility when odds of success are so poor. This will prompt attempts on their part to escape individual responsibility for actions with potentially far-reaching consequences as these may reflect badly on them in any post-crisis evaluation<sup>98</sup>. In these conditions leaders tend to look for anyone who is suitable to take responsibility, whether it be on other public officials, institutions or even citizens. There are very few examples where this strategy actually succeeding. Public expectations of elected

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<sup>96</sup> **Boin Arjen, ‘T Hart Paul, Stern Eric and Sundelius Bengt** (2005). *“The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership Under Pressure”*

<sup>97</sup> **’T Hart Paul, Rosenthal Uriel and Kouzmin Aleksander** (1993), *“Crisis Decision Making, the centralization thesis revisited”*

<sup>98</sup> **‘T Hart, Paul** (1990) *“Groupthink in government: A study of small groups and policy failure”*

officials are even higher than their real responsibilities and opportunities so do not advertise at critical moments, can hardly remain unnoticed.

### 3.4.3. *Crisis Decision in Face of Public Expectation*

Contemporary Western society has drastically changed in the last 50 years. Social and technological advances have allowed much greater comfort of living that it has become a goal in itself. At the same time, comfort is provided to citizens' personal development which in time caused emphasizing the importance of the individual in relation to society. Democratic leaders have found themselves in a position to meet the individual needs of citizens to achieve their political ambitions. In their aspiration to get closer to voters, political leaders do not hesitate to give promises which will be difficult to meet. Although such behavior is considered as negative, actually it stimulates the development. Not fulfilling expectations that they themselves established, the leaders compromise their own credibility but also set new standards that, sooner or later have to meet or their political opponents will do. This is the system which currently operates under normal conditions. However, what happens in crisis situations?

To repeat once more accepted description of the crisis as a "serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values and norms of a system, which under time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances necessitates making vital decisions". As can be seen in critical conditions there is not premises for individual desires and even less for personal comfort because the threat applies to the whole society and as Aristotle said: "The whole is different from the sum of its parts"<sup>99</sup>. In terms of direct threats and pressure of time, public leaders are called upon to protect the interests of society as a whole or its major part, keeping in mind the far-reaching consequences that their decisions may have. In contrast are standing particular interests of citizens as individuals. Essentially, these interests are made on the basis of experience dating back to normal circumstances and do not correlate with those in crisis. Citizens will at critical moments, by rule, revise its aims and to what extent the attitudes of citizens adapt to current conditions depends very much on the public leaders. Elected officials will meet this challenge with several dilemmas.

*Raising public awareness* - It is possible to build public awareness about the current conditions and threats that limit the normal way of life and public leaders, faced

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<sup>99</sup> Aristotle "*Metaphysics*"

with extreme situations, probably will attempt it. A key opponent of this process is the pressure of time. As opposed to individual acceptance of knowledge, such a process goes a somewhat slower when it comes to the Societies as a whole. Acceptance of new facts by all society requires meeting of critical mass of individually acquired knowledge that, in slightly different form, will create new value. An example is the growing awareness of the consequences of global warming but for that it takes almost three decades.

*The motivation of citizens* - when required public awareness is reached, this does not mean that they will at once begin to act in accordance with new circumstances. Be aware, and act in accordance with that, there are two related but different issues. When the newly acquired knowledge restricts comfort and negatively affects the perception of lifestyle, acquiring new habits involves certain sacrifices that the citizens are reluctant to accept. Once again, the leader needs to invest their credibility in order to motivate people to do something that do not make them happy. Further aggravated are numerous stakeholders in the process who do not support leaders' aspirations. In the example of the consequences of global warming we see that the citizens more quickly accept the fact of the uncertain future than they are willing to cut spending at the expense of comfort. This disproportion is strongly supported by the international economy, which is based on the greater consumption.

*Avoid possible consequences* - It would be a delusion to think that it is possible to achieve a civil consensus, in the subordination of personal interests by collective. Leaders will often find themselves acting against the expressed will of one part of the population and on the other hand should work in the accordance with the will of the majority to avoid or minimize the potential political consequences. Particularly interesting question is what the will of the majority. Majority will not be known through the media where we find the most loudly, but not necessarily the majority. Direct impact on public leaders has the most influential, which also does not represent the majority. As for the broader understanding of citizens in the crisis situations there is often not enough time this stay on public leaders and their political skills. Elected officials also often do not have enough time in crisis situations to provide citizens with relevant information and, consequently, to build awareness of the new circumstances. These conditions state leaders to act for the general welfare in opposition to the will of

the citizens regardless of political consequences. Since leaders are accustomed to comfort as much as citizens, such sacrifices should not be expected.

### **3.5. Long term consequences**

The period following the acute phase of the crisis is mainly perceived as a process of restoring normal life flows. True, the direct threat has been eliminated, the circumstances are less dramatic, is no longer expressed the time pressure but far from the fact that a job of public leaders, as a crisis manager, is over. It follows, still a dynamic process of reconstruction, accountability and drawing lessons useful for future challenges. Leaders face pressures to produce and promote reforms that will help to safeguard the system from future crises. At the same time, leaders feel the pressure to defend the core of the system as it existed before the crisis<sup>100</sup> and all of this in conditions of mitigating or eliminating the damage that occurred due to the critical events that preceded.

#### *3.5.1. Reconstruction*

There is no crisis which caused no damage. It is seldom possible to completely remove the consequences of the crisis. Human casualties cannot be compensated, it is possible just to show compassion with the families and submit blaming regardless if it is established or not. Destroyed property can be repaired but it takes relocation of resources and withdrawing of previous development plans. Collapsed social values may be re-developed but not from a position that was current before the crisis but on the basis of the experiences that are produced by dramatic events. So, it seems that it is impossible to return to the situation before the crisis, thus it can be concluded that the reforms are inevitable.

There are very few instances in which people enthusiastically welcomed the reforms after the crisis. In principle, all accept the reforms as a path to prosperity, but the perception of reform as a process, often is completely different depending on the point of view. An excellent example is economic crisis in Greece. Citizens are clearly expressed the necessity for reforms, but also insist on the need to continue their life in a way that was before the crisis, although exactly those conditions are brought to the current problems.. This paradox is present in almost all post-crisis reforms. Elected

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<sup>100</sup> Boin Arjen, McConnell Allan and 'T Hart Paul (2006) *"Inertia or Change? Crisis-induced Challenges for Political Leaders"*

officials in these circumstances have a decisive role, primarily depends on their credibility how the citizens will accept the measures of recovery. The real problem arises when the credibility of politicians during the crisis are undermined as is the case in Greece. On the other hand a public bureaucracy has their own perception of reform and surprisingly, does not differ too much from the way other people see the reconstruction after the dramatic events. Just because a crisis has occurred and there is a 'whole of society' commitment to learning lessons, does not mean that institutions and actors will easily give up their inherited rights, rewards, and ways of working<sup>101</sup>. In this case, the credibility of leaders has an indispensable role, but in slightly different ways. Several times in this paper, highlighted a kind of rivalry between elected leaders who hold the "key" of strategic decisions and public agencies in whose hands are operational ability and most of the resources. It seems that the epilogue of this power game strongly reflects on reform that implemented as a result of the crisis. During and after the dramatic events at the stadium Heysel, Belgian Minister of Internal Affairs has decided not to involve himself in the occurrence, leaving services on the ground to solve the problem. He was not even found as necessary to visit a place of tragedy<sup>102</sup>. Following this approach of Belgian Minister, it is not surprising that the Gendarmerie, which was designated as most responsible for the failures of the stadium, does not bear any consequences. They even brokered a budget increase. Obvious gaps in the work of the gendarmerie would require reforms in the service but the interior minister, with his approach lost credibility to insist on any changes.

From the above it is clear that leaving the acute stage of crisis, elected leaders do not leave the challenges of the crisis. Moreover, post-crises reforms seem quite unfeasible. However, in these circumstances mass media has predominantly role. If the leaders succeed to gain an understanding of the media for the upcoming reform process, then can be considered that basic conditions for reconstruction after the crisis exist. Otherwise, post-crises reforms seem as impossible mission.

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<sup>101</sup> Boin Arjen, McConnell Allan and 'T Hart Paul (2006) "*Inertia or Change? Crisis-induced Challenges for Political Leaders*"

<sup>102</sup> 'T Hart Paul and B. Pijnenburg. 1989. "*The Heysel stadium tragedy*"



### 3.5.2. Accountability

It is more than expectable that after elimination of the threat comes a period of accountability. This is often an unpleasant but inevitable process for public leaders; moreover it is a process that they should initiate. Questions such as: whether damage could be avoided or reduced and who is responsible for what happened, are imposed by it self. However, elected officials, as a rule, very precariously are dealing with this challenge. Namely, the specific position as elected representatives placed on them the burden of responsibility regardless of whether they caused the damage or not by their direct acts or omissions. The question is how much their responsibility will be reduced by the direct failure of other actors. Thus, for leaders accountability is actually consist of two separate segments. The first is facing with its own responsibility and those who insist on it. The second segment is ensuring that responsibilities for failure are placed on the appropriate shoulders and that sanctions are imposed where necessary<sup>103</sup>. Facing with their own responsibility, first and foremost is the mental pressure and a guilty conscience. This is purely a psychological issue and it depends on personal characteristics, but experience teaches us that politicians somehow learned to deal with it. Facing with the sections of society who insist on the responsibility of leaders is a process that usually takes place in public debate. Such accountability debates are often little more than ‘blame games’ focused on identifying and punishing culprits rather than deliberating and reflection seriously on crisis causes and consequences<sup>104</sup>. Another form of debate about responsibility, takes a place in an official investigation that can be implemented at different levels of government. In any case, public leaders are faced with numerous challenges in the process of accountability but the one issue stand out as particularly significant. Deny or accept responsibility?

A key challenge for all elected leaders is a dilemma between denial and acceptance of responsibility. Denial certainly acts as a more acceptable and safer choice. Indeed, the causes of crisis events can often be related with an external factor that cannot be influenced or with force majeure. Proving responsibility is generally a complicated process, full of controversy. Also, especially from a position of leaders, responsibility can always be transferred to other actors. However, leaders should be aware that, such prove of

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<sup>103</sup> Boin Arjen, McConnell Allan and 'T Hart Paul (2006) *"Inertia or Change? Crisis-induced Challenges for Political Leaders"*

<sup>104</sup> Boin Arjen, McConnell Allan and 'T Hart Paul (2010) *"Coping with Unscheduled Events: The Challenges of Crisis Leadership"*

responsibility is a complex process it also goes to prove innocence. Hence, the denial of responsibility often leads to new crisis rather than deprives the leaders of accusations. The other, much more risky option is acceptance of responsibility. True, when the responsibility is clearly defined, it is expected that follow some kind of sanctions. Of course, things may not always be observed in such a drastic way. Accepting responsibility is an honourable act, political opponents certainly will not interpret in that way, but it is possible for citizens to recognize the grandeur of such a gesture. For example, in the aftermath tsunami in Southeast Asia, Norway's eventual acceptance of slow and ineffective procedures for assisting in helping rescue their citizens and identify victims probably enhanced the political legitimacy of the Norwegian government. This stands in contrast to Swedish Prime Minister Persson and his administration, which received substantial political backlash for continuing to blame a range of actors from low level officials to the King of Sweden<sup>105</sup>.

Denial or acceptance of responsibility actually not so strictly divided as in a theoretical view. The answer to this dilemma depends on the ability of leaders to, facing the circumstances with balanced attitude, because there is no matrix in which the consequences would be safely minimized. A decade after the wars in former Yugoslavia, in the atmosphere of general stabilization of relations, national leaders have suddenly started to apologize to each other for the committed war crimes. Moralists were greeted this leader's behaviour, but the citizens of all former Yugoslav countries experienced this gesture as hypocrisy. For some offenses it is simply distasteful to apologize.

### 3.5.3. Drawing lessons

A crisis or disaster holds huge potential for lessons to be learned in terms of reforming contingency planning and training in order to enhance resilience in the event of similar episodes in the future<sup>106</sup>. Since we found there is much less examples of successful crisis management than the other, it seems that this potential remains untapped. It would be mistake to think that public leaders are skipped the learning process. Not at all! As a rule, the elected leaders after the acute stage of the crisis are taking steps in order prevent similar critical events in the future. Former U.S. president Jimmy Carter created FEMA in 1979 as a separate agency. His administration had to

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<sup>105</sup> **T Hart Paul** (2009) "*15 cases of political crisis management*"

<sup>106</sup> **Boin Arjen, McConnell Allan and T Hart Paul** (2010) "*Coping with Unscheduled Events: The Challenges of Crisis Leadership*"

deal with three relatively unique crises: the toxic messes at Three Mile Island as well as the Love Canal scandal, and the eruption of Mount St. Helens. While the immediate handling of both of the nuclear events was dreadful, Carter ensured that FEMA had the power to review the emergency plans and coordinate external evacuations of incidents like the former, and created the Superfund for the latter<sup>107</sup>. However analysis of similar cases indicates that process of learning in aftermath of the crisis ends by establishment of new or some form of reorganization of existing institutions. Expected activity, such as reform of organizational practices, scenario planning, crisis training, worst case thinking, most often are absent from the agenda of public sector.

Crisis-induced lesson drawing is thus according to this perspective characterized by linking old solutions to new problems<sup>108</sup>. Only weeks after Hurricane Katrina had destroyed coast areas in Louisiana and Mississippi, Hurricane Rita entered the Gulf of Mexico. As lessons of Katrina had been learned, when the projected trajectory of Rita included Houston, the Texas authorities quickly ordered an evacuation. In the chaotic evacuation more than 100 people died. Hurricane Rita changed course and never reached Houston. Experience of dramatic events from the past should stimulate learning not to burden that process and close the mind. In aftermath of September 11 Department of Homeland Security has been transformed and improved with higher level of importance. Often question is whether is such strong focus of Homeland Security on terrorism, affected poor outcome in coping with Hurricane Katrina.

It's true there are many barriers that be placed in front of public leaders when it comes to drawing lesson in aftermath of crisis. One crucial barrier is the lack of authoritative and widely accepted explanations of the causes of crisis or disaster, but it's should not be a reason that the lessons learned from previous crises are so superficial. Sometimes seems that leader's learning in aftermath of crisis, hiding responsibility from the past rather than finding solutions for future.

### **3.6. Political cost of Crisis Leadership**

Behaviour and the activities of elected officials are always under the scrutiny of the public. The public claimed on a transparent work of their leaders because the

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<sup>107</sup> **Kapucu Naim** (2009) "*Leadership Under Stress: Presidential Roles in Emergency and Crisis Management in the United States*"

<sup>108</sup> **Deverell Edward Charles** (2010) "*Crisis-induced learning in public sector organizations*"

citizens entrusted them at the elections to lead the community. Another, somewhat more practical reason of public interest is, of course, the fact that work of elected officials strongly affected on lives of all citizens. So it is inevitable that results of the elected official's action leaving consequences on their political careers. Public relation towards work and the results of politicians differ due to cultural differences, level of democracy in society, historical heritage and the like. Yet in times of crisis, insecurity and fear in society are turning citizens to the leaders of which are expected that eliminate the threat and return serenity.

The political and legal dynamics of accountability processes play a significant role in determining which crisis actors emerge unscathed and which end up with reputations and careers damaged<sup>109</sup>. There are many examples in which the ability of leaders to deal with the crisis and their behaviour during critical events crucial influences their political careers. German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder miraculously emerged as the winner of the national elections following his well-performed role as the nation's symbolic 'crisis manager' during the riverine floods in 2002<sup>110</sup>. As an example with different outcome could be used case of former Spanish Prime Minister Aznar. His conservative party paid a heavy price when he continued to insist that the Basque terrorist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) was behind the Madrid train bombings, even though police investigations were quickly pointing towards Muslim radicals. Aznar's party lost the elections.

Crisis leaders can be competent and conscientious, but that alone says little about how their performance will be evaluated when the crisis is over<sup>111</sup>. American political strategist David Garth said: "Sometimes you eat the bear, and sometimes the bear eats you". This is exactly how can be described the relationship between elected officials and crisis situations. When George W. Bush arrived on the scene at September 11, he becomes national hero. In the period that followed, Bush had strong public support. This support could not be shaken even by cognition of the U.S. administration's failures in preventing the tragedy of the WTO. Merits that are earned by coming to the ruins of WTO are not forgotten even when the hysterical security measures are

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<sup>109</sup> **Brändström Annika, Kuipers Sanneke** (2003) *"From 'Normal Incidents' to Political Crises: Understanding the Selective Politicization of Policy Failures"*

<sup>110</sup> **Boin Arjen, 'T Hart Paul and McConnell Allan** (2009) *"Crisis exploitation: political and policy impacts of framing contests"*

<sup>111</sup> **Boin Arjen, McConnell Allan and 'T Hart Paul** (2010) *"Coping with Unscheduled Events: The Challenges of Crisis Leadership"*

implemented in response to 11 September. Then came Hurricane Katrina. Shortly after the storm, Bush visited New Orleans and praised Michael Brown, the managing director of Federal Emergency Management Agency, said: "Brownie, you're doing a heck of a job". US citizens have never forgiven this statement. In both cases, it was not about Bush's decisions that would strongly influence the crisis, its course and consequences. It was about fulfilling the expectations of citizens, compassion and understanding. Truly, the political cost of a crisis Leadership may not be strictly related only to rational coping with the crisis. The political consequences are arising much more from different subjective interpretations of leadership in critical situations.

#### **4. ELECTED OFFICIALS THROUGH THE PERIOD OF CRISIS – BETWEEN EXPECTED, CONDUCTED AND REQUIRED SOLUTION**

The theoretical framework that was set in the previous Chapter has a systematic course in which certain issues are relatively clear divided and analyzed almost as autonomous theoretical units. This approach should contribute to a clearer picture of the challenges and dilemmas faced by elected officials in crisis situations. On the other hand, the perception like that could create impression of a pattern that matches the crisis and as such can be used in crisis management. This of course is not true. Such patterns can be developed for specific, isolated cases of emergency, which may or may not be part of the crisis. The crisis itself is too complex, unpredictable and most often affects multiple values at the same time so that attempts to establish a pattern of events sequence that would be universally applicable, is quite misleading. In practice, the critical event is difficult to systematize. Signals that seem clearly recognizable sometimes go unnoticed. Small events in their scope can cause great problems as the large and loud can pass almost without consequence. Impact of the public and stakeholders to the course of the crisis varies from event to event and it is hard to predict. Phase of the crisis can be fully disproportionately in its duration and some elements of the crisis that we believe are essential may simply be invisible. Crisis is often built upon each other so that we cannot be sure whether it is one or more of various crisis situations, whether overlapping or repetitive. Exactly one of the main objectives of the fourth chapter is to point in the changing dynamics of the flow and containment of the crisis in relation to the theory. The second objective is to test theoretical claims established in examples. This is not an effort to demonstrate the functionality of theoretical claims, but to emphasize the need for continuous cognitive design and review of what we find out.

## 4.1. Elected Officials in Incubation Stage of Crisis

### 4.1.1. *The assassination of Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme: Not Recognized Crisis*

#### *Case No.1*<sup>112</sup>

Sweden has been spared from the drama of assaults on Swedish statesmen for over 200 years, the last being when Anckarström shot King Gustav III at the Opera House in Stockholm on March 16, 1792. However now, two centuries later, Sweden and the surrounding world look dramatically different. Persons in high political positions do not normally appear in public without bodyguards.

Nevertheless, Sweden was relatively open in the eighties. It was just in the fall of 1982 that Säpo contacted Olof Palme to discuss his personal security. According to Sven-Åke Hjälmarth, the head of Säpo, he did not accept of personal bodyguards until the early part of 1983. Olof Palme was keen on safeguarding his integrity and made sure he maintained a private sphere. “[This conception] derived from his philosophy of how a democracy should work” Holger Romander, the Director General of the National Police Board, said (Ibid.). A trait of fatalism seems to have nursed the illusion of safety, at least in regards to the public image. Of more vital interest to this context is perhaps the assessed threat picture directed towards Palme and the government at that time.

For some reason, the Croatian Separatist movement, that had been behind the murder of the Yugoslavian ambassador to Stockholm in 1971, played a certain role during the night of the murder and a few years thereafter. Miro Baresic, who had been convicted for having killed the ambassador and served a lifetime sentence outside Stockholm, had repeatedly pleaded the government to change the lifetime sentence to a time-limited one. The government had denied these requests, but in the fall of 1985, his wish was accepted and his sentence was limited to 18 years. Olof Palme was troubled with this decision, as he believed that Baresic was capable and motivated to seek revenge on him personally. Lisbet Palme had apparently been informed of Olof's fears, which she communicated to the police during the night of the murder. However on this night, Baresic was behind bars. Säpo recommended protection whenever Palme appeared in public. His aversion to constant protection led however to an arrangement where he informed Säpo of his plans, which he normally did, but not on Friday night, February 28. It was up to the government in power to decide upon the security arrangements and the degree of police involvement, and Romander noticed that the social democratic government had chosen a lower degree of personal protection than its liberal predecessor had.

Olof Palme was shot in Oslo on Friday February 28, 1986, at the corner of Sveavägen and Tunnelgatan, a man in a dark coat stole up to them and shot towards them twice. The first bullet hit the Prime Minister The second bullet grazed Lisbet Palme's back. As she leaned over her husband, she saw the killer jogging calmly down Tunnelgatan.

Long-term stability and economic prosperity have drawn public attention from the crucial threats to public safety and security and high-ranking politicians. In contrast, the services responsible for safety assessments have become aware of the threat, first as

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<sup>112</sup> Source: **Hansen Dan** (2003) “The Crisis Management of the Murder of Olof Palme: A Cognitive-Institutional Analysis”

a general attitude of the premier security that must be treated in a special way because it is a highly responsible state leader, and then in the form of concrete suspicions which indicated the threat. It is unusual that experience of Olof Palme also pointed to the fact that his safety could be compromised, what more had specific fears about it. Yet it seems that, neither competent institution nor Palme, did not imagine that can get to the assassination, which is supported by the fact that even today there are many controversies about the event. It appears that prevailed a general sense of security in the Swedish society, whose creation was contributed Palme by himself. Namely, its resistance to personal security was primarily of ideological character. He believed that this is prosaic and unnecessary in a truly democratic society. Such his attitude was crucial for its inadequate security. Can be drawn several conclusions from this case:

- Although it does not seem so at first glance, the public service which has been responsible for the security of the Prime Minister did not fulfill the task that belongs to them, in order to identify signals that indicate a crisis. Olaf Palme was, by his advanced and truly democratic views on international politics, made many powerful enemies around the world. This was more than clearly indicated Palme's vulnerability and it appears that the services are easily passed over his inappropriate attitude towards personal security. Another thing that goes at the expense of the agency was the fact that only a lack of bodyguards provided Palme's murder. If the services are really recognized the potential crisis event, Prime minister's security could not be based only on bodyguards.
- This case emphasizes the important influence of public opinion in recognizing the crisis. Swedish society in those years, felt very safe and it was functioned in this spirit. Regardless how objective were concerns of relevant institutions and the Palme himself, the social climate had to make an impression on them. This also reflects the influence of historical and cultural heritage which caused that issues of high-ranking politicians' safety were not a topic of public interest because Sweden did not have a similar experience more than two centuries. In a different cultural framework this issue would be reasonably raised. Indeed, how it is possible that in the city in which ambassador were killed only a decade earlier, the Prime Minister walks the streets without security.
- Olaf Palme was not an inexperienced politician, was prime minister in two mandates and he was certainly aware of fundamental issues about the security of



politicians. Also, Palme was had a substantiated fear for own safety. So, in his attitude to security, it's won a personal ideological stance. This once again, in a specific manner, supporting the claim that crisis events are not suitable for viewing through an ideological prism.

#### 4.1.2. *The assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić: Ignoring the framing of the crisis*

##### *Case No.2*

*On 12th March 2003. in 12:25, in the courtyard of the Serbian Government in Belgrade, Serbia, the assassination of Zoran Djindjic, the fifth Prime Minister of Serbia, carried out.*

*New governance structure that took power on a wave of popular discontent that has shattered Milosevic on 5th October 2000., were not able to hold that power so firm as Milosevic used to do. The new ruling circles were weak and shaky from the start. Presidential elections held on previous year, where no candidate received enough votes to get elected, were indication of the crisis in the governing structures and the weak ground they stood.*

*Đinđić had made many enemies for his pro-Western stance, reformist economic policies, arresting Slobodan Milošević and relinquishing him to the ICTY, and for clamping down on organized crime. The murder was allegedly organized by Dušan Spasojević and Milorad Ulemek, also known as Legija. Ulemek is an ex-commander of Special Operations Unit (combat units of the Serbian intelligence service) founded by Milošević during the nineties, who ordered Zvezdan Jovanović (Lieutenant Colonel of SOU) to carry out the assassination. Ulemek was connected to the powerful Zemun clan of the Serbian mafia, and had been recently sentenced to 40 years in jail for other offences that included murder and attempted murder.*

*Đinđić and organized crime – At the end of 2001. the Prime Minister Djindjic announced that the 2002 will be year of the fight against organized crime. In December 2002, five months earlier the Law on Fighting Organized Crime was adopted in the Federal Assembly of Yugoslavia. By that law in the legal system has been introduced Special Prosecutor for Organized Crime and the Special Department of the Belgrade District Court for Organized Crime, established a month later. Also, this law introduced an institution of co-witness.*

*Djindjic's security - Djindjic's didn't pay attention to his safety. After becoming prime minister he kept his private security guards who had a poor relationship with the professional police officers that it is often made difficult to provide security for the prime minister. Only in 2002, two years after he became prime minister, he moved to the residence (previously he lived in an apartment in the city centre where it was almost impossible to keep him safe). Establishment of the Security Intelligence Agency created a legal vacuum, so that neither one service was responsible to make a security assessment of the prime minister. The former head of Djindjic's personal security, who resigned a month before the assassination, claimed that he resigned because he was not able to improve the security of the Prime Minister. Djindjic himself said, "If anyone thinks that will stop the implementation of the law by killing me, is terribly wrong, because I am not the system. The system will continue to work and nobody will get amnesty for crimes by removing one or two officials of the state".*

*Djindjic and the Special Operations Unit - SOU was formed in the nineties as a combat unit of the State Security specializes in high-risk tasks intrusions and raid. The unit was known for its competence and unscrupulousness that showed during the wars in former Yugoslavia. Part of this unit had a criminal record and was suspected of war crimes. During the overthrow of Milosevic's power on 5th October 2000. SOU put itself on the demonstrators' side. Because of*

*that Djindjic felt a kind of respect for this unit. The arrest of war crimes suspects has been used as a pretext for SOU rebellion. It was later found that rebellion was organized by members of the Zemun clan. Officials of the Ministry of Interior estimated that police do not have a unit that could oppose and disarm the SOU. Because of the bad relation between the Prime Minister Djindjic and then president of Yugoslavia, Djindjic did not want to seek for the military support coping with the SOU and decided to go into their base for negotiations. SOU was disbanded in 2003 immediately after the assassination of Djindjic, because it was suspected that part of the Unit participated in the assassination, which was later proven.*

Previously described case of the assassination of Olaf Palme and the case of the assassination of Zoran Djindjić, appears similar but with a careful consideration may be concluded that still vary greatly. Although state administration was in quite confused condition, it was clear that Serbia is in the middle of serious political and social crises expanded with ten years of crisis caused by wars and economic devastation of the country. It is amazing that no one had predicted that the crisis may take the course which would endanger the life of the holder of changes in Serbia. As a strong leader, Djindjić emphasized himself in the reform of society, especially the unpleasant aspects such as the fight against organized crime, the arrest of suspects for war crimes and the like. It was not difficult to assume that all those who oppose the radical reforms, perceive Djindjić as an obstacle which should be removed. As all of society and security services are going through changes but it cannot be a excuse for not taking the necessary measures after the assassination attempt on the highway near Belgrade's arena. Even worse, the conduct of the judiciary in this case can be characterized as complicity.

As in the previous case, the Prime Minister had a significant impact on his safety, first through the selection of bodyguards, for what was certainly not competent, and crucially, by attitude towards security, which, like Palme, perceived through his own political beliefs.

Pseudo crisis created by USO to draw attention to themselves had a multiple impact on the further course of events given that members of this unit participated in the assassination. However, when the USO is concerned, irreparable damage is made by relationship between President Kostunica and Djindjic. It is incomprehensible that because political disagreements of the two senior statesmen, the government shows weakness in regard to insurgency of armed unit that has only 200 members.

It is interesting that the public was concerned for Djindjic's security. Specifically, the public was divided over support for Djindjic but there was no doubt about the

potential threat to his security. Inadequate security of Prime Minister was a frequent topic in the media. This case can be considered as a bad example of dealing with signals that indicate the crisis:

- The relevant institutions have not met expectations. Moreover it seems that by activities of services in terms of prime minister's security, crisis recognition is even more disabled.
- The attitude of Prime Minister about his safety had a negative effect on the outcome. Given the similar conclusion from the previous case, two questions are imposed which, unfortunately, even in this paper will not get its answer. First, is it permissible to senior state leaders affecting their own security? In this particular case it is not about safety of Zoran Djindjic, but security of Prime Minister. Hence the security of the Prime Minister is primarily in the interest of the state. On the other hand, is it possible to force the senior politicians, to a greater degree of security with respect that personal security affects the privacy?
- This case is a drastic example of different interests within the state's mechanism. Drastic because diametrically opposed interest to the government is demonstrated by an armed formation and this does not happen often.
- As discussed in the previous chapter's opponents remain political rivals in the crisis. It seems, in this case, that the President and the Prime Minister chose worst moment to prove these claims.
- The media are the only that pointed to threat but because of the divided support to Djindjic's politics in public, it is not achieved a significant impact to related Authorities.

#### *4.1.3. Ronald Reagan and Global Warming: Impacts on the recognition of long-term crisis*

##### *Case No.3<sup>113</sup>*

*At the highest levels of the American government, officials pondered whether global warming was a significant new threat to civilisation. They turned for advice to the elite of the scientific world – a shadowy organisation known as Jason.. It was established in 1960 at the height of the cold war when a group of physicists who had helped to develop the atomic bomb proposed a new organisation that would – to quote one of its founders – “inject new ideas into national defence”.*

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<sup>113</sup> Source: **Oreskes Naomi and Renouf Jonathan** (2008) “Jason and the secret climate change war”

*Of the roughly 100 Jasons over the years, 11 have won Nobel prizes and 43 have been elected to the US National Academy of Sciences.*

*In 1977 they got to work on global warming. There was one potential problem. Only a few of them knew anything about climatology. To get a better understanding they relocated for a few days to Boulder, Colorado, the base for NCAR – the National Center for Atmospheric Research – where they heard the latest information on climate change. Then, being physicists, they went back to first principles and decided to build a model of the climate system. Right on the first page, the Jasons predicted that carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere would double from their preindustrial levels by about 2035. Today it's expected this will happen by about 2050. They suggested that this doubling of carbon dioxide would lead to an average warming across the planet of 2-3C. Again, that's smack in the middle of today's predictions. They warned that polar regions would warm by much more than the average, perhaps by as much as 10C or 12C. That prediction is already coming true – last year the Arctic sea ice melted to a new record low. This year may well set another record.*

*Nor were the Jasons frightened of drawing the obvious conclusions for civilisation: the cause for concern was clear when one noted “the fragility of the world's crop-producing capacity, particularly in those marginal areas where small alterations in temperature and precipitation can bring about major changes in total productivity”.*

*The Jason report was never officially released but was read at the highest levels of the US government. Adviser to President Jimmy Carter, asked the National Academy of Sciences for a second opinion. This time from climate scientists. The academy committee, headed by Jule Charney, a meteorologist from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), backed up the Jason conclusions. The Charney report said climate change was on the way and was likely to have big impacts. So by the late 1970s scientists were already confident that they knew what rising carbon dioxide levels would mean for the future. Then politics got in the way.*

*In 1980 Ronald Reagan was elected president. He was pro-business and pro-America. He knew the country was already in the environmental dog house because of acid rain. If global warming turned into a big issue, there was only going to be one bad guy. The US was by far the biggest producer of greenhouse gases in the world. If the president wasn't careful, global warming could become a stick to beat America with.*

*So Reagan commissioned a third report about global warming from Bill Nierenberg, who had made his name working on the Manhattan Project developing America's atom bomb. He went on to run the Scripps Institution of Oceanography where he had built up the Climate Research Division. And he was a Jason. Nierenberg's report was unusual in that individual chapters were written by different authors. Many of these chapters recorded mainstream scientific thinking similar to the Charney and Jason reports. But the key chapter was Nierenberg's synthesis – which chose largely to ignore the scientific consensus. He argued that while climate change would undoubtedly pose challenges for society, this was nothing new. He highlighted the adaptability that had made humans so successful through the centuries. He argued that it would be many years before climate change became a significant problem. And he emphasised that with so much time at our disposal, there was a good chance that technological solutions would be found.*

It is a great example of long lasting crises, and the third case in this paper that points to widespread significance pre-constructed attitude leaders in predicting the course and possible consequences of the crisis. Although it was a group of prominent scientists gathered in the organization of Jason, the insistence on the second report was a positive step that leads to more competent planning of future activities. Insisting on

the third report, which was similar to the previous but with different conclusions, is problematic. The third report shows Reagan's determination to prove at all costs attitude that is pre-taken.

This case creates a dilemma about whether, in this case, the crisis is not recognized or not adequately set up its framework. It seems unlikely that Reagan did not recognize the threat from first two reports. As much as had the opposite view, he could not ignore the opinion of so many eminent scientists. On the other hand, if the threat is identified it is expected some kind of reaction. This dilemma can be resolved by the fact that the first two reports predicted entry into the acute phase of crisis in a several decades. These conditions have allowed Reagan to ignore the threats and to leave to his successors to deal with these problems.

Reagan's conservative political preference implied in the first place a strong national consciousness, the primary concern for future economic progress and achievement of U.S. strategic interests. The problem of global warming suggests necessity of greenhouse gas emissions reduction, which of course entails higher costs and constraints in the industry. Namely the United States at the time, spent about half of all energy produced in the world. It is therefore not difficult to assume that a number of stakeholders from the business environment have made significant pressure on Reagan.

In this case the public was excluded and had no impact. The public has begun to address the issue of global warming just a few years later, which resulted in a slow but serious concern with a politician on this subject. Major conclusions from this case can be:

- Insisting in another opinion is justified and desirable. As determined in the earlier part of the text such a decision can only contribute to better understanding the circumstances. Nonetheless, from Reagan's case, we can conclude that request for other opinions are not always motivated by the desire to prevent single-mindedness; on the contrary motive may be completely opposite.
- Once again is confirmed strong influence of leader's preconceptions in recognizing and defining the crisis
- The case suggests the complexity of the theoretical approach to practice. In contrast to the theory, in practice, course of crisis events is rarely structured.

Therefore, the attempt to apply theoretical knowledge as a matrix due to solving practical events could create the impression of hopelessness.

- Based on Reagan's conduct in this case it might be anticipated that political leaders are highly prone to avoid dealing with unpleasant issues if the nature of the event allows to leave that issue for later. Lack of information of the public especially contributes to this.
- Although it is not clearly demonstrated or proven, it can be sense a strong influence of stakeholders on Reagan's stance on global warming. The influence of stakeholders, particularly those from the business environment is often imperceptible but we should not lose sight that they are always nearby.
- The absence of the public, paradoxically points to the influence which the public can have in identifying and defining the crisis situation. If the conclusions of all three reports were known to the public, the crisis caused by the influence of global warming would undoubtedly have a different course.

## 4.2. Elected Officials in Onset of Crisis

### 4.2.1. *Yitzhak Rabin and Entebbe hostage situation:* Critical decisions under pressure

#### Case No.4

*Operation Entebbe was a hostage-rescue mission carried out by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) at Entebbe Airport in Uganda on July 4, 1976. A week earlier, on June 27, an Air France plane with 248 passengers was hijacked by Palestinian terrorists and supporters and flown to Entebbe, near Kampala, the capital of Uganda. Shortly after landing, all non-Jewish passengers were released*

#### 27.6.76: Cabinet meeting - 'We're in deep trouble'

**Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin :** "Before we continue I have an announcement: We lost contact with an Air France plane that took off in Lod. It was probably hijacked. There were about 83 Israelis onboard, 10 of them got off in Athens. Most were women and children."

**(Security forum convenes at 4 pm)**

**Rabin:** "The first thing we must do is declare that we view France as responsible for the lives of the Israeli passengers. They will ask, 'There are 73 Israelis onboard, what's the government doing about it?'"

**Transportation Minister Gad Yaacobi:** "I recommend not publishing any names and an Air France representative should be the one to deliver the news to the families at Ben-Gurion Airport."

**Foreign Minister Yigal Allon:** "We are in deep trouble."

**Rabin:** "We definitely are."

29.6: Cabinet meeting - 'Don't discussion mission now'

**IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Mordechai "Motta" Gur:** "The IDF has prepared a mission."

**Rabin:** "I suggest we don't discuss it here."

**Defense Minister Shimon Peres:** "We need to rally up the editors' committee (an informal forum comprised by the editors and owners of the main Israeli media) so they don't begin to speculate. They have already cooperated and not published the passengers' list."

**Peres:** "We are in a tough situation, but not the toughest thing that can happen to us."

**Rabin:** "I think it is the toughest."

30.6: Cabinet meeting - 'Operation impossible'

(The ultimatum: Free terrorists by 2 pm tomorrow, or hostages will be killed)

**Rabin:** "I want to say that any information leaked out today can end up costing lives. So I ask you to not behave normally regarding this issue."

**Allon:** "If we publish a statement saying we'll meet the terrorists' demands, they will say, 'If Israel accepts the possibility of surrender, what will the hyssop on the wall say?' The French will announce they aren't planning on surrendering to pressure. West Germany is completely rejecting the possibility. In a meeting between our Washington ambassador and the assistant to the secretary of state, he mentioned that their secret approach is known to us – not to give into demands or blackmail."

**Rabin:** "At this stage, I don't think a military operation is possible, because we don't have the ability to act without the consent of the countries involved. So what do we do? Attack Uganda? Not because of the IDF, but how would we even reach Uganda? The object is not to act militarily but to save people's lives. As of right now I can't see a way to do that. So, without befogging the issue, we are in distress. We aren't going to be surprised if the families start to pressure us."

(Security forum convenes at 12 pm)

**Rabin:** "A telegram arrived from Uri Lubrani (Israeli ambassador to Iran). He and Idi Amin Dada (president of Uganda at the time) both shared an experience where they were saved from a plane crash. Regarding this, we have a statement that will be read by Yigal."

**Allon:** "Lubarni writes, 'I want to offer myself as a messenger to Amin in Uganda, to try and get him to free all the hostages or trade myself in for them. I think we can try to play this card, especially with such a primitive person like Amin.'"

**Rabin:** "I suggest you tell him to try and get there."

**Peres:** "He is the Israeli ambassador to Iran. If, God forbid, they place their hands on him, he knows a lot of secrets."

(Rabin and Peres meet with IDF officials at 12:20 pm)

**Gur:** "We put together a team to look into all the military options, and Ehud Barak (then-assistant to head of the Military Intelligence Directorate) is working with the Air Force and Navy."

**Rabin:** "An article about 'Heartburn' (military operation executed by the Mossad and Shin Bet during which Palestinian and German terrorists planning to bomb an El-Al airplane were captured in Nairobi), telling almost the entire story, written by a military correspondent in one of the newspapers, but it was disqualified. Everything was mentioned inside. The fact that we can't take a military correspondent, put him in jail and question him how he got this information – this is a catastrophe."

**Gur:** "I think we have to do it, no later than today."

(Meeting with the Editors Committee)

**Rabin:** "There is going to be an assembly today of all the family members, demanding the government begin negotiations. I've asked the radio and television stations not to interview them and not to publish this story. I think the extremists amongst them wished to protest near my house

and outside the prime minister's building. One thing will be very severe – if the world finds out our government is pressured to surrender."

**Maariv Editor-in-Chief Shalom Rosenfeld:** "We can't prevent a feature article in the newspaper calling the government to surrender. It's a legitimate opinion, even though I reject it."

**Davar Editor-in Chief Hannah Zemer:** "Even in this case the government will surrender and not allow 77 Jews to blow up in an airplane."

**Haaretz Editor-in Chief Gershon Schocken:** "What's the make-up of the hostages?"

**Rabin:** "As far as Israel is concerned, I haven't checked the ethnicity. Anyway, it didn't interest me. Usually, people of scanty means can't afford to travel around the world. So one kind of people that don't have means and it doesn't matter what their ethnicity is – aren't there."

**Schocken:** "There are wealthy people of North African origin."

#### 1.7, 7 am: Cabinet meeting - 'We are risking lives'

**Yaacobi:** "Last night around 11 pm, I met with the passengers' families. To their credit I must say that the mood was very calm and responsible. Most of them claimed that due to the special circumstances, an Israeli military operation is impossible so the only thing they demand is to begin negotiations."

**Peres:** "The problem isn't simply the families' claims. It should be made clear that negotiations and surrendering open the door to future terror attacks."

**Rabin:** "Who says?"

**Peres:** "I do."

**Rabin:** "I ask you to clarify yourself and explain tell us why."

**Peres:** "Until now, the Americans haven't surrendered because Israelis were a world class standard. If we surrender, there won't be any country in the world that will stand it. It will cause more and more pressure."

**Rabin:** "This is the situation at the moment: Without making a decision, that is a decision, including everything that comes with that, with all the question marks. We must remember that we'll be the first government to show willingness to enter into negotiations regarding exchanges."

**Allon:** "I am opposed to accepting the terror organization's terms, and I know this is a strong statement, because we truly are putting people's lives at risk, and they have proven before that in certain cases when the ultimatum wasn't answered – they carried out (their threat)."

**Rabin:** "I wish to clarify: We don't have time for evasions. The question is - are we fundamentally willing to enter negotiations or no? I ask the government members to not avoid answering this question."

**Education Minister Aharon Yadlin:** "Since anyone who saves an Israeli life is actually saving the entire world, and for pikuach nefesh (the preservation of human life) of those Israelis caught in this situation – I support any effort to save them, including negotiations."

**Rabin:** "They aren't willing to return them under these conditions, there is no point in announcing negotiations. If we do – what would we negotiate? Their non-return? Let's not run away from the issue."

**Minister without Portfolio Yisrael Galili:** "I suggest the government begin negotiations immediately in order to save the hostages, while showing readiness to free detainees. I don't suggest we elaborate which ones."

**Rabin:** "I second Galili's suggestion simply because of this: I'm not willing to explain to the public why we have traded 130 terrorists for corpses till this day, eight of which were part of hostile destructive activity including murder. And based on this, I don't wish to explain to the Israeli public or to anyone else why we can return corpses but not live people."

**Peres:** "Precedents aren't the problem. The problem is the future, the people's future and the future of Israeli airplanes and aviation. We should be concerned with the fate of the people here, of what will happen to the country and her status regarding hijacking, terror and so on, in



addition to the fate of those taken hostage. For now, all of the terror organizations, aside from Wadie Haddad, have disagreed with hijacking, mostly because of Israel's strict and persistent stance."

**Rabin:** "This was a political decision made by the Fatah (the largest faction within the PLO, Palestinian Liberation Organization) to cease their operations abroad, had nothing to do with Israel's strict stance."

**Peres:** "If Israel had surrendered every time, the Fatah would have made the decision to continue its terror operations."

**Rabin:** "I wish to know whether anyone is opposed. I don't want any misunderstandings on this issue. I don't propose we discuss negotiations, but that the government authorizes the team to continue our attempts to release the hostages, including exchange of prisoners in Israel. We'll say 'prisoners', and that doesn't mean accepting the terrorists' terms. No numbers and no names. Those in favor of this offer raise your hands? It's unanimous."

#### 1.7: Consultation - 'IDF not built for mission'

(Gur proposes conquering Entebbe with an option of landing the nearby Victoria Lake and beginning a wide-spread operation)

**Peres:** "If we surrender, Israel will look so wounded and ridiculed. And if we execute an imaginative military operation it could be huge all around. I have no doubt that the IDF can do it, but then we run the risk of people being killed."

**Gur:** "It's an operation that's nearly impossible to plan in two days."

**Peres:** "We can wait one more day."

**Rabin:** "I feel it might end up being a lot like the 'Bay of Pig', the biggest operation we've done so far. When I examine three different operation options – chances aren't great."

**Gur:** "We can't deny: The IDF isn't really built for operations in Entebbe."

**Rabin:** "I'm not complaining, I think we don't have military capabilities over there."

(Security forum convenes at 5 pm)

**Peres:** "We must ask ourselves whether we are willing to return all terrorists, without any exceptions."

**Rabin:** "What does that have to do with the mission?"

**Peres:** "It has a lot to do with it, since you're going to have to explain to the public why you were willing to kill them for X but not kill them for (Y)."

**Rabin:** "If I believe we had a chance to rescue them, I would support it regardless of the price."

**Peres:** "If there is a military operation, it's preferable. Until now, I admit that there's no concrete proposal, only ideas and imagination. The second proposal is complete and utter surrender. If we want to negotiate, we should send someone to Kampala (Uganda's capital)."

#### 2.7, 12:15 pm: Consultation - 'No one will back us'

(Gur proposes a practical military plan for the first time.)

**Allon:** "It's a flight without aerial defence."

**Rabin:** "Without. The problem is interception."

**Peres:** "The advantage is the element of surprise."

**Rabin:** "I am still uncertain about this operation. We have never had so many hostages. The military information we have is the most limited we've ever had. This is going to be the riskiest operation I have ever known."

(Cabinet convenes at 2 pm)

**Rabin:** "Begin suggested that the government not get entangled in these reservations that we won't commit to the number of prisoners or their names, so we don't face yet another humiliating fold. I admit to accepting his proposal. We should know that from the moment they separate the hostages, it becomes Israel's problem. No one will stand with us. The decisions will be ours. The world

couldn't care less. Best case, they'll be sympathetic, or not. We have no one to turn to but ourselves, and the decision isn't going to be made by anyone else but by Israeli government. We are conducting negotiations regarding the release of prisoners, but I don't recommend they start arguing about the numbers, 40 or 50. We didn't say – 'blood avenger', no. I wouldn't want to see this whole thing fail."

**Peres:** "Starting tomorrow we only have half a day left, and I recommend that all ministers be prepared to stay here for a while. Tomorrow is going to be a dramatic day."

### 3.7. 1 pm: Cabinet meeting - 'We've done all we can'

**Rabin:** "New information has come into play and as of today we have a military option."

**Peres:** "The heart wrenching question is whether we sure risk the lives of innocent unarmed civilians, and save the future of this country, or not. If we surrender, the respect for terrorism will grow, and encourage more operations like this, seeing as how it pays off. In the eyes of the world, Israel's honour will deteriorate, and so will her deterring capabilities. Countries around the world might understand our ways, but mock us in their hearts."

**Gur** (presenting the military plan): "To summarize: The operation risk is, as I see it, very calculated and can be taken. There is a possibility of injuries, just like in any other operation we've ever done to rescue civilians, but over all I think the circumstances are reasonable and a military operation can be done."

**Industry and Trade Minister Haim Bar-Lev:** "If they fail to refuel, how long is the flight?"

**Gur:** "They won't be able to return home."

**Bar-Lev:** "What about weather issues over there?"

**Gur:** "It's risky."

**Minister Yosef Burg:** "What if we find out they moved the hostages' location over night?"

**Rabin:** "The mission will be a complete and utter failure."

**Peres:** "It's an IDF operation like never before. This is the first Israeli military mission in history executed outside of Middle Eastern borders."

**Rabin:** "I admit that after receiving the data regarding the landing I calmed down a bit, relatively of course, because I'm not saying there aren't any risks."

**Allon:** "I support this mission. Questions have already been raised in this country, why did we act quickly in the Ma'alot attack when there were children from a certain ethnicity involved, whereas we were willing to settle when it came to people belonging to a different ethnic group."

**Bar-Lev:** "If we fail, we'll have about 300 Israelis in Uganda, including soldiers, and we have to know that. But even if we don't succeed, we've done all that we can."

**Rabin:** "We're going to execute a complex mission with expected injuries. Nonetheless, I recommend the government approve it, though not with a light heart."

(The mission was approved unanimously)

Mossad built an accurate picture of the whereabouts of the hostages, the number of militants and the involvement of Ugandan troops from the released hostages in Paris. While preparing the raid the Israeli army consulted with Israeli firms involved in building projects in Africa during the 1960s and 1970s. While planning the military operation, the IDF erected a partial replica of the airport terminal with the help of civilians who had helped build the original. It has been claimed by researchers that after arriving at the military base to begin work on the replica building (not being aware beforehand what they were to do), the civilian Israeli contractors were invited to dinner with the commander of the base. At the dinner, it was indicated to them that, upon completion of the replica, and in the best interest of national security, they would be held as guests of the military for a few days.

Well-known case of hostages at Entebbe airport became famous due to magnificent releasing action performed by the IDF, which set the standards in dealing with similar cases. In the shadow of military action, there was no less successful crisis management for the entire event headed by Yitzhak Rabin and his cabinet.

Hostage situations are very sensitive events by its nature. Yitzhak Rabin and his cabinet met a direct threat to human life, which greatly depend on the decisions that the government would adopt. On the other hand, accountability to national integrity and the international community are ordered not to enter into negotiations with the hijackers. It is the primary dilemma in situation with the hostages. Every concession to hijackers could motivate future kidnappings as a way of verified pressure. The whole case is complicated with the expected public interest. The part of public which represented the families of the kidnapped was personally and emotionally interested in the outcome. The first task was to alleviate public pressure and prevent outflow of information that could jeopardize the future course of events. Time pressure, imposed by kidnappers, degraded the ability to obtain the outcome of the crisis which is favourable for Rabin government. Therefore the second task was related to obtaining time as much as possible, what has been achieved by balanced informal negotiations. The choice between preserving the integrity and preservation of life of hostages is conditioned by the alternatives. Rabin government that de facto, turned into the Crisis Headquarters came to a conclusion about the opportunities available to them through the confrontation of different opinions and information. In this case the alternative was a seemingly impossible hostage rescue operations. Entebbe Airport is located in Uganda, 4000 kilometres from Tel Aviv, which means that military action could lead to international problems, because its implementation would jeopardize the territory of other countries. The third task of Rabin's government was to ensure international support for possible armed action. Hereby challenges are just started. The most important part of the work related to the action itself was done by the Mossad and the IDF, it seems immaculately. Crucial influence on the decision and the release of hostages had information that was gathered by the Mossad. We should not leave out the importance of circumstance. In fact, given that Israeli engineers have designed the building of Entebbe airport, the plan of the building was available for the IDF. If it were not these unexpected advantages, the course of the crisis would probably be different. Practically, historical merit of enforcement raid on the Entebbe airport belongs to the

IDF. For this action was needed a lot of courage and overall capabilities of the armed forces. It should be added the impact of the Israeli society and the environment in which it is located. In the Middle East were, then as now, alternating the war and the threat of war, which caused the cultural environment where the use of force and sacrifice for the society are acceptable, even desirable. Crisis management of Entebbe hostage situation can be considered as one of the rarely success stories from which can be learned a lot:

- Justifiably a strong principle, which excludes negotiations with terrorists, did not create atmosphere of "fait accompli". On the contrary, Rabin's Government has considered all options that might be in the best interest of Israel. Pre-established principles are important as guidelines for decision making but the crisis simply require consideration of all possibilities
- Proactive role of governments has led to a sincere and an open relationship with the media, which did not result in censorship, but by mutual understanding in the interest of the society.
- Aware of the importance of considering all available options, Rabin encouraged presentation of opposing attitudes within the government and thus prevents single-mindedness which is characteristic of crisis teams. This can also be seen as his need to share the burden of responsibility but the suspicion will remain in the shadow the achieved results
- Indispensable role in this case had the relevant government institutions Mossad, IDF and Military Intelligence Directorate. Striking is the clear division of responsibility and orientation toward a common goal. At least part of this is attributable sense of vulnerability in the Israeli society
- Notwithstanding the commitment of all parties, an appropriate set of circumstances has a key role. Planned action was a great risk because there was no backup plan. In the case that any detail occurred outside the planned framework, which was very possible, this action would be remembered as one of the biggest failures. This was the case with the U.S. Operation Eagle Claw
- Finally, one detail might bring discomfort to the analysis of these and similar situations. Retention of Israeli engineers against their will at a military base in this case it seems entirely justified. However, the tendency of the suspension of individual rights during critical situations is an issue that requires serious thought to the future

#### 4.2.2. *Slobodan Milošević and Referendum on the participation of foreign representatives in the resolving problems in Kosovo and Metohija:* *Avoidance of decisions making and playing with public expectations*

##### Case No.5

*The conflict in Kosovo entered a new phase when, on the Day of the Albanian flag November 28th 1997, "the Kosovo Liberation Army " was promoted. Events from the end of February 1998. in Likošan and early March 1998. in Prekaz, when the first leader of the KLA Adem Jashari was liquidated, are often taken as the beginning of the Serbian-Albanian conflict in Kosovo and Metohija.*

*In the spring of the 1998 the International Contact Group was activated, after being inactive for two years after the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. After the major conflicts in the Drenica area where were hundreds of dead, the Contact Group at the meeting in London on 9th March 1998, threatened Serbia by political and economic measures, while demanded from Albanians to stop provocations. From this meeting as well as from the fourth meeting of the NATO on 4th March, was sent message to Belgrade that Kosovo is no longer an internal matter and that it has become an international problem. It was demanded from Serbian authorities to withdraw special police units and Yugoslav Army within 10 days, suspension of operations against the civilian population, a free visit to Kosovo and Metohija for all humanitarian and other organizations, the arrival of investigators from the Hague tribunal, return of the permanent OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojvodina, the arrival of a new OSCE mission led by former Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, the implementation of agreements on education in Kosovo, the beginning of unconditional dialogue with the Kosovo Albanian leaders, and acceptance of international mediation in the negotiations.*

*The Serbian government on 10th March formed a negotiating team and invited Kosovo Albanians to negotiate but they it two days later. On 14th March, President Milosevic has rejected the mission of Felipe Gonzalez, and the European Union has agreed to apply set of sanctions against the FRY. In the second half of March parallel parliamentary and presidential elections of Kosovo Albanians were held, not interfered by the police, and where Ibrahim Rugova and his Democratic League of Kosovo won. The next day, in Pristina, in the presence of intermediary Mons. Vincenzo PAGLIA, Ratomir Vico in front of Serbian government and Fehmi Agani signed the document on the implementation of the Agreement on Education in Kosovo and Metohija in 1997, which provided gradual return of ethnic Albanians in state schools and colleges by 30 June. Radivoje Papovic, Rector of the University of Pristina, announced that agreement is betrayal and added: "Today's signature is the collapse of the Serbian state."*

*In the weeks preceding the referendum, numerous global emissaries visited Belgrade, including Yevgeny Primakov, Robert Gelbard, Klaus Kinkel, Hubert Vedrine, Bronjislav Geremek, Jiri Dienstbier, Strobe Talbot, Jeremy Greenstock, Sadako Ogata, and Wolfgang Ischinger. At the meeting of the Contact Group in Bonn on 25th March, was expressed dissatisfaction with the progress that the FRY did and new deadline of four weeks was set up to fulfill all the requirements of the London meeting held on 9 March. The European Union suspended the issuing of visas to Yugoslav officials that took part in suppressing the rebellion in Kosovo and Metohija. The UN Security Council session from the 31st March introduced the embargo on the arms and the repressive machinery import to the FRY, which would remain in force until the Council is satisfied that the Yugoslav authorities have started "meaningful dialogue without preconditions" for greater autonomy for Kosovo and Metohija, and complete withdrawal of the police special units and*

*allowed unhindered presence of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and the OSCE in the province.*

*The new Serbian Government with Prime Minister Mirko Marjanovic, was elected on 24 March 1998, stated that one of its priorities was "Kosovo as an inalienable part of Serbia and internal matter." On one of the first session, the new government decided unanimously to accept the proposal of Slobodan Milosevic, then president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, to ask the National Assembly to call a referendum in which citizens would declare whether they accept the participation of foreign representatives in resolving problems in Kosovo and Metohija. Slobodan Milosevic's idea to call a referendum was expressed in a letter dated 2 April 1998 to Milan, Mirko Marjanovic and Dragan Tomic, the presidents of the Republic, Government and National Assembly, and came as a complete surprise. In a letter to Yugoslav President, among other things, said: "We know that we refused to accept the participation of foreign representatives in the resolution of internal matters of our country, especially in solving problems in Kosovo and Metohija, which represents an internal matter of Serbia. I believe that this attitude is essential to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our country. We believe that all this time of crisis in former Yugoslavia led national policy, not personal politics, or even party politics. And in this case our refusal to foreign factor involved in solving the internal affairs of the Republic of Serbia - Kosovo and Metohija is also national policy and not personal or party politics. Is that true or not, the answer can only give people ... "*

*The referendum question was: "Do you accept the participation of foreign representatives in resolving problems in Kosovo and Metohija?". The referendum was held on 23 April 1998. The referendum turned out 5,297,776 voters (73.05% of registered voters). Against the participation of foreign representatives in resolving problems in Kosovo declared the 94.73% of voters, and cons was 3.41%.*

For decades, Serbia failed to make progress in solving problems in the southern provinces of Kosovo. Failed policies in the eighties resulted in the mass abandonment of Kosovo by the Serbs and the louder demands for independence by ethnic Albanians. During the nineties, occupied the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the wars in the region, Serbia is not much engaged Kosovo. This resulted in complete alienation of the local population of the state. In the second half of the nineties various Albanian paramilitary formations had taken control of some areas. In response to these developments Milosevic decided to solve the problem by using force. Showing his usual awkwardness in conducting foreign policy and the implementation of combat operations, Milosevic was soon faced allegations of excessive use of force and ethnic cleansing of Kosovo. There followed the internationalization of the problems in Kosovo which Milosevic refused to accept. At the same time, Milosevic was aware of possible consequences and decided to throw over the burden of responsibility to the citizens of Serbia by calling the referendum. In order to provide a negative response of the citizens, Milosevic was shortened statutory period between the calling and holding of a referendum, which prevented wider discussion in public. Intensive campaign in the government media kept

the focus of the problems on weakening the sovereignty of Serbia. Finally, the referendum question is formulated in a way that the result of expression of citizens will, was more than expected. Indeed, faced with a choice between approval and rejection of foreign interference in the internal problem of Serbia, the citizens are, of course, took a negative attitude, regardless of whether they were supported Milošević's politics. If the referendum question contained the consequences of outcomes, the results of the referendum would probably be different.

The international community has interpreted the results of a referendum as a citizen's support to Milosevic's politics and this event was a prelude to the NATO bombing of Serbia. Final result is thousands of dead, destroyed infrastructures and permanent loss of control over the province. It is very difficult to find bright moment in this case of crisis management:

- On the first place, this case suggests the possible consequences of the predominant role of leader. Milosevic's policies did not have much sense. Except for the insistence on the principles of sovereignty, which he was unable to defend, it remains unclear what were the goals of his decisions. In this occasion, neither one decision made by Milosevic, did not lead to the dismissal of the crisis, on the contrary. Democratic mechanisms of diversification of power exactly exist to prevent such occurrences.
- Striking single-mindedness in a group of Milosevic's closest associates was a key factor for the survival of Milosevic's politics
- The role of media in this case could be understood as support for Milosevic's decisions. This was not about collaboration of government and media but about control over the media services that were owned by the state. Journalism that was outside of government control was weak and inadequate to be compared with influence of state media. Regardless of the circumstances, this testifies to the crucial role of the media during critical situations
- Aware of the possible consequences of their decisions Milosevic tried to avoid the liability and passed it to the citizens. The goal of this step remains unclear, because the consequences are too great to avoid responsibility by referendum. Generally speaking, the situations in which the liability can be returned to the citizens are very rare.

- This case also points out the interdependency of historical and a cultural heritage on the one hand and public influence on the course of critical events on the other hand.

### 4.3. Elected Officials in Aftermath of Crisis

#### 4.3.1. Margaret Thatcher and Football Hooliganism: Accepting Responsibility and the Conversion of the crisis into an Opportunity

##### Case no.6<sup>114</sup>

*Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the UK had a reputation worldwide for football hooliganism. However, the UK government has led a widescale crackdown on football related violence. While football hooliganism has been a growing concern in some other European countries in recent years, British football fans now tend to have a better reputation abroad. Although reports of British football hooliganism still surface, the instances now tend to occur at pre-arranged locations rather than at the matches themselves.*

*In March 1978, a full-scale riot broke out at The Den during an FA Cup quarter-final between Millwall and Ipswich.. Dozens of innocent people were injured. In March 1985, hooligans who had attached themselves to Millwall were involved in large-scale rioting at Luton when Millwall played Luton Town in the quarter final of the FA Cup. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's immediate response was to set up a "War Cabinet" to combat football hooliganism. On 11 May 1985 a 14-year-old boy died at St Andrews stadium when fans were pushed onto a wall by Police which subsequently collapsed following crowd violence at a match between Birmingham City and Leeds United. The fighting that day was described by Justice Popplewell, during the Popplewell Committee investigation into football in 1985 as more like "the Battle of Agincourt than a football match". Because of the other events in 1986 and the growing rise in football hooliganism during the early 1980s, an interim report from the committee stated that "football may not be able to continue in its present form much longer" unless hooliganism was reduced, perhaps by excluding "away" fans. On 29 May 1985, 39 Juventus fans were crushed to death during the European Cup Final between Liverpool and Juventus at Heysel Stadium in Brussels; an event that became known as the Heysel Stadium disaster.*

*Margaret Thatcher, UK Prime Minister from 1979 to 1990, made a high-profile public call for the country's football hooligans to be given "stiff" prison sentences to act as a deterrent to others in a bid to clamp down on hooliganism. On 31 May, immediately after Heysel Stadium disaster, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher put pressure upon the FA to withdraw English clubs from European competition, and then two days later UEFA banned English clubs for "an indeterminate period of time".*

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<sup>114</sup> Sources: [www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk](http://www.crimereduction.homeoffice.gov.uk)  
[www.homeoffice.gov.uk/crime-victims/reducing-crime/football-disorder](http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/crime-victims/reducing-crime/football-disorder)  
 David McKie (1985) "Thatcher set to demand FA ban on games in Europe"; London, The Guardian



*Thatcher set to demand FA ban on games in Europe*

*The Prime Minister is expected to tell the FA chairman, Mr Bert Millichip, today that English football should pull out of Europe before it is thrown out. The Government also hopes to push legislation designed to curb crowd violence through Parliament in the next few weeks. With 38 people known to have died in Wednesday night's disaster at the Heysel Stadium in Brussels, the urgency of Mrs Thatcher's summons to the FA chairman was clear from the way she sent the British ambassador in Mexico City to interrupt Mr Millichip's trip with a touring English team and acquaint him with her wishes. He later left for London and said before boarding the aircraft: 'We must consider taking action before anyone else does. And that could mean action at any level.'*

*Mr Millichip arrived in Mexico late on Wednesday with the general secretary of the FA, Mr Ted Croker. He said he had received a call from the ambassador, Sir Kenneth Graham, just after 6am yesterday with a request from Mrs Thatcher that he fly home immediately. He said that he and Mr Croker had decided to do so anyway after hearing of events in Brussels. Mr Croker said that while many of the facts seemed to be known about Wednesday's fatal incident 'there might be more to the matter than meets the eye' in considering who was involved.*

*Officials of the controlling authority in Europe, UEFA, were pinning blame yesterday squarely on the English fans as it considered the possibility of banning English clubs from European matches. A three-man commission has already been set up to investigate and will report before the July 4 draw for next season's European competitions. The team will be Mr Gunter Schneider, of West Germany, Mr Erik Hyldstrup, of Denmark, and Mr Da Silva Resende, of Portugal. Mr Schneider, the official UEFA observer at the Brussels match, said yesterday: 'Only the English fans were responsible. Of that there is no doubt.'*

*Mr Jacques Georges, the UEFA president, said: 'The committee will have to judge and they must be decisive. This is not a matter of football but humanity. We cannot tolerate the continuation of this appalling behaviour.' The UEFA secretary, Mr Hans Bangeurter, said: 'My personal view is that, having written so often about this problem, having warned for so long, the only consequence now can be to suspend, definitely, the club involved. Whether there will be an extension I don't know. Theoretically, it could go as far as suspending the national team from European competitions. 'We have reached the stage now where football is at the crossroads. We cannot and are not willing to let this game be killed by irresponsible elements who have no place in football stadiums.' He warned that sanctions would be 'extremely severe.'*

*The Belgian government is expected to announce today a ban on British - not just English - football teams from the country for an unspecified term. The Belgians have advised other European countries to do the same and London sources yesterday believed that some would accept the advice.*

*The British government is seeking urgent talks with political leaders so that legislation to curb crowd violence can be an agreed package. Ministers want to have it on the statute book in time for the start of the new football season in August. These measures will be aimed mainly at violence on British grounds. Ministers reluctantly accept that it will take rather longer to frame legislation which could deal effectively with behaviour abroad. But one target for early action could be the cross-Channel ferries which carried many fans to Belgium this week and many others involved in earlier scenes of violence. There could be support for a ban on alcohol sales aboard for perhaps two or three days before matches.*

*The main focus of the package, though, is likely to be on action to stop alcohol sales at domestic matches and on the way to them on controls on the sales of tickets, possibly with the introduction of identity cards for supporters and on strict crowd segregation. Some of the provisions in the planned bill were foreshadowed in the Government's white paper on public order published earlier this month. A bill based on that white paper is due next session. But the Government is also likely to move next session to take extended powers to deal at home with*

*offences committed abroad. This is already possible with some serious offences and crowd behaviour is now rated as belonging to that class.*

*Mrs Thatcher held a two-hour meeting yesterday morning with the Sports Minister, Mr Neil MacFarlane, the Home Office Minister of State, Mr Giles Shaw, and the Foreign Office Minister of State, Mr Richard Luce. Afterwards, at an impromptu press conference in Downing Street, she said she had written to the Italian and Belgian prime ministers expressing 'horror and revulsion' at Wednesday's events and offering an initial contribution of pounds 250,000 to the Italian Disaster Fund. The Queen, she said, had sent messages to the Italian and Belgian heads of state. Mrs Thatcher had also asked to see some of the football correspondents who were in the stadium during the riots - though many of them have already left for Mexico. She said the country wanted to get offenders before the courts and given stiff sentences. But solid evidence was needed to do that. The use of television cameras to get 'total observation' of football crowds could be useful here, but she appealed to anyone who constructive ideas for dealing with crowd violence to put them forward.*

*The Prime Minister said her meeting with the FA to discuss domestic crowd trouble, timed for June 21, would be brought forward. She seemed to rule out the extension of the Popplewell Inquiry, called after the Bradford disaster, to cover the Brussels events. 'I think the Popplewell Inquiry is for matches held here on grounds here,' She said.*

*There was no disposition in London yesterday to minimise the responsibility of British 'supporters' for the Brussels deaths. But there was criticism of some aspects of the organisation of the Brussels match, which was contrasted with the extremely successful handling of the earlier cup final in Rotterdam. Mr Macfarlane had a long telephone conversation early yesterday with the Liverpool chairman, Mr John Smith, who is shortly to take over as head of the Sports Council. Mr Smith said in a radio interview yesterday that necessary precautions had not been taken in Brussels and the segregation of fans had been inadequate. Alarmed by reports that segregation at the match might prove to be inadequate, Mr Macfarlane sent a Telex message at midday on Tuesday to Mr Bangeurter in Berne. He said he was concerned at indications of counterfeit tickets circulating in Italy and that tickets would be available at the stadium on the day of the match. He said he would welcome Mr Bangeurter's assurance that UEFA's rules and provisions drawn up by the Council of Europe in 1984 on crowd segregation would be vigorously implemented. No assurance - or reply of any kind - was received.*

*With the Commons in recess there was no immediate response among MPs to the news from Brussels, but a government statement is promised when Parliament resumes on Monday.*

*The SDP leader, Dr David Owen, and the Liberal leader, Mr David Steel, called on the FA yesterday to consider a ban on British teams playing abroad. There were indications that some MPs would have welcomed an immediate and categorical government statement that no more British teams would play in Europe for a couple of years at least. Ministers, however, believe that this move would be impossible and that the Government is confined at least at first to acting through the FA.*

*On 6 June FIFA extended the ban to all worldwide matches, but this was modified one week later to allow friendly matches to take place. The ban did not apply to the English national team. English clubs were banned indefinitely from European club competitions with a provision being added that Liverpool would serve a further three-year ban after the ban on other English clubs had been lifted. In the event English clubs were banned for five years. Liverpool in the end served one year extra*

In the spring of 1985 the UK was facing condemnation of the international public about the mess that caused the Liverpool's fans on the stadium Heysel when died

39 Juventus supporters. Because of the reputation of supporters of British clubs, immediately after the tragedy in Brussels, the international community is absolutely blamed Liverpool fans. Due to many years of disorders on stadiums, hooligans were a serious problem for the government of Great Britain. British hooligans have also caused concern among the organizers of international football competitions.

Margaret Thatcher's government has been trying for a while, to find a solution for violence on stadiums. Largest problem, which has hindered the implementation of radical measures, was the extreme popularity of football in the UK and the many successes of clubs and national teams. Any wider activity aimed at combating hooligans, inevitably would involve other fans. Confronting the fans would mean opposing the football and that sport has been and still is part of British culture, tradition and image. Initially benign problem turned into a nightmare for government of Margaret Thatcher.

In the days after the tragedy at Heysel stadium, the British public no longer had a dilemma. Hooligans had to be stopped because they caused damage to the reputation of the UK, which still is more important than football. Margaret Thatcher, as a skilful politician, used the spirits in the public and brought some very important decisions that affected on the future of football in the UK. Faced with the destruction of national reputation, in the case of ejection of British clubs from European competitions, Thatcher decided to propose that measure by herself, and accept the responsibility of UK for events in Brussels. Although, awarded that the responsibility is not only of Liverpool's fans Thatcher decided to leave discussion on this topic for later. The British government has used unequivocal condemnation of acts of vandalism on the stadium and took a series of radical measures to bring order in this field.

This was the beginning of suppression of hooligans in the UK. As expected, consequences for football in the UK could not be avoided. It took a long time to recover a football and again become a symbol of UK. Today we can say that hooligans in the Britain are not greater problem than similar phenomena in any other country.

- Accepting accountability can often be interpreted as a noble gesture, especially in circumstances when the refusal would be defence of the indefensible. Thatcher has wisely assessed that it would be wrong to deny accountability in the circumstances where the international community is undivided about the role of British fans in the Heysel stadium tragedy. Although there were many failures

in the organization, an attempt to shift accountability on that side, would act as a blame game which would further undermine the reputation of the UK. Of course, when things got quieter, the British government has strongly supported the review of circumstances in appropriate way. It is important to emphasize that it is about accepting accountability on behalf of the nation. When it comes to personal accountability, politicians are more difficult to accept because the consequences are also personal.

- Problems with hooliganism in the UK began long time before the events in the Brussels, but the public was divided over measures to be taken. After the tragedy on the Heisl, there was no longer argument to prevent a sharp reaction of authorities. Margaret Thatcher's government has used a crisis and turned it into an opportunity for comprehensive reform of regulations that have concerned the behaviour on the stadium
- Decisions taken by the British government at that time had brought its negative consequences. Ban of participation of British clubs in European competitions is causing great harm football in this country. Although, one can see this result as prosaically, it is not simple to distort the symbol of the nation, not at all. However, the choice between the two decisions, in the critical circumstances, often turn on assess of less adverse effects.

## 5. CONCLUSION

### 5.1. Theoretical and Empirical Findings

Analysis of the role of elected officials in the crisis situations, as the primary focus of this paper, turned into a much broader field of study - crisis management in the public sector. This course was inevitable because, as is presumed in the beginning, leaders themselves and individuals, in general, cannot have an independent role in coping with the crisis. In the previous chapters is dismantled the whole mechanism, which basically is not designed for crisis situations, to identify capacity of act exactly in such circumstances.

Given that the essence of this paper is the democratic principles of elections, the question of legitimacy of public administration to deal with crisis situations has received the expected answer. The government acquires its legitimacy in elections. This legitimacy is related to all tasks of running the state, which also applies to crisis situations. In accordance with the needs, the government is developing a public administration that carry out its share of responsibility. Satisfaction with government and public authorities, citizens will show in election in which the current convening of the government may lose confidence, but it will not survive the legitimacy of government as an institution because it is the foundation of social order which we cherish. Observation of legitimacy through successes and failures of the organizational issues and as such it should be considered

Analysis of theoretical findings, imbued with practical examples of the capabilities of public administration to cope with crisis, points to the opposition of organizational solutions that are designed to operate under normal circumstances and the possibility of applying these solutions in the crisis situations. It follows that the ability of public administration to respond to the challenges of the crisis, is reflected in the degree of adaptability to new circumstances. Implementation of this simple form has proved quite complex. Phenomena that were eventually rooted in everyday activities of the public sector have variable usefulness for crisis situations. Some of the features of Bureau-political behaviour make it difficult to deal with critical events, while the other proved to be very useful. The dilemma between centralized and decentralized models, which is present in the everyday activities of the public sector, becomes more pronounced during the crisis. Analysis in this study indicates the need for different

approaches. There is no model that would be a priori accepted or rejected but it is necessary to create a flexible system that will be able to identify and implement any model to suit the circumstances. However, it seems that the tendency to routines is the largest problem of public administration in dealing with crisis. Burdened with the procedures, public administration becomes sluggish and inflexible versus crisis that is often sudden and variable. To improve readiness for crisis situations, the public administration in most cases need to give up routines and to develop policies that would enable the detection and correction of errors in procedures.

The core claim that elected leaders are part of a much broader mechanism, which should cope with the crisis and not an independent power, is proved to be correct. By passing through most of the challenges that face elected officials in times of crisis, we perceived that their action is influenced by many other factors. The position of a leader is determined by the will of citizens and thereby citizens affecting behaviour of elected officials in a crisis. Expectations of citizens often depend on how the leaders present circumstances. This may be significant because spontaneously formed expectations without sufficient information, may be contrary to the best interest the society. This is linked on the specific role of the media that, with their influence can often change the course of events. Therefore, the establishment of genuine cooperation at a reasonable distance, between the leaders and the media is crucial for dealing with critical events. Public bureaucracy as part of the capacity part of the capacity in which the leader disposes in dramatic moments also has an impact to the strategic decisions. Ideally, public bureaucracies and elected leaders should be compatible with each other but in practice the relationship can be range from vassal to the competitive. To this should be added the different stakeholders and political opponents whose attitude and interests remain almost unchanged regardless of to the critical circumstances. As expected, the elected leaders are the most reliant on their own experience and attitudes. Such a subjective approach is a common cause of errors thus in designing a social system which is facing a crisis should bear in mind those high-level politicians has personal limits as everyone else.

The paper points out to the possible overvaluation of decision making in critical situations. Elected leaders often act as coordinators rather than decision makers. Crisis management in the public sector implies a series of activities that involve numerous actors. Even in a fully centralized system it would not be possible to make and

distribute so many decisions. Operational decisions are made at different levels and to the leader is coordination of activities and making rare strategic decisions.

Overall, the role of elected officials in a crisis situation is torn between the different extremes. On one side is a threat that could negatively affect to the whole society on the other there is an opportunity to implement major reforms. In relation to the public, elected officials are between the expected, possible and required. Activities carried out during the crisis may turn leaders in national heroes, but also may mark the end of their careers. Generally speaking, the role of elected officials in critical situations is not necessarily crucial but it is certainly complex.

The final chapter in which has been analyzed several cases points to the agreement of theoretical knowledge and practice. It also indicates to changeable nature of the crisis does not allow application of the theory as a prescription for dealing with crisis. Considering that crisis is an inexhaustible source of new circumstances, proactive upgrade of knowledge, regardless of whether it is a theory or lessons learned may be considered as necessary.

## **5.2. Conceptual Observation**

Some general conclusions were imposed during the work on this paper. These conclusions can be seriously reflected in practice and their significance requires treatment at some future research.

First, it seems that are study of crisis management in the public sector is very burdened by ideological approach. Most literature in crisis management deals with organizational issues through the conflict of different solutions such as planning versus trial-and-error learning, hierarchical versus decentralized, private institutions against the institutions in state ownership and the like. The aim of crisis management is to remove or reduce the negative impacts of the crisis and not to find justification for use of ideologically acceptable solutions. In crisis management simply have no room for dogmatic approach.

Second, the focus of crisis management studies in public administration is to find the application of existing institutional and organizational framework. It seems that we need to accept the fact that democratic institutions, such as we know, are not designed to deal with crisis situations. The complexity of upcoming crises requires

redesigning of public institutions. Probably it is better to deal with it before the dramatic events then wait for institutional reform to be motivated by the consequences.

Third, it seems that the role of high-ranking leaders and leadership in general, is overestimated. Practical examples of crisis situations show that the ability to implement complex strategic features is much demanding then process of decision making.



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